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ABSTRACT  
   
Naming and naming practices take place at various sites associated with 
international politics. These sites include border crossings, migrations, diasporas, town 
halls, and offices of political parties representing minorities. This project is an 
investigation of these and other sites. It takes seriously questions of names and naming 
practices and particularly asks how people participate in these practices, often doing so 
with states and state authorities. It not only looks at and discusses how people proceed in 
these practices but also assesses the implications for people regarding how and when they 
can be at home as well as how and where they can move. Through an ethnography of 
Aegean Macedonians involving interviews, participant observation, and archival 
research, I find that naming practices occur well beyond the sites where they are 
expected. Names themselves are the result of negotiation and are controlled neither by 
their bearers nor those who would name. Similarity of demonyms with toponyms, do not 
ensure that bearers of such demonyms will be at home in the place that shares there 
name. Changes in names significance of names occur rapidly and these names turn home 
into abroad and hosts into guests. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
Aerodrom is a municipality full of modern blocks of flats with retail space on the first and 
basement floors and residential units on the higher ones. It is located just to the East of the city 
center, known as Centar Municipality, on the southern, predominantly ethnically Macedonian, 
side of the Vardar river. While sitting on the terrace of a café on a boulevard named after a 
Macedonian partisan shot dead by Bulgarian occupiers towards the end of World War II, 
journalist and former philosophy professor Dimitar Chulev recounts an episode from his life.  
 
He was born in Romania to ethnic Macedonian refugees of the Greek civil war. After moving 
back to Macedonia and becoming a journalist, Dimitar was sent on assignment to the region of 
Romania he had lived as a child. Returning to his native village, to his old neighborhood, he met 
a familiar old lady. In her younger years, she had lived in the apartment below his. Recognizing 
her, he went and introduced himself as little Dimitar. What followed next was an intense 
negotiation. The old woman insisted he could not be Dimitar because Dimitar was a little boy 
and he protested that he was indeed that same Dimitar whom she had watched play football from 
her window. Dimitar told me that it was then that he realized that there was no way to prove that 
the name really belonged to him. There is no biological test, no ultimate sovereignty that can 
finally say, and convince an old lady, once and for all that a name, be it Dimitar, Danish, or 
Dominican Republic, really represents the object that stands before you whether it is in the form 
of a man or whether it is a formless nationality or nation-state. 
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THE PROMISE OF THE NAME  
Names promise a lot. Through a claim to represent that to which they are linked, they offer a 
sense of permanence and continuity in a world of change and decay. While I may not be the 
same person I was as a boy, my name remains the same. Governments change, populations are 
entirely replaced over time, and institutions dissolve themselves. Yet, the name that pretends to 
represent that government, that population, and those institutions can continue unchanged and 
can persuade us to speak as though the stuff it claims to stand in place of remains intact. At least, 
it grants an air of equivalence in the face of much difference. Thus France, the kingdom of Louis 
quatorze, the Republic of Napoleon Bonaparte, and the current member of the European Union 
can be represented as a single entity continuing through time. When we think of England, we can 
imagine Elizabeth I sending out her sea vessels to discover the world. Just as easily, we can 
imagine Margaret Thatcher sending hers to the Falkland Islands. The author of both of these 
events can be referred to by the name England. Even where it is considered that a particular state 
has ceased to be, the name can still be recalled and offers a continuity after death so to speak
1
. 
Although the referent of the name Soviet Union is considered to no longer exist, through the 
name, we can still refer to it. Its history continues to be written.  
 
                                                 
1
 Jean-François Lyotard and Georges Van Den Abbeele, “The Différend, the Referent, and the Proper 
Name,” Diacritics, Vol. 14, No. 3, Special Issue on the Work of Jean-Francois Lyotard (Autumn, 1984),  
3-14, 10 
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In addition to the colors on a political map of the world, it is the names that would divide the 
Earth. Names “attempt to order and structure the chaos and flux of existence.2” While the 
bounded hues territorialize sovereignty, power, and identity, it is the names that differentiate 
between sovereignties, powers, and identities. Over time, names offer us durability and, over 
space, they profess external difference and internal identity. The external difference that names 
indicate, difference between states, regions, towns, and seas endow us with the sense that we can 
set off from here and go to there. We can then return to our starting point and we will really have 
come home, to the same place we left from. This is especially true if we bear a name that is 
identical or similar to that of the place to which we return. For example, if I am ‘northerner’ 
returning to the north or, as in the case we will discuss, a Macedonian returning to Macedonia 
then it will seem obvious that we have returned home.  
 
As we carry our own name with us, we know that, when we do return, we will be able to 
represent ourselves as the person who left and we will be able to speak to our old friends who 
will know us by our name. It is this contrast between the continuation of our name and the 
changing of the name of the place we are in that underpins our conception of movement. After 
we return to our friends, we can tell them that we really went to another place, one with a 
different name. We can describe the place to them knowing that they will be able to go there too. 
                                                 
2
  Dale Spender, Man Made Language ( London: Routledge, 1980), 84, quoted in Sara Mills, 
“Caught Between Sexism, Anti-sexism and `Political Correctness': Feminist Women's Negotiations with 
Naming Practices,” Discourse & Society 2003 14: 87. 
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The place continues to exist as its name remains unchanged. To go there, our friend will key in 
the name of the place into a GPS and follow the directions.  
 
In this project, I argue that names, whether they be those of individuals, ethnic groups, or states 
fail to deliver on this promise of lasting homogenization and differentiation. They fail on several 
accounts. While names make claims to a representation of identifiable physical structures, the 
lack of a sovereign center to finally fix that name to the thing for which it is taken to be a proxy 
allows room for the play of fractured sovereignty. The multiplicity of names that result from this 
dispersed naming power are not interchangeable but refer to overlapping and overhanging 
spaces. This means that we are not simply considering rival names for some single immutable 
being. Rather, since the name has a constituting property, the deficit of an authoritative name 
throws open doubts of existence. The lack of a recognized nominator inhibits any sort of decision 
on what or who gets a name, how far in time and space the label extends, and how we may verify 
the name.   
 
This project, rather than simply show a failure of the name to keep its promise, is an exploration 
of the clash between those who would overcome this failure, who would finally fix the doubt and 
fill in the room for play, and those who are able to use the ambiguity that it creates to go on with 
their lives
3
. Those who would govern, who would name, and thus divide and preserve order 
                                                 
3
  Richard Ashley, “The achievements of post-structuralism” in International Theory: Positivism 
and Beyond, eds. Steve Smith, Ken Booth, and Marysia Zalewski, (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1993), 244 
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attempt to create practices to fix names to states, peoples or individuals. The practices are 
designed to give substance and consequence to names, to underpin the verifiability of names. 
While these goals will not be achieved without significant cooperation from those who would not 
want to do so, practices are not controlled by one voice and vary in the subject positions that are 
available in them,
4
 they are nevertheless goals that are pursued. Others, whose goal is not to 
govern but to escape governance, or to escape an inconvenient or undesirable name, are 
sometimes compelled to participate in these practices. My question specifically then becomes, 
when compelled to participate in these naming practices, how do women and men, whether they 
claim to act in their own name or that of a collectivity,  use the ambiguity that is present due to 
the impracticability of naming, in order to resist the fixing of an unwelcome or inconvenient 
name.  
 
As well as investigating this inevitable back and forth between effected order and blatant 
disorder, I want to make a qualitative, political point about the natural ambiguity at play in 
names. As already alluded to, it is this gap in certainty that often allows people to go on living 
their lives. With a side-by-side existence of alternative names, where the final decision is 
indefinitely postponed, the people involved can continue to peaceably enjoy the privilege of 
thinking in terms of that name. Alternative realities coexist. Attempts at final decisions regarding 
                                                 
4
  Roxanne Doty, "Aporia: A Critical Exploration of the Agent-Structure Problematique in 
International Relations Theory,” European Journal of International Relations 3.3 (1997): 365-392, 385 
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the reality or authenticity of seemingly rival names are invariably violent. However, while 
violence against an individual or a certain piece of infrastructure can achieve its goal, violence 
against abstracts, such as a name, cannot. Therefore, any decision to use the necessary coercion 
to decide once and for all a correct name becomes perpetual. In the following chapters, the 
violence used will vary qualitatively. However, in terms of deciding the name, it will always fail. 
It may serve to make people’s life more difficult and will kill some. It will never be sufficient to 
stop the oscillation between names though. Alongside my argument that people will find ways, 
even in the violent practices designed to fix a name, to carry on with another name in defiance, is 
this argument that allowing them to do so is qualitatively less violent.  
 
NAMING CONFLICTS IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS 
But the name and naming has long been an issue for relations between nation-states. Perhaps the 
most famous and currently salient issue of naming and resistance to naming in international 
relations is the dispute between Greece and the Republic of Macedonia. Since its independence 
from Yugoslavia, declared in 1992 with general recognition the following year, the Republic of 
Macedonia has been locked in a dispute with Greece over the use of the name ‘Macedonia’. On 
8th April 1993, the United Nations admitted “the State whose application is contained in 
document A/47/876-S/25147
5” to membership and, for convenience, designated that the State 
                                                 
5
  U.N. General Assembly, 98th plenary meeting. Resolution 47 (1993) [Admission of the State 
whose application is contained in document A/47/876-S/25147 to membership in the United Nations]. 
1993. http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/47/a47r225.htm accessed 11/15/2012. 
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would be “provisionally referred to for all purposes within the United Nations as the former 
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. [FYROM]
6”   
This did not end the dispute over the name and, almost a year later, the conflict escalated. In 
February 1994, then Prime Minister of Greece, Georgios Papandreou, imposed a trade embargo 
on his new northern neighbor with the aim “to force Gligorov's [President of Macedonia] 
government to become less intransigent in the UN negotiations [on the name and related issues] 
and to alert foreign governments which were losing interest that this was a vital but still 
unresolved issue.
7” Alert them it did and the European Commission, with the backing of EU 
member-state foreign ministers referred Greece to the European Court of Justice for taking 
“unilateral measures towards FYROM aimed at preventing trade through the port of Thessaloniki 
of goods coming from or going to FYROM as well as the import into Greece of  products from 
FYROM.
8” 
 
The Greek government objects to the use of the name Macedonia by the country to its north. 
They insist that Macedonia “is a Greek word9” and that “it refers to the Kingdom and civilization 
of the ancient Macedonians, who belong to the Greek nation and constitute an incontrovertible 
                                                 
6
  Ibid. 
7
  Nikolaos Zahariadis, "Greek Policy toward the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, 1991-
1995." Journal of Modern Greek Studies 14.2 (1996): 303-327,  314 
8
  European Commission - IP/94/278   06/04/1994, The Commission decides to refer the Greek 
embargo of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia to the European Court of Justice 
9
  Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “The question of the name of FYROM,” 
http://www.mfa.gr//to-zitima-tou-onomatos-tis-pgdm/ accessed 11/15/2012.  (my translation) 
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piece of Greek historical and cultural heritage.
10” While they place parts of the ancient kingdom 
in “the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, in Bulgaria, and in Albania,” they counter that 
“its largest part is found in Greece.11” The case that the Greek government is building against the 
use of the name Macedonia by its neighbor is presented as one of historical fact. This appeal to 
the writers of legitimate history is an appeal to what some would consider a sovereign center – 
the sovereign center of history. The article calls “the concept of a ‘Macedonian nation’, which 
has been cultivated systematically through the falsification of history.
12” Doing so, it creates a 
boundary between the sovereign center of legitimate history (the one that affirms the Greekness 
of Macedonia) and the periphery of junk history or falsified history which affirms and 
strengthens the position of that sovereign center. 
 
This move is an attempt to bound the possible meanings linked with the name Macedonia. It is a 
bid to limit meaning to names also associated with the name Greece. The view taken by the 
Greek government in this case is that there are authoritative (historical) sources that can 
determine the proper use of names. Not all meanings that are ascribed to a name are legitimate. 
For the government of Greece, there are ways to limit the meaning of names that we have said 
have infinite meaning. For them, appeals to history can be made to decide the legitimate use of a 
name. Not any old history is relevant though, judgment is also required to discern between 
history and ‘falsified history’. This in itself is an attempt to limit the meaning of the name 
                                                 
10
  Ibid 
11
  Ibid 
12
 Ibid (my emphasis) 
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history. This inevitably leads to a politicization of the meaning of the name Macedonia. With the 
lack of a sovereign center to finally decide the limits of the meaning of Macedonia, the name 
refers us to a boundless plethora of meanings. These meanings, in the context of nation states and 
national sovereignty align themselves contradictorily and a negotiation is established between 
‘Greek’ meanings and ‘Slavic’ meanings of the name. 
A further justification for this name dispute offered from the Greek side is captured in the words 
of Ambassador Manolis Kalamidas to Greek scholar Nikolaos Zahariadis. The latter reports the 
ambassador, a foreign policy advisor to current Prime Minister but then Foreign Minister 
Antonios Samaras, as saying: "Recognizing Skopje under the designation Macedonia plants the 
seed for future turmoil because it allows Skopje to harbor territorial claims and pursue them at 
some future date when international circumstances are more favorable.
13
" This explanation, 
however improbable such a situation might be, goes some way to showcasing the significance of 
naming in international relations. For the ambassador, there is a tangible and real link between 
the name Macedonia and a piece of territory. The connection is so strong that, despite obvious 
disparity in capability in favor of Greece, the use of the name Macedonia by another nation state 
is in and of itself a security threat to a much larger, richer, better connected, and militarily more 
powerful state.   
 
                                                 
13
 Zahariadis, 312 
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The Macedonian government sees the conflict over the name as “irrational.14” Moreover, at least 
publically, the ruling VMRO-DPMNE party frame the matter as a technical one connected to 
entry to NATO and the European Union
15
. Solving the name issue for the Macedonian 
government is not to reestablish a fundamental historical truth but to come to a pragmatic 
agreement. The governing party does, however, place further significance on a possible 
resolution to the name issue. In pursuing such a resolution they insist that they will not “accept 
ideas or proposals that would endanger the Macedonian national identity, distinctness of the 
Macedonian nation and Macedonian language.
16” This endows the naming of the state with the 
potential to alter the ontological makeup of the nation and its language. As already mentioned, 
the name affords its referent a distinctness from all other states that do not bear the name. For the 
Macedonian side, the sovereign center of history is not cast in the chief role in this circumstance. 
The name itself becomes a sort of authority for them though. Altering the name can alter the 
fundamental identity of the nation that claims to bear it and threatens to fold its people into an 
indefinite mélange of peoples.  
 
If the disagreement between Greece and Macedonia about the name is the most famous one, it is 
not the only one to have taken place. The Republic of Ireland has gone through a process of 
naming and renaming over the course of the 20
th
 century that is described by British-Irish studies 
                                                 
14
 Macedonian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Goals and Priorities,” 
http://www.mfa.gov.mk/?q=node/411&language=en-gb accessed 11/19/2012 
15
 VMRO-DPMNE, “Electoral Program of VMRO-DPMNE 2011-2015: The Next Steps Forward”, 
http://hostiraj.info/vmro-dpmne/wp-content/uploads/documents/Manifest_za_reformi_i_razvoj.pdf, 190 
16
 Ibid 190 
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scholar, John Coakley
17
. Following the removal of the King from the politics of Ireland in 1949, 
the government in London preferred to call the newly freed Ireland the Irish Republic. On their 
part, Dublin designated their president President of Ireland. The British rejected this on the basis 
that it seemed to claim the province of Northern Ireland, which, after all, was Ireland too. A 
president of Ireland, for the British government, suggests a leader who would be a president of 
the whole island. So again we encounter a system where a morphologically different name is 
preferred by one side in the dispute in order to differentiate between two sovereignties.  
A compromise was nevertheless struck between the British and Irish government.  As a result, in 
international treaties between the two sides, rather than agreeing to an identical document, and 
thus having the heads of state and government put their own names on documents referring to 
names that were an anathema to them, the sides agreed to sign documents that differed only in 
the names given to the various territorial entities.
18
 Thus, representatives of the London 
government took home a treaty between the ‘United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern 
Ireland’ and the ‘Republic of Ireland’. Dublin’s government would leave with a treaty between 
‘Ireland’ and the ‘United Kingdom’. This arrangement lasted until the Good Friday Agreement 
in 1998. The agreement was the first one signed between the “`the Government of the United 
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland' and `the Government of Ireland.'
19”  
 
                                                 
17
 John Coakley, “‘Irish Republic’, ‘Eire’ or ‘Ireland’? The Contested Name of John Bull's Other Island,” 
Political Quarterly; Jan2009, Vol. 80 Issue 1,  49-58 
18
 Ibid., 53 
19
 Ibid., 54 
12 
 
 Before the agreement, the designation Irish Republic was favored by two groups. The traditional 
Irish Republicans, inspired by the Fenian 32-county republic saw this historic ideal in the name. 
Their historical opponents, the British government also preferred this nomenclature. For the Irish 
Republicans the ‘Irish’ in Irish Republic united the island. The whole territory was Ireland and so 
the republic was one for all living on the island. For the British government, it was the 
‘Republic’ part of the name that was important. This divided the island of Ireland between 
Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland
20
.  
This double understanding of the name ‘Republic of Ireland’ emphasizes how names in 
international relations cannot be decided by a sovereign center. In this example, both Irish 
Republicans and British nationalists favour the same name for different reasons. There is not 
independent meaning to the name and thus there is no decision as to who is rightly pleased with 
the name, the Republic of Ireland. Rather there is a constant contradiction that is made possible 
by an understanding that Irish Republicans and the British government are enemies and that no 
appeals can be made to an outside authority for clarification regarding the authoritative owner of 
the name. The contradiction functions when the enmity is understood and when the two parts of 
the name Irish and Republic are esteemed differently in proportion to each other by the 
conflicting sides.  
The name ‘Irish Republic’ is not remarkable in the context of the state system where other 
entities hold similar names. The ‘French Republic’, the ‘Italian Republic’, and the ‘Hellenic 
Republic’ all share this style of name. While they seem natural and fit into what is understood 
                                                 
20
 Ibid., 57 
13 
 
about the nation-state, the Irish and British case really shows how the combination weakens the 
strength of the meaning of the constituent words. The ethnic adjective in these formulations 
promise universality. It is a republic for all the Italians, all the French, or all the Hellenes.  
However, where the noun ‘republic’ refers to a state with control over a geographic territory, as 
it is prone to do, then the appeal to the nation is limited. Assuming that Italians outside of Italy 
participate less in the Italian Republic, the promise of a republic for Italians is stymied by their 
geographic distance from the territory. In the Irish example, the British can rest safe in the 
knowledge that the Irish Republic, as a geographically defined entity does not reach the Irish 
living in the province of Northern Ireland even as the Irish Republicans revel in a republic for all 
Irish. 
 
Often, the process of naming is depicted as being the act of a sovereign. Ludgar Mülle-Wille 
explains the naming of the Canadian Eastern Arctic in these terms. His story is one of rival 
sovereignties one native to the land and the other conqueror from Europe. In Nunavik, a 
Gazetteer was produced that contained indigenous place names from around the region. This was 
then put to a council of elders for approval. Following the approval of the Inuit Elders of their 
Gazetteer, the Avataq Cultural Institute appealed to the Commission de toponymie du Québec 
for recognition of the name ‘Nunavik’ for the region. Permission was granted. Building on this 
success, 2,200 further Inuit toponyms were approved by Canadian authorities. Commenting on 
this success, Mülle-Wille concludes “within a few years, the aboriginal Inuit place name system 
14 
 
has been transferred into written tradition at an equal level with the encroaching exogenous place 
names of mainly French and English origin.”21 
 
In the short example above we see sovereign centers consulting and agreeing upon how to name 
places. The Inuit Elders give their approval to a Gazetteer prepared in order to preserve the oral 
traditional toponyms. Their approval is not final however and recognition is sought from the real 
sovereign, the Canadian authority. While the Gazetteer claims to be a collection of names 
already in use to refer to the places, there is apparently still a requirement for confirmation of the 
identity of these places from the commission which is set up to govern such names. The reasons 
that these indigenous names did not belong to the places as much as the exogenous ones is 
because they had not yet attained the level of written tradition which is guarded by the sovereign 
government. The role that naming plays in claims of sovereignty and rival sovereignties starts to 
become apparent. The appeal to a sovereign center, whether it be an independent historical 
record free of falsification or a board of people set up to decide the undecidable names, is a 
common one that nevertheless fails to finally decide.  
 
Nevertheless, what must be taken into account in the above example is that, in order for those 
names to come about and to be approved by the council of elders, they must, at some level have 
preexisted that procedure. In other words, for the names to final make it into the Gazetteer, they 
must first have existed without the book. No doubt, these names existed as alternatives to the 
                                                 
21
 Ludger Mülle-Wille, “Place names, territoriality, and sovereignty: Inuit perception of space in Nunavik 
(Canadian Eastern Arctic),” Société Suisse des Americanistes. Bull 53-54. 1989-1990, 19 
15 
 
ones in the Gazetteer that they replaced. The names that they replaced did not cease to function 
either. Though presently unfavored by the authorities, they forever exist alongside the official 
names. Under another set of political circumstances they may again become official themselves. 
However, this is not a requirement. Those original names continue to exist alongside the newer 
names. They provide enough ambiguity to maintain questions about the identity of the place, the 
people living there, and movement through those places.  
 
THE REGION OF MACEDONIA AND ITS DIVISION 
 
Recognizing that it is useful to delimit certain named spaces that will feature in the discourse of 
this project, I now endeavor to do so. Before such a distinguishing of parts, however, I must 
recognize an inability to escape from a to and fro of competing narratives, none of which 
completely control the scene. The imposition of names to these parts pretends to exert control 
over the landscape. Such control, though, is always temporary, extremely temporary, so as to 
render effectively vain any claims of a successful ordering. With this in mind, this caveat that 
any order I impose at this point will be undone in its very doing, following an account of 
another’s attempt to order space, I offer a description of my territory.  
 
16 
 
Above the village of Zrze in the municipality of Dolneni, Macedonia
22
 sits a monastery. The 
monastery is staffed by young monks, who, among other work, tend a garden on the site. The 
garden, which sits on the edge of a dramatic cliff and overlooks the plain of Pelagonia was the 
site of an explication given to me by one of the inhabitants of the monastery. The monk 
explained that the plain I was looking at was the plain of Patagonia
23
. The villages on the plain, 
including Zrze, had a long history and had farmed the rich land and enjoyed unrestricted 
communication with one another. It extends all the way south past Prilep to Lerin, which the 
Greeks call Florina. The border with Greeks dissects the plain and controls communication 
between its two sides.  
 
Despite the lofty view we shared of this fertile valley, the judgment that the monk, endowed with 
all of the authority that the Macedonian church could offer, made on the valley was one of many. 
One may further endow the description of the space with the strength of physical geography. The 
flat plain contrasted sharply with the craggy mountains surrounding it. However, his ordering of 
space cannot make any serious claim to universality. As soon as he spoke of the valley as 
separate from the mountains,  
                                                 
22
  This municipality can be seen outlined in Map 2. It is the black-colored area. It features the area 
around Prilep which can be found in the center of the Republic of Macedonia. On Map 1, Prilep can be 
found in the middle of the red-colored section.  
23
  Map 2 is designed to show this plain. Its northern extent coincides with the municipality of 
Dolneni, which is colored black on the map. The plain extends southward between Krusevo and Prilep. 
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separate from the other valleys across those mountains, he entered into a spatial politics that 
may, at that very incident, have been contradicted from another monastery across the valley 
where a monk was explaining the division and conflict between villages.  Of course, this is not to 
say that this other, imagined version of the space was any accurate a representation. The main 
problem, and a problem taken seriously in this work, is that there is never one controlling 
narrative that orders space in a way that is not disputed.  
 
While the boundaries of the region of Macedonia are constant source of controversy, they can be, 
and usually are, roughly delimited so as to focus attention on the area widely understood to 
constitute Macedonia. As well as the contested outer boundary, there are borders within the 
region that divide it along current nation-state boundaries
24
. By their nature, these state borders, 
while not completely without dispute
25
, are nonetheless more generally accepted than the outer 
boundary which often does not line up with a current, legal border. In this section I describe the 
geographic labels that I use in this project to discern peoples and lands. Specifically, I define the 
region of Macedonia, and its subdivisions: Vardar Macedonia, Pirin Macedonia, and Aegean 
Macedonia. In doing so, I recognize that these are politically charged terms. Indeed, I was once 
asked not to mention the name ‘Macedonia’ in a presentation in Thessaloniki despite the fact that 
both people with a Greek nationalist outlook and those with a Macedonian one would agree that 
the city is a Macedonian one. However, in the interests of clarity, and of setting up the difference 
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that I will eventually argue is simultaneously active and non-active depending on politics, I offer 
this brief definition of terms.  
 
The part of Map 1 on page 2 colored in red, blue and green is one representation of the region of 
Macedonia. Rather than see the above graphic as the superimposition of order upon unordered, 
or otherwise ordered, space, I would conceptualize it otherwise. What appear to be layers on the 
map are not, in fact layers. They are not an attempt to slice up the world horizontally. Any such 
attempt would imply either that the lower layers are either foundational or subliminal. In order to 
guard against the perception of privilege to any of the non-layers, they must be considered to be 
at once there and not there – more like a line made of infinitely small points with infinitely small 
spaces between them than  geologically- modeled layers. Because these points and spaces take 
up infinitely small space and are arranged alternately you can allow for a space to really mean 
three different things all at the same time. It is all Macedonia, it is the intersection of several 
modern states, and it is the meeting of three different Macedonias. This is not an offer where you 
get to choose one of the options. The space is synchronously filled by multiple competing 
meanings and is nevertheless not full because it is open enough to allow for other political 
impositions of meaning. It is upon this basis that the rest of this project really depends. While I 
will go on to describe the terminology of the above meanings that I have encountered in my 
conversations and readings, I can in no way guarantee any of them as the correct, current, or final 
interpretation. As we will see, such names are negotiated at every second and in every situation. 
The geography of Macedonia, its extent and its internal divisions and the Macedonia of 
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geography, its situation in the world, its relationship to other political entities, as infinite even as 
these are, continue to be written, continue to be negotiated. Even our monk, looking out from his 
position of seeming privilege on top of the mountain with his claims of theocratic authority, is 
thwarted by the politics that goes on in the villages below.  
 
This region is situated in the southern Balkans and consists of all or part of the territory governed 
by five modern nation-states. It somewhat corresponds with the area occupied by the three early 
twentieth century ‘Macedonian’ vilayets of the Ottoman Empire. These were Kosovo, which 
contained modern day Skopje, Monastir, which included the area around modern Bitola, and 
Salonica, oriented around Thessaloniki
26
. Bordering this region, and indeed claiming parts of it 
as their own territory, are the states of Bulgaria to the East, Serbia (and Kosovo) to the North, 
Albania to the West, and Greece to the South.  
 
The map above is intended to define the use of three geographic designators that are important to 
my project. The different colored regions on the map represent the partition of Macedonia into 
the territory of three modern nation-states. The green region is known as Pirin Macedonia and is 
the small part of Macedonia that is in Bulgaria. The blue region is known as Aegean Macedonia 
and, in terms of modern, Greek administrative areas, comprises part of East Macedonia and 
Thrace, the whole of Central Macedonia, and the whole of West Macedonia. The red region is 
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known as Vardar Macedonia and constitutes the whole of the Republic of Macedonia as well as 
small parts of Albania and Serbia. 
 
Pirin Macedonia, which is so named after the mountains that dominate the region, has had 
varying degrees of autonomy and recognition of its Macedonian minority.
27
 It is currently 
designated by contemporary Bulgarian authorities as Blagoevgrad Province after its principle 
city. Other cities in this region include Goce Delchev and Sandanski, named after heroes of the 
struggles in the region against Ottoman rule. These individuals are national figures in both 
Bulgaria and Macedonia and appear in the national anthem of the latter. Very little of what is 
covered in this project takes place in this region and Pirin represents the smallest of the three 
divisions of Macedonia spoken of here.  
 
The part of the region named Vardar Macedonia is roughly equivalent to the present day 
Republic of Macedonia. It takes its name from the river that runs from the northwest to the 
southwest part of the state. That same river runs through Aegean Macedonia, where the Greeks 
call it the Axios, and empties into the Aegean near Thessaloniki/Solun. It is in this part of 
Macedonia that many of the Aegean Macedonians finally settled. Vardar Macedonia became 
constituted as the Peoples Republic (and then the Socialist Republic) of Macedonia as a 
constituent part of Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia following the end of the Second 
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World War
28
 and around the time that Aegean Macedonia, as part of the Greek state was 
overcome by civil war. As I shall further explain, chapter three is an investigation of how 
refugees from the Aegean part of Macedonia were received here in Vardar Macedonia and to 
what extent this constituted a return home from their refuges in Poland, Hungary, Romania, 
Czechoslovakia, and other third countries.  
 
Aegean Macedonia, so named because of its Aegean coastline, is the part of Macedonia which is 
now under the control of Athens. It constitutes the largest section of the Macedonian region and 
is the birthplace of the people to whom I refer in this project as Aegeans or Aegean 
Macedonians. The Macedonians who were born here, or who have strong family connections to 
the area, play the main part in this dissertation. The largest city is Thessaloniki which is 
considered the co-capital of Greece by the Greeks and is historically the largest and most 
cosmopolitan city of the Macedonian region and historically has been an important seaport in the 
region. It is the contemporary crossing from Vardar to Aegean Macedonia and the application for 
birth certificates that I consider in the second chapter of this project. The fourth chapter, that 
focuses upon events in the 1990s in Florina/Lerin also takes place in this part of Macedonia. The 
city is located in the west of Aegean Macedonia not too far south of Bitola which is featured on 
the map above.  
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EXILE OF THE AEGEAN MACEDONIANS 
 
This project concerns itself chiefly with people who were born in the Aegean part of Macedonia 
that I have described above. While population exchanges resulting in the exile of Macedonians 
from Aegean Macedonia have been taking place for some time, I concentrate on persons 
involved in a specific iteration of this expulsion of Slavs from the region. In this section I carve 
out an Aegean Macedonian population based on the experience that they had in the final stages, 
and following, the Greek Civil War. I begin in the summer of 1948 when, under the orders of the 
Greek Communist Party and with the help of the Red Cross, they leave their homes and villages 
in Aegean Macedonia and are evacuated to, what they often refer to as, the democratic countries 
of Eastern Europe. Indeed, the term Egejci, for which I use the English translation Aegeans, is 
often reserved exclusively for the refugees of the Greek Civil War
29
 and not those who may have 
left the region as a result of prior pressures.  
 
After recounting some of their experiences in these other countries, we then return with them 
back to Macedonia, Vardar Macedonia. While not everyone who can be referred to as Aegean 
Macedonian actually made this trip – some of them remained in the democratic countries, some 
went to Australia and Canada, and others went directly to Yugoslavia - the people on whose 
stories and on whose company I have relied on in the writing of this work mostly did. This 
section, then, outlines the circumstances in this movement and thus designates a group of people 
with this shared background.  
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It was bombardment from the Greek monarchist forces, who were supported by Britain and later 
by the United States that forced the evacuation of Aegean Macedonian villages. Donka 
Piskaceva –Gruevska lived in the village of Setina, now found under its Greek name Skopos, 
halfway between Lerin (Florina) and Voden (Edessa) about 2 miles from the then Yugoslav-
Greek border. She describes bombardment that forced her family and her across the border: 
 
There followed a terrible bombardment over the village…in a panic the whole village 
was fleeing toward the border…On the main road a column of exhausted and frightened 
villagers formed…In a short time everyone reached the border each thinking only of his 
life. 
Then at the border we heaved a sigh of relief, happy that we were alive and sure that 
there was no bombardment.
30
  
 
Other than this impromptu evacuation, which resulted in the old people and young children being 
admitted to Yugoslavia and the older children and adults being sent back to fight as partisans, 
there was a more organized and orderly removal of children from the war-torn area.  In March 
1948, approximately eighteen months before the close of the Greek Civil War, the leadership of 
the Greek Communist Party (KKE) announced its plan to evacuate children between the ages of 
three and fourteen from the warzone of northern Greece
31
. The children, in groups of twenty-five 
and led by a ‘mother’ assigned to them from the village women, walked across the mountains 
and into Bitola in Vardar Macedonia. From there, they were placed on trains, often not knowing 
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where they were going and sometimes separated from siblings, that eventually arrived in Poland, 
Czecholslovakia, Hungary, Vojvodina in Yugoslavia, Romania, and Bulgaria. Around twenty-
eight thousand children were evacuated from the theatre of the Greek Civil War in this way.  
 
In the countries of their new hosts they were housed in the palaces of the pre-war aristocrats, in 
army barracks and other locations. They were known as ‘Greek children’ and there was often 
little distinction between those of Macedonian ethnicity and those of Greek heritage. At school, 
all the child refugees studied together and the only opportunity for difference was that they were 
allowed to choose between a Greek literature class and one in Macedonian literature. In fact, 
local teachers and others responsible for the children were often ignorant of the distinction. One 
of the people I interviewed, who was evacuated to Poland, related a story that happened as she 
was learning the local language at school. At one point, her teacher asked her why she could 
pronounce the Polish language so well and her classmate Eleni had such a hard time. The 
informant explained that she was Macedonian and thus a speaker of a Slavic language. Much of 
the Polish vocabulary was similar to the language that she had spoken at home with her parents 
in Aegean Macedonia. On the other hand, Eleni was a Greek and her native language very 
different from Polish. Eleni was learning a completely new set of vocabulary. 
 
This event does not only show how the refugees were housed and educated together without a lot 
of regard to ethnicity. It also shows something of a negotiation of identity. My informant used 
the difference perceived by the teacher to negotiate a negation of her membership in the 
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community of ‘Greek Children’ and to construct, in that moment, in the context of that class, and 
with that teacher, a Macedonian identity based on a Slavic background she shared with her 
Polish teacher. Part of the goal of this project is to highlight moments where these negotiations 
of identity take place and show how they are ultimately temporary and circumstance specific. 
Nevertheless, as shown here in the exchange between teacher and pupil, individuals, even 
children, have plenty of scope to negotiate an identity even with a host government.  
 
Friendships between Greek and Macedonian children were common. One story published by the 
Association of Children Refugees from the Aegean Part of Macedonia tells of two girls, one 
Greek one Macedonian, sent to Czechoslovakia. Vaska Petrovska explains “In the train we were 
together the whole time, and when we arrived, together with the other children we were placed in 
[a] shelter for old people, Macedonian refugees after the defeat in the Civil War. Since then we 
never separated from each other, we went to learn Czech language together.” According to the 
story, they remain friends to this day and, since Vasilika Damjanidi doesn’t speak Macedonian, 
they converse in Czech.
32
 
 
It was agreed at a general meeting of Communist Parties in Bucharest in November 1953, five 
years after the organized evacuation of Aegean Macedonia by the KKE, that the democracies of 
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East Europe would assist the reunification of families divided by the exile
33
. Family reunification 
involved the children moving to various countries including Canada, Australia, the USA, and, 
closer to home, FYR Macedonia, Greece
34
, and Bulgaria. The fourth chapter of this project deals 
with those who returned to Macedonia and asks the question of whether or not this was a 
homecoming.  
 
OUTILINE OF THE THREE CASES DEALT WITH IN THIS PROJECT 
 
The rest of this project continues as follows. The second chapter is a discussion review of work 
that already deals with names. It offers a theoretical background to the further study of names 
and naming in the context of this project as already outlined.  
 
Chapter three deals with a journey I took with Aegean Macedonians back to the villages of their 
birth. It takes place on a bus travelling towards the international border between the Republic of 
Macedonia and Greece, or Vardar and Aegean Macedonia, next to Lake Dojran. From the border 
crossing, the bus carries its passengers, many of whom were born in this part of Macedonia, on 
to their various villages. From their villages we go to town hall after town hall in an attempt to 
apply for certificates of birth for the native Aegeans on the bus. This chapter is a record of the 
events that took place on this trip. Specifically, it deals with the ambiguity of names, the 
possibility that is left for play and resistance to attempts at fixing identity, and the impossibility 
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of showing once and for all that a person is really the name that they are given. It also serves as a 
testament to the difficulties faced by Aegean Macedonians who wish to return to their places of 
birth. The narrative is based heavily on my own eyewitness account of the two days spent with 
these people on the bus, in their villages, and in hotels where they were once at home. It is put 
together from notes made at the time and from memories of the events.  
 
Insofar as chapter three tackles issues of identity, chapter four deals with problems of movement 
implicated in names and naming. It takes place as the Aegean Macedonians, displaced as 
described above, return from their exile to Macedonia. Is this really a return though? In response 
to this question, I introduce my concept of political movement. Some Macedonians from the 
Aegean part of Macedonia left their places of refuge in Romania, Poland, Hungary, and 
Czechoslovakia and travelled to Skopje in the Socialist Republic of Macedonia. To what extent 
could this be said to be a return to Macedonia? Through investigating this point I elaborate a 
theory of political movement by exploring the capacity of a name to join home space. As well as 
to join space, how does the name bridge time?  
 
In chapter five, we deal with an incident in the Aegean part of Macedonia that occurred in 
September 1995. Incited by a sign that displayed the name of their town in both the Greek and 
Cyrillic (Macedonian) script on the headquarters of the Rainbow Party, local townspeople, led by 
the mayor and other dignitaries, stormed the headquarters and confiscated the sign. The incident, 
and the ensuing court case where senior members of the party were charged with inciting 
28 
 
violence, is used to explore attempts to decide the undecidable, the decision of the name. It 
investigates originary violence which, being used to decide the undecidable, must then be 
forgotten and hidden under the order of law. It is in this chapter that we take a close look at the 
failure of violence to decide the name and the tenacity of oscillation.  
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CHAPTER 2 
WHAT IS IN A NAME? 
As stated in the opening chapter, this project is an investigation into names and naming practices 
and what impact these practices have on some issues of world politics. The topic has received a 
good deal of attention from geographers, often in the context of place names, philosophers, 
sociolinguists, and anthropologists. Their studies have been concerned with who can name, what 
functions a name performs, and what names are. In international relations, despite the fact, as we 
saw in chapter one, that names and naming have long been implicated in relationships between 
nation states, study of the issue of names and naming seems to have been mostly left to 
international lawyers. While the now historic turn in international relations to a bigger role for 
language opens wide the door for an application of names and naming into issues of world 
politics, names and naming have not been a main theme of study in international relations theory.  
 
This chapter will bring into detail the theory that is introduced in the introduction chapter. Names 
and naming are scenes of conflict and cooperation where states engage with one another and 
with national peoples that they would claim to represent. Not only are these actors agents in 
these engagements, they are made and remade during these negotiations that constantly occur. 
Britain, without making a claim to act in its own name, a name that has been spoken and heard 
and written and read in international relations for a very long time, without claiming to represent 
the interests of a British people, cannot function as a nation-state in international relations. It is 
through making these appeals to be recognized as the correct bearer of its own name that it enters 
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into our imagination as a state that has existed for two hundred years or so. Through its name, 
and the naming of some as British we can imagine that it is this large group of people acting 
through the nation-state. Britain becomes its name as it celebrates historic events related to its 
namesakes in the past, as it keeps and breaks agreements that other Britains have entered into. 
These negotiations with the international community, and with its own people, both ask the 
world to agree that it really is the same Britain that has always existed and restricts its actions to 
actions that reinforce its claim to the name. This is what makes names and naming so important 
to our project. 
 
These struggles govern citizenship, movement, trade, and other world politics related themes and 
so are legitimate points of focus for international relations scholars. On that basis, the chapter 
continues with a reading of various texts on naming taken from the fields mentioned above. This 
provides a basis from which we can explore some of the themes of names and naming and 
consider what they might say about the themes and topics that I have said are relevant to 
international relations. Following this initial review of some of the naming literature, I set about 
developing the claims I have already made about names and naming with the help of work from 
Jacques Derrida and Jean-Francois Lyotard.   
 
One of the more fundamental debates surrounding names and naming is what the connection 
between a name and the thing it names is and so we will start by looking at this. Next, I take a 
preliminary look at the instability built into names themselves. At that point I will concentrate on 
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translation and look at this instability as a problem for nation-states. Following this introduction 
to the instability of names, I look at some of the qualities that names ascribe either to the named 
or to the namer itself. In this section I will look at, among others, the qualities of possession and 
security in relation to naming. I then move on to the violence of naming and consider Jacques 
Derrida’s reading of Levi-Strauss. Following this I return to my theme of instability within 
names themselves. I look at Jean-Francois Lyotard’s discussion of the name as the lynchpin of 
reality and show, with this model, how the name fails to hold up reality.   
 
DARTMOUTH AND THE FLOWING FOUNDATIONS OF NAMES 
Ethnographer Susan Bean concludes that proper names are fundamentally indexical.
35
 That is, 
names belong to their bearers and are not dependent upon the presence of any defining 
characteristics. In this, she agrees with J S Mill who, more than one hundred years ago asserted 
that Dartmouth, were the mouth of the river Dart to be dislocated by earthquake, would continue 
to be called Dartmouth even though it might no longer be located by the mouth of the Dart.
36
 
This conception of the relationship between name and named suggests that the named doesn’t 
have to prove itself to be the name it bears. It does not have the wherewithal to do so if it wanted 
to. Correspondingly, should a rival to the named come and attempt to prove its right to the name, 
it would have no means to accomplish this. For example, a rival city wishing to claim the name 
Dartmouth would profit nothing from claiming to be situated at the mouth of the Dart. Proof that 
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it was so situated would bestow as much right to the name as any other city not so placed. 
Further, Dartmouth College can get away with its name despite being located on the banks of the 
Connecticut River with no proximity to a river Dart or, for that matter, the mouth of any river.    
 
The important implication of this sort of conception of a name is the one already stated. If there 
is no way to prove that the name belongs to one state or another, one nation or another, then 
there is no restrictions on what a namer wishes to call a city, a state, a people, or anything else 
for that matter. We see some of the consequences of this in European enlargement debates 
involving non-European countries in the Maghreb and, to some, Turkey. The fact that the 
organization is called the European Union does not prevent speculation that non-European 
countries can be involved in it. In fact it would be difficult to argue that the whole of the 
European Union as constituted is really European. French Guinana which, as an overseas 
department of France, is part of the European Union is located some five thousand miles from 
the European continent and yet we can still refer to a European Union. With the ability to refer to 
states and international organizations by any name comes the reality that there can be no proof 
that a state, for example, really is the name they say. There are no foundations upon which to 
judge such a claim.  
 
Somewhat to the contrary, John Searle argues that these foundations can be built 
intersubjectively. Through his theory of institutional facts,
37
  he suggests something of a 
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foundation for names. Institutional facts are, for Searle, epistemically objective because there is a 
general acceptance that It is his assertion that meaning is collectively ascribed to a symbol to the 
point that it becomes an institutional fact. While the existence of a touchdown in football, which 
is one of the examples he uses, is ontologically subjective, it is dependent upon the perceptions 
of humans, we can still objectively say that one team scored 3 touchdowns and the other 2. The 
thing that interests us here is that he asserts that “the symbolization has to carry the deontic 
powers, because there is nothing in the sheer ontological facts that carries the deontology by 
itself
38.” Following this proposition, while Dartmouth does not necessarily need to be at the 
mouth of the Dart, it is nevertheless factually linked to its name because the collection of people 
who live and work in the town are known by many others to inhabit Dartmouth. This, he claims, 
creates an objectivity that is not ontological but is an objectivity. Here I take toponyms, names 
given to places, as being somewhat comparable, perhaps a subset, of these symbolizations. 
Doing so, we can read Searle as claiming that the power of states to demand allegiance, to 
require specific treatment at the hands of one another, in Searle’s words, their deontology, lies 
not in any physical attributes we may attribute to them – population, military, history, culture, 
territory for example, but rather in their name, in their symbolization and the acceptance of this 
at the hands of others. Where I find difficulty with Searle’s account of institutional objectivity is 
that it assumes a community who understand the phenomenon in the same way.  It is necessary 
to his assertions that a phenomenon has the same significance to all members of a group. He also 
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assumes that these understandings are consistent enough over time that they constitute an 
objective reality.  
The indexical understanding of a name does allege a spacio-temporal relationship of sorts, 
though. This relationship is between the name, namer and the named
39
. At one point, when the 
name was bestowed upon the named, the two were spatially and temporally proximate. This was 
achieved at a baptism or some other ceremony more or less formal. In colonial times when 
European explorers went abroad over the seas, we can imagine them setting foot on a beach and 
at that moment naming the land. Certainly, it took more than a single proclamation on a 
seashore, it took journal entries and picking an appropriate name that would be adopted by the 
powerful. However, once someone has been to the far away island and called it a name while 
there, we can use the name to refer to the named despite the distance between us who are uttering 
the name and the island that we consider named thus
40
. This prompts further questions. How 
close, temporally or spatially, must one be in order to successfully name? Is any place a valid 
place to perform a naming? Can anyone do this or is it restricted to certain nominators? 
Ultimately though the answers to these questions are limited to people who have been proximate 
to the named and who have performed some sort of naming ceremony. 
 
CHALLENGES TO REALIZING STATES AND THEIR NAMES 
If the connection between name and named is unstable then the bindings within the name, those 
that connect the name to itself are themselves only superficially strong. By this, I am writing 
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about the internal integrity of the name. One of the things that really undermines that integrity is 
language difference. I said that Searle relies on a universal significance of each name within a 
group and a difference in language undermines the slightest pretense at this.  For Evangelos 
Kofos, a well respected Greek scholar who has involved himself both academically and 
politically in his country’s name dispute with Macedonia, names are not equivalent across 
languages. He notes the difference in meaning attached to the nouns Μακεδόνες and it seeming 
Slavic equivalent Македонци. While in English we would hold these two words of equal value 
translating them both as Macedonians, Kofos points out the difference in meaning between the 
two.  For him, Македонци are citizens of the republic of which Skopje is the capital and a 
million and a half local Slavs. Μακεδόνες41, on the other hand, are the two and a half million 
ethnic  Greeks living in the Greek region of Macedonia
42
. This illustrates the instability caused 
by translation
43
 of the name Macedonian which is given to two peoples considered, by many, to 
be unrelated.  It is unstable because we cannot guarantee that when the name is used that we 
know which people we are referring to. We already know that it is not possible to prove which 
people really are the Macedonians – Dartmouth doesn’t have to be at the mouth of the Dart. So, 
we have at least two distinct groups with that name and no real way to say which is really the 
true Macedonian. 
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It is easy to see how the preceding example impacts the heart of international relations theory, 
the nation-state itself. If a name can describe two at a time, that is at least enough to cause 
confusion and to bring the self-identity of states into serious question. If it is just the name that 
distinguishes between states then the separation of states is a flimsy affair. It isn’t only names of 
nations or states themselves that are important in the crafting and maintenance of states though. 
Sometimes other types of names interfere with statecraft. One example of this is in the naming of 
the sea between the Korean peninsula and the Japanese archipelago. With the occupation of the 
peninsula by Japan in the early 20
th
 century, the name of the sea that Koreans had known as the 
East Sea was changed, in the absence of any Korean representation to the International 
Hydrographic Organization, to the Sea of Japan
44
. Not only was Korea reoriented into a sea 
bearing the name of its neighbor-occupier, but the humiliation affected the first line of its 
national anthem invoking God to protect Korea: “Until that day when Mt. Baekdu is worn away 
and the East Sea's waters run dry.” The restoration of the name Korea to the list of nation states 
(in its two forms) was not accompanied by a renaming of the Sea of Japan. Korea’s protests 
about the name of the sea really betray an impotence in the face of this undesirable name. It is a 
weakness that speaks to the question of who can name that has to do with proximity. Being on 
the shores of the sea, both Korea and Japan are as physically proximate as possible to the sea. 
However, it seems that Japan’s success, and Koreas failure, in the naming of the sea is in the 
hands of others.  
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NAMES AND THEIR POWER TO BESTOW QUALITIES ON NAMER AND NAMED 
While this foundational truth of a name is elusive, the correct connection of a toponym with its 
ancestral source has been known to bring authority to those recounting such etymologies.
45
 In 
Kuipers study of the Weyéwa on the Indonesian island of Sumba, authority to perform an 
important ceremony hinged on the ability of one of the villagers to recount the story of how the 
village got its name. The descendents of the main protagonist in the story were the ones 
responsible for leading the feast
46
. This relies on a name having an origin and a meaning linked 
to events that can be recounted. Had the villager sung his account and, instead of accepting it, his 
fellows had complained that the story belonged to another place, authority to perform the 
ceremony would have still been in question. Whether or not the name of the village has any 
foundation that can be independently verified, the ability of one to control the name to the point 
that they can convince others in the community that their account is correct enables him to 
assume a position of responsibility.  
 
In their study
47
 of the naming of Victorian fishing boats, those used to fish in Victoria, Australia 
that is, Dwyer, Just, and Minnegal argue that the namer matters. Names of the boats reflect either 
the personal affiliations or the intentions of those who name the boat. Overall, these names serve 
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to socialize the sea upon which these vessels perform their functions.
48
 In arguing this they offer 
a rebuttal to the work of those who claim that proper names are without meaning beyond a label 
for the thing named. Affiliations of the namer of the boat were most common. Names of wives 
and children predominated this sort of name giving. The second most popular method of naming 
was what the authors termed Hero-Classical. These names did not come from any personal 
connection between the boat owner and the boat. These names reflected the hopes that the boat 
would enable the operator to catch a certain type of fish or that the boat itself would become a 
great hunter like Nimrod. 
 
To this point we have mostly looked at the unverifiable nature of names and naming and have 
said that because names have no certain foundation, there is no clear way to tell what a name 
should or should not be, to what or whom a name really always refers, or even who can name 
and when they can name. Despite the lack of foundation for names, they play an important role 
in world affairs. As I will explain in this section names promise a lot. They allow us to order 
international society and to inscribe states and nations into culture. Names allow these ideas to be 
spoken and written and thus allow the attribution of qualities, not least the quality of ownership 
and belonging, and ideas to states and people, naming plays a role in security and allows 
confusing jungles of the unfamiliar to be cleared. Names also perform the role of a right -the 
right of self expression, the right to say who you are. These roles are not exhaustive but they 
form the basis for the rest of this section.  
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Names order society by replacing the named with the name and thereby introduce the named into 
the order of culture
49
. The name allows the named to be written about and spoken about. It 
allows the named to become the theme of songs, studies, and films. In international relations it is 
the name that we find on lists of United Nations members, on military uniforms, and 
international trade treaties. In so far as recognition of states is the basis of their existence, and 
since all states are recognized as the rightful barer of their name, the name is intimately wound 
up in the very existence of states. It is difficult to imagine a state existing, much less 
participating in international relations, without being inscribed into culture by its name. Much of 
international relations is conducted by names and on behalf of names. One does not have to read 
far into international treaties before one is faced with a list of the names of signatories. It is the 
name of a state that allows it to be party to these agreements. It is this representation which 
allows it to be included in international affairs.  
 
Part of being inscribed into culture, of being attributed qualities, is that the name can become a 
locus of power where control of it, assuming such a possibility, can give control of the qualities 
attached to the name. In the Puccini opera Turandot and the German folktale Rumpelstiltskin we 
see the control of a name connected with great rewards, the same can be observed in accounts of 
relations between states. Kofos, for example, insists that: 
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Whoever monopolizes the Macedonian name might well claim title deeds to whatever is 
associated or defined by that name: the history, the culture, the peoples as well as the 
entire geographical region of Macedonia
50
.  
 
He further explains: 
In an indirect way it [whoever succeeds to impose upon foreign languages its own 
version of Macedonian’] lays claim to anything identified as ‘Macedonian’, diverse 
‘Macedonian’ historical and cultural values, even commodities from different 
Macedonian regions or countries
51
. 
 
Names have a serious role in international relations then. First of all, names package a range of 
goods –histories, cultures, peoples, regions, and commodities. Thinking of names as fulfilling 
this sort of a function, though, raises some complicated questions. What if more than one name is 
attached to a certain object? And then, if one subject claims one of the names, and another the 
other, then with which do the title deeds reside? How can we discern which things are identified 
as Macedonian in order to claim them?  
 
Secondly, the ability to control the use of the name, to claim the name as one’s own exclusive 
property, is to capture all of those goods associated with the name. It isn’t quite that simple, 
though. To claim the name, to possess the rights to it, it is necessary to you to convince others, 
those who speak another language to enact your version of the name, your claim to the name, in 
their own language. Claiming a name has to be endorsed by a community but, in the few 
examples we have already encountered in this work, it is plain to see that unanimity is rarely if 
ever achieved in these issues. Therefore, and this is key to this project, ownership of a name is an 
end that is never reached. One of the main practical contributions of this dissertation to 
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international politics and, in particular, naming disputes is that it shifts away from trying to 
figure out who rightfully owns the name – which is impossible – to taking interest in the 
maneuvers and plays actors take in order to move towards control of a name.  
 
This theme of ownership is taken up in Pricilla Parkhust Ferguson’s reading of Paris Street 
names
52
. Commenting on the literary culture of Paris and the corresponding proliferation of 
streets named after French authors such as Voltaire and Victor Hugo, Ferguson writes as though 
the writing of one’s name on the street confers an ownership: 
 
Voltaire, Montaigne, Victor Hugo, and Balzac have their streets in the prestigious, central 
sections. With a boulevard, a quai, a rue, a cite, and an impasse Voltaire can claim 3.7km, 
which rank him second only to the 4.3km of the rue Vaugirard
53
. 
 
For Ferguson “nomination makes a fundamental gesture of possession54” so artists who have 
streets named after them in some way own the space. The location of the name of the artist in a 
prestigious central location endows that artist with prestige. An analogue in world politics might 
be the physical location of an embassy. The building which bears the name of foreign states can 
occupy space that is closer or further away from seats of government. Taking London as an 
example, Canada House and South Africa House are located in Trafalgar Square at the bottom of 
the Mall, the processional street that leads up to Buckingham Palace. The Palestinian mission, 
however, is quite a distance outside of  London’s inner ring road. Canada and South Africa enjoy 
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the company of names such as Whitehall, Trafalgar, Nelson, Westminster, Charles I, and St 
Martin. Palestine, in comparison, finds company in Hammersmith and the ubiquitous King St.  
 
If we consider the bearers of names as somewhat belonging to the name, or belonging to the one 
that can control the name, then name choice can be an act of resistance to that ownership or 
acquiescence to it. Shobhana Chelliah explains how, in the Indian subcontinent, speakers of 
Meithei show support or opposition to continuing political integration with India through use of 
personal names. Those supportive of Indian political authority, but who cherish pre-Hindu 
identity, move fluidly between pre-Hindu name forms and Hindu-influenced name forms. Those 
oppose India use exclusively pre-Hindu name forms for one another
55
. 
 
The question of who possess the named opens several possibilities though. For Kofos, we could 
say that there are two types of possession when it comes to the name. The first is that some 
things (culture, space, states, people) belong to the name in that they are identified by it. This 
primary possession is fully realized in a secondary possession where those who control the name 
lay claim to everything that the name possesses. Those controlling the name can perhaps be said 
to be the namers. They are not that in the same way that a priest baptizing a baby is. They are not 
the first ones to proclaim the name. Rather, because a name is never fully conferred, never 
complete and final, those that Kofos worries about controlling the name are those who speak and 
write the name. They are those who participate in the ongoing process of naming. He, and 
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anyone else who wants to finally fix a name, are right to worry about changes in meaning of the 
name. This is unpreventable. Ownership then, belongs to the name and those who participate in 
naming. In the case of the street names, we talk about the owner of the street as a person who 
shares the name of the street. The one who shares the name is not the one that makes the decision 
to name the street. On the other hand, he is in some ways still the namer. He gives his name, and 
all that is attached to it to the street, the street perhaps takes on the qualities that belong to the 
name – literary ones maybe or royal ones.  
 
Along with implying possession either by the namer of the of the place or by the one who shares 
the name, names can also be used to bring qualities other than possession. One example of this is 
the deliberately misleading naming of Greenland which “played a role in the political economy 
of place promotion
56.” In the context of the argument about whether a place name has 
significance beyond its indexical one, this property of naming has something important to say. 
While Greenland is not particularly green, and so the name really does apply without being an 
accurate descriptor of what it names, there is some intention to make it green in the minds of 
would be immigrants. The name is not attached to physical qualities of the land but it is intended 
to convey on the landscape a veil of fertility and hospitality and in so doing perform physical 
qualities.  
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Another quality that names are said to be able to bestow upon a place is security. American 
forces in Baghdad transformed the foreign capital into an analogue of a North American city by 
altering the names of streets, airports roads and localities
57
. The goal was a military one. As 
Rose-Redwood et al. explain:  
 
with a more familiar set of toponyms at their disposal US soldiers were better able to 
navigate throughout Iraq and ‘pinpoint locations’ of potential interest.58 
 
Names are able to familiarize the foreign. Endowing unfamiliar places with familiar names can 
facilitate navigation and control over an area. This picture casts names as a powerful 
transformative force that alters a place. It shows how the qualities of a place can be adjusted 
through the practice of naming. This situation also shows that names need not necessarily be 
universally used in order to effect such a transformation. Presumably, the Sunnis in Iraq went on 
calling the parts of the city with the names they had used under Saddam Hussein. Maps were still 
bought and sold with those Arabic names inscribed on them. Nevertheless, to the American 
soldiers, the city was transformed from an incomprehensible spaghetti of unintelligible words, to 
straight forward city of the plains, a Kansas City complete with its own Main Street. It was 
changed thus, chiefly through the use of naming practices.  
 
The above discussion of the Americanization, for the benefit of the US Army, of Baghdad 
shouldn’t lead us to accept a straightforward account that implicates the name in a sort of 
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obvious cultural hegemony backed by military or economic superiority. Yurchak, in his 
account
59
 of the renaming of the St Petersburg public space following the fall of state socialism 
in the Soviet Union offers a nuanced account of the imposition of seemingly foreign names. He 
dismisses the thought that new names of shops and cafes in St Petersberg (e.g. ‘Luxury’, ‘City’, 
‘Smile Market’) were merely importations of English speaking market economies. Rather, these 
new names are “the result of the interaction between these different cultural materials and 
histories…a production of something quite new.60”  These new names performed several 
functions. They performed a radical change from the Soviet naming system which was tightly 
controlled and predictable, they represented the change as desirable and legitimate, they claimed 
credit for this radical change for the authors of the name (the business owners), and they created 
a group of private business owners and clientele by publically representing them
61
. This account 
endows the authors with quite a lot of agency and sees them able to make their own name, to 
create themselves through a name. It also affords them the ability to radically change the public 
space, much like the Americans did in Bagdad except here in St Petersburg, the effect is more 
general.  
 
As well as a relationship between place names and the physical qualities of a location, names in 
the international system of states are seen as rights. States are said to have a right to a name. For 
lawyers, a name is a legal identity in the absence of which a state will “lose its capacity to 
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conclude agreements and independently enter into and conduct its relations with other juridical 
persons. Therefore, the name of the state appears to be an essential element of its juridical 
personality and its statehood.
62” The name animates the state by providing a personality that 
allows the state to interact with other personalities, other states, individuals, corporate entities, 
etc. Only in the performance of these interactions does the state exist. So, the name is an 
essential element of statehood.  
If a name is essential to statehood, it apparently does not follow, in international law, that a 
change in name, even one brought about by a complete change in form of government, 
constitutes a change in the nature of the state. A state undergoing such a change is nevertheless 
the inheritor of all the rights and duties it took on under its old name
63
. As well as a change in 
name over time, a phenomenon that has happened more than forty times since 1982
64
, state 
names are multiplied by the official languages in their home country and in the UN, by the 
considerations of shortened versions of the official names, by acronyms, two letter country 
codes, and commonly used nicknames
65
. So, what I might refer to as Spain might be just as well 
designated: The Kingdom of Spain, Reino de España, es, l’Espange, etc. The multiple names in 
this case do not usually signify more than one state. It may be appropriate to assume, that for 
international lawyers, a state can be animated one time and that the name that breaths legal life 
into a state is immaterial. This view of names clashes somewhat with Kofos’ argument that 
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Makedonci and Makedones are different peoples despite the fact that they are, respectively, the 
Macedonian and Greek translations of the English Macedonian.  
 
THE VIOLENCE OF NAMES 
 Coming to see names as a right held by people, nations, and states somewhat hides the violence 
of names and naming. By inviting states to take up their rights to a proper name, we invite them 
to commit violence against themselves. One of the later chapters deals with some physical 
violence related to naming but here, with the help of Jacques Derrida, I outline what I am talking 
about when I refer to the violence of names and naming. The process of naming is itself violent 
as it encodes the professed particularity into a system of relations of difference. The following 
account is a description of three violences inherent in naming. 
 
The account of these violences is taken from Derrida’s reading of Levi-Strauss.  
 
There was in fact a first violence to be named. To name, to give names that it will on 
occasion be forbidden to pronounce, such is the originary violence of language which 
consists of inscribing within difference, in classifying, in suspending the vocative 
absolute. To think the unique within the system, to inscribe it there, such is the gesture of 
arche-writing: arche-violence, loss of the proper, of absolute proximity, of self-presence, 
in truth the loss of what has never taken place, of a self-presence that has never been 
given but only dreamed of and always already split, repeated, incapable of appearing to 
itself except in its own disappearance.
66
 
 
The right to be named, the right to one’s own name is the right to inflict this first violence on 
oneself. As mentioned earlier in this chapter, the name is the means by which the named is 
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inscribed into culture. We now come to see the full implication of what we mean by culture. We 
see culture cast as a system of difference, in fact the system of difference mentioned by Derrida. 
The existence of the subject simply as itself is impossible. Only with inscription into the system 
of difference through a linking and juxtaposition of the name with other names does a subject 
come into view. It is a paradox that only by negating the absolute identity of the subject, and this 
is the violence of which Derrida first talks, by defining it against other identities, can a subject 
come into being. Being named then is the loss of what was never possible in the first place – a 
self-present self identity. A name is a mechanism for being comparable with others, it is a 
technology of socialization.    
This inscription into difference means of coming into being deemphasizes the role of the one 
who names. For Searle, institutional facts could come about independently of other institutional 
facts. There simply has to be broad intersubjective agreement about what constitutes, to use 
Searle’s own example, a touchdown. Searle does not claim that the touchdown comes into 
existence by entering into a system of difference with other institutional facts like a field goal, a 
kickoff, a try (in rugby), a goal (in soccer), etc. It is enough that some knowing subjects bundle a 
set of ontological facts together with the name ‘touchdown.’ For Searle, there is no violence 
against the self-identity of an institutional fact which can stand for itself. As there is no first 
violence of naming in Searle, there is not then a second or a third which we now go on to 
discuss.  
 
49 
 
The second violence is “reparatory, protective67” and “prescrib[es] the concealment of 
writing.
68” In Derrida’s reading of Lévi-Strauss, this violence is the concealment of the proper 
name of the people of the Nambikwara culture amongst whom it is forbidden to use the proper 
name. In issues of world politics, the name itself is not often hidden. Names of states, as we have 
already said are really what allow them to fully participate in world politics and hiding it would 
be almost unimaginable. While names are not hidden, the violence of names and naming is 
covered over. This is a concealment of writing even if not in the way that Levi-Strauss observes 
it in the Nambikwara. The concealment of writing in international relations amounts reveals 
itself in the discourse of self expression. In terms of states, this self expression takes the form of 
having other states recognize your state under the name of your choosing. While this promises to 
exalt your identity to the pantheon of nation-states, it actually binds you into a system of 
difference where any self-identity is unintelligible.  
 
Concealment of writing enables the commission of a third violence which “consists of revealing 
by effraction the so-called proper name, the originary violence which has severed the property 
from its property.
69” In other words, this third kind of violence takes place once something has 
been named and after that name has been concealed. It is the revelation of the first violence, the 
violence of naming which inscribed a subject in the system of difference. The above paragraph, 
the one that reveals the concealment of writing could be offered as an example of this sort of 
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violence then. Inasmuch as it discredits the self-identity of states, it reveals the inscription of the 
state into the system of signs and the resulting loss of properness. Work that reveals the system 
of states as a hegemony of status-quo interests that allows change within the system but fights to 
prevent the disintegration of the state system performs this third violence.  
 
NAMES AS THE LYNCHPIN OF REALITY 
Part of the first violence mentioned is the movement to fixity. The inscription of the name into 
the system of difference promises to bring a stability to named, it promises to place the name in 
its proper context and to create something like an institutional fact as described by Searle if by 
different means. Jean-Francois Lyotard describes how names act to form an illusionary fixed 
reality.  Lyotard shows proper names acting as a form of deictic that appear fixed through their 
invariability. Instead of referring to ‘here,’ which changes to ‘there’ as the speaker moves, we 
have a place name (e.g. Macedonia) which remains the same irrespective of the position of the 
speaker or writer. Names “transform now into a date, here into a place, I, you, he into Jean, 
Pierre, Louis.”70The name is the lynchpin.71 For Lyotard, names make reality. Adapting 
Lyotard’s examples for our Macedonian purposes, an ostensive statement here is Macedonia is 
not enough for reality, neither is the descriptive Macedonia is the land of Alexander. Not only 
are both types of statement required but it is required that ostension, the here is Macedonia part,  
and meaning, the land of Alexander, be linked. The proper name fulfills this function by 
replacing the deictic, a word whose significance is dependent upon the context and the position 
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of its utterer, in this case ‘here’, in the first sentence with the name Rome. Then you explicitly 
connect the deictic with the descriptive. Thus we have This is Macedonia, the land of Alexander. 
There seems to be here a fixing of the landscape not unlike Searle’s institutional fact. We have a 
meaning attached to a stable place by a proper name. Unlike the violence outlined in Derrida, 
there seems to be no negation of the subject as self identical.  
 
In the formation of this fixed reality then, it is required that the name have some meaning to it, 
some significance. However, following Bean and Mill, we have already discussed how names 
are not anchored to any foundations in their meanings. We can therefore begin to see many 
different meanings attached to one name without any way to decide which are the more 
appropriate. Indeed in such formulations as:  Macedonia is the land of Alexander, the modern 
Balkan nation-state, the former Yugolslav Republic, the environs of Thessaloniki, the land that 
the Vardar River runs through, the region of Greece, the place that exports Ajvar, etc. there is 
usually no inclination to choose between them. And, because all there is to be said has not been 
said about Macedonia, or any other place, the meaning of Macedonia is infinitely variable.
72
  
 
Despite the immutability of the name itself, it doesn’t lose the variability of the deictics in whose 
place it would stand. Paraphrasing Lyotard, “[Macedonia] is an "image" of many heres 
actualized in many phrases
73” So Macedonia is the ‘here’ where Alexander the Great was born, 
the place I conducted my research, and the place where many Aegean Macedonians live. Insofar 
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as naming does enable a fixed reality, it is one that is limited to an image fractured by its own 
multiplicity. Names, in fact do not, cannot, and should not follow the “principle attributed to 
Antisthenes: one name per referent, one referent per name,
74” Macedonia, and any other 
toponym refers to an infinite number of heres – exactly as ‘here’ does itself.  
 
This infinite meaning is not polysemous but rather a case of dissemination. IJsseling explains the 
difference:  
Polysemy refers to a multitude of meanings that are essentially governable and 
controllable. The many and different meanings can be determined and registered. 
Dissemination is about the phenomenon that the production of meaning is never fully 
controllable.
75
  
 
An example would be useful to illustrate the difference and its implications for those who would 
more clearly demarcate the boundary of the name Macedonia. An example of dissemination 
though is difficult. Writing at all, in acknowledgement of dissemination, is a difficult task. When 
meaning is not fully controllable there is always the possibility, even the probability, that some 
of what I am trying to convey about dissemination is lost to the reader. However, by way of 
example, take the following statement from the Greek Ministry of the Exterior: 
Historically, the term “Macedonia”, which is a Greek word, refers to the Kingdom and 
culture of the ancient Macedonians, who belong to the Hellenic nation and are 
unquestionably part of Greek historical and cultural heritage.
76
  
We can take this as an attempt to control the meaning of the name, Macedonia. The Greek 
authorities are attempting to limit the use of the name to, what seems to them, a specific 
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historical context. This shows that the author has a polysemous view of the name. It has many 
meanings but through careful writing we can control the meaning and limit it to one specific 
meaning. Understanding this term under the auspices of dissemination tempts us to look for ways 
that their definition of the word escapes the boundaries set for it. We can show that the term 
Macedonia gets out of control even in this careful statement.  
 
So, even with the careful attempt to control the meaning of Macedonia in the sentence above, 
there is still room for play and doubt. First of all, the qualifier ‘historically’, allows us to imagine 
that perhaps what follows in the statement does not apply anymore. Either that or, outside the 
discipline of history, the statement tells us nothing. Next, while we are told that Macedonia and 
Macedonians are ‘Hellenic’ or ‘Greek’ this does not foreclose the possibility that the Republic of 
Macedonia, in its present configuration, is Greek or Hellenic itself. We could understand, if we 
rely on this description alone, that Greece is welcoming the Macedonians into its own national 
community. After all, the Foreign Ministry leave us alone to decide what Greek and Hellenic 
mean. Are they synonyms? Do they only refer to the current Greek state? What about Asia 
Minor? If it could include the Pontus region could it not also include the state they call FYROM? 
We see Greek cultural and historical heritage everywhere don’t we? We see Washington, DC 
decked out in full neoclassical splendor. What is therefore different about the relationship of 
Macedonia to Greece? Since they are only talking about Macedonia, ‘the Greek word’ is it 
possible that there is another word, Makedonija for example, that through its non-Greekness 
escapes from this definition? Is Macedonia really even a Greek word? It is pronounced 
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differently from the word that is usually used in Greek which would be transliterated Makedonia. 
Which ancient Kingdom of Macedonia does it refer to anyway? There is not a scholarly 
consensus of what the ancient kingdom of Macedonia really constitutes.  
 
The questions and comments on that small statement by the Greek Foreign Ministry is supposed 
to partly display the openness even following an attempted narrowing of the meaning of 
Macedonia. Since even the Greek government who are skilled writers and have a strong 
inclination to do a good job of narrowly defining the name Macedonia cannot fully close the 
possibility that the Republic of Macedonia is Macedonian, the argument for dissemination over 
polysemy is a strong one.  
 
So, what we adapt from Lyotard here is a boundless bound. On the one hand, the name, with its 
immutable quality is the lynchpin of reality, the differentiator of one it from another. On the 
other hand, because the name must be linked with a description as well as a deictic, and because 
the potential descriptors with which the name can be linked are unending, the name contains 
unmeasured meaning. This paradox is an important one for this project. The boundless part of 
the concept allows play, while the bounded part demands, and promises, order. We are left with a 
fractured reality, one where the name does and does not operate to divide and define the world. 
Even when it operates, it is only able to point us towards infinite meanings and ask us to decide 
ourselves. Not only is the signifier Macedonia filled with many possible values, none more real 
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than another, we also see an emptiness where yet more value awaits attachment. The history of 
Rome continues to be written. 
 
The name, as a function of difference, can never stand for itself, on its own merits. While we 
have spoken about the name receiving meaning, it can only exist in opposition to other names. 
Jacques Derrida asks whether or not proper names, kept secret, unknown even to the bearer, can 
represent themselves, can stand on their own feet. His answer is that such a name cannot exist in 
a pure form, there is no proper idiom. “if an idiom effect or an effect of absolute properness can 
arise only in a system of relations and differences with something else that is either near or far, 
then the secret proper name is right away inscribed-structurally and a priori-in a network where it 
is contaminated by common names.
77”This contamination with common names is important to 
Derrida because he is about to claim that “the proper name bears confusion in itself…to the 
extent to which it can immediately become common and drift off course toward a system of 
relations.
78” It is this problem that one attempts to overcome with the ostensive, the this, you, this 
one! The ostensive is accompanied by some sort of a gesture pointing to the place or person that 
we intend the proper name to refer to. How do we ensure though, that the gaze of the other is 
drawn towards the correct it of this is it? It is a problem we have already encountered in this 
chapter, it is a question of how people attempt to prove that they really are that name, that the 
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name, as a quasi-deictic points uniquely to them. Of course, it is impossible, but there exist 
important practices that are set up to perform exactly that illusion. 
 
This discussion of the name as a replacement for the deictic omits the temporality of naming, its 
process. Temporality of naming is important to this project too. Part of the appeal of the name is 
a promise, or, in the terms of semiology, a deferred presence. The structure of “classical 
semiology
79” “presupposes that the sign, which defers presence, is conceivable only on the basis 
of the presence which it defers and moving toward the deferred presence that it aims to 
reappropriate.
80” In the terms of world politics, a name of a state or a nation refers to the bearer 
of the name despite the fact that the state itself can never be present. A state or nations name is 
the instantiation of an entity that we can never be in the presence of.  An abandoning of this basis 
of presence leads Derrida to conclude that “the signified concept is never present in and of itself, 
in a sufficient presence that would refer only to itself. Essentially and lawfully, every concept is 
inscribed in a chain or in a system within which it refers to the other, to other concepts, by means 
of the systematic play of differences.
81” What I want to add to this aspect is in some ways its 
inverse. What happens to this chain of difference when the difference in the sign is effaced by an 
identical signifier. How big is the sign? Can it contain all the difference within itself that is 
affixed to the name France. If we take my adaptation of Lyotard seriously, and if signifiers, in 
this case names, are attached to an infinite and growing meaning, and if we substitute that 
                                                 
79
 Jacques Derrida, Margins of philosophy, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984), 9 
80
 Ibid., 9 
81
 Ibid., 11 
57 
 
meaning for the signified of the sign, how can the difference between signs be separated from the 
difference within them? 
 
 For example, Let’s see the United States as an isolationist country and an interventionist one as 
invited to do so in two newspaper stories dating from the past twelve months.
82
 This attaches 
these two seemingly contradictory values to one name, the United States. Now, let us assume 
that x is an isolationist state and y is an interventionist one.  State x and State y are fictional, self-
identical one and there is a clear difference between them, one is isolationist and the other 
interventionist. There is no difference within them and so their respective names represent an 
internal identity and external difference. Let us now compare our simplified
83
 United States to x 
and y. We find that the United States is the same as x and the same as y. It is internally 
differentiated and identical to two states bearing different names. If the name United States 
means the things we have been invited to believe it means then it fails to create a self identical 
unit that is easily differentiated from x and y. To the extent that it is possible, I take up this 
question in chapter 4.  
 
In Babel, the proper name is a place for gathering but is confounded by the inability to establish 
a precise referent. God punishes the people “for thus having wanted to make a name for 
themselves, to give themselves the name, to construct for and by themselves their own name, to 
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gather themselves there…, as in the unity of a place, which is at once a tongue and a tower, the 
one as well as the other, the one as the other.”84 This analysis opens up a vision of a name as a 
refuge, somewhere to dwell, to establish oneself. The people attempt to create a name and “to 
gather themselves there.” It further allows us to see what I will come to call the undecidability of 
the proper name. The place, the one that would be represented by the name, is as much a tongue 
as it is a tower, a language, and a structure. Derrida emphasizes this point when, earlier in the 
piece, he tells us, referring to Voltaire, “Babel means not only confusion in the double sense of 
the word, [the confusion of languages and of the architects building the tower]but also the name 
of the father, more precisely and more commonly, the name of God as name of father.”85 The 
confusion of the name of God
86
 and the common noun ‘confusion’ adds to this undecidable 
question of where to gather.  
 
The question arises in Derrida’s reading of the account of the Tower of Babel about whether we 
can name ourselves or whether names are given to us from the outside. In the story of Babel it is 
precisely because the ancient men try to make a name for themselves that they are confounded. 
The name that it becomes called by then becomes a signifier of confusion. If we accept 
Voltaire’s translation of the ancient language that Babel contains the name of God therein, we 
see that the name the people end up with is not one of their own choosing. They are named after 
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God. Their attempt to find security in a name of their own creation results in the name 
‘confusion,’ the name of someone else, and their own scattering. This does not portend well for 
self-determination.  
 
Since a great portion of this project plays out within the story of the modern state of Greece, it is 
useful to turn to the work of Michael Hertzfield regarding Greek national identity. It is of course 
not only that Hertzfield discusses Greek national identity that he is useful to this project but 
rather that he recognizes a negotiation within the Greek identity that, in some ways as I shall 
describe, is dependent upon names. No one, no state, no people ever has only one name. Though, 
through violence (see chapter 5), one or more of the names may be forbidden, unspoken, or even 
unknown (see chapter 3) or unpronounceable, the negotiation, the navette travelling between the 
various points (names) continues on, never able to rest, carries on never able to finally arrive and 
settle.  
Even if there were one name, however, the infinite, ever expanding meaning attached to a single 
name renders every name vulnerable to a negotiation with itself. Hertzfield shows this when he 
writes about Greece’s relationship with ‘Europe.’ 
Greeks today express their ambivalence about their cultural affiliations by a variable use 
of “Europe” both to include and to exclude themselves. Inclusion alludes to the founding 
role of Classical Greece in Europe, while exclusion represents the adoption of a self-view 
as oriental and illiterate
87
. 
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Leaving aside, at least for now, the illiterate oriental and the literate European, this variable use 
of the name “Europe” is significant for what we are doing here. It is first of all noteworthy that 
this variable use of “Europe” should not be surprising. Given what we have said about the name 
already, that it contains an undefined amount of meaning, it should be the expectation rather than 
an anomaly when we see one of them being used variably. However, if we want to emphasize the 
point that the meaning attached by the name can be contradictory here is an empirical example of 
just that which Herzfield provides us. In Greek usage “Europe” contains the Greeks and it does 
not contain the Greeks.  
 
If for Lyotard the endlessness of the meaning attached to names is based on the possibility of 
writing - not everything that can be written about Rome has been written- for Hertzfield it is a 
history or istories (and not History) that allows for alterity within the meaning of the name. His 
history “makes possible the recognition of the recognition of a domestic alterity – of Turkish 
elements in Greek life.
88”  Referring to meaning attached to the name of Greece, via ‘Greek life,’ 
as Turkish when it contradicts the Hellenistic ideal, is an attempt to purge undesirable meaning 
from the name. It is however, the attempt to purge it, the labeling of it as foreign which 
ultimately draws attention to the contradictions within the meaning attached to the name.  
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Herzfield employs this dichotomy between the imperfect, human, Turkish, feminine Romiossini 
and the, law- abiding, codified, and masculine Hellenism .
89
 In so doing, he points 
anthropologists away from a “rule-bound concept of the past, highly idealized and 
conformist…that has dehistoricized and universalized itself,” and towards “the internal, practical 
history of Greece…of the villages and towns, of social life.90” This use of two names for the 
study of Greek anthropology sets off the same sort of negotiation that we have been speaking of. 
It allows for, and even privileges, a fallen concept of Greekness.  
More significant for this project is the splitting of the meaning that might otherwise be attached 
by the name Greece to a deictic sign like ‘here’ or ‘there’ or ‘those/this people’ 
That there is no final arbiter does prevent a clear, authoritative differentiation of name bearers. 
This disorder does not prevent attempts, particularly by modern governments, to demarcate and 
to clarify.  
 
This project owes something to ethnography and as such attempts to represent a group of Aegean 
Macedonian refugees in the Republic of Macedonia. By now, ethnography has a reputation for 
generalizing the experience of the ethnographer and, usually, the wealthy elites of the village 
where the ethnographer plies his trade,
91
 and the important people, traditions, practices, 
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institutions, and events of the subjects of ethnographies are dependent on the view of the 
writer
92
.  
 
Ethnography is complicated in this context, however. It contains field work, interviews and 
archival research. It involves me, the participant observer, travelling to a land populated by 
others in order to see how they live. I am starting from the position though, that the people I am 
investigating are negotiating their idenitity. They are their own ethnographers in that they write
93
 
and rewrite their people
94
, their ethnos, through their participation and their implication in 
naming practices. Further, the Aegean Macedonians, on whom I concentrate throughout this 
project, are not the only participants in the practices that name them and bring them into being. 
Their ethnos, then, is written by themselves in conjunction with border guards, police men, 
administrators in town halls, party and association officials, movies, and one another. In this 
sense my work here aims only to be a record of particular portions of that ethnography on which 
no one and no group enjoy the final word. 
 
As we have already begun to say, this group is an important one because of their experiences of 
exile and their presence in a land that is at once home and foreign. So my research focus with 
these people, one that was gladly accepted and directed in some ways by the Aegean 
Macedonian exiles themselves, was their movement from Greece to Eastern European countries 
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and then to the Socialist Republic of Macedonia. Not only was their movement important to me, 
but also the attempts of various states to either expel, refuse entry to, or make these exiles stay in 
their respective territories. These attempts involved naming practices and elicited resistance and 
cooperation in these naming practices from the Aegean Macedonians.  
 
Giorgi Donevski, who passed away during my time in Macedonia was highly influential in 
providing sources for this ethnographic research. He was a long-time leader and friend to the 
Aegean Macedonian exiles in Macedonia. He organized groups and, at the time of his passing, 
was working with lawyers to try to help the exiles claim their family properties in Greece. He 
was a well known and well loved advocate of these people. It was he that provided me with 
names and phone numbers for about twenty Child Refugees from Aegean Macedonia. Now well 
one in life, those I contacted, and those I met in the club that Giorgi kept in the basement of a 
high rise in Aerodrom municipality, were more than happy to talk to me about their experiences 
in their native villages, their exile to Hungary, Romania, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Vojvodina, 
etc. Those interviews really gave me a sense of their background and what was at stake in a 
study about home and identity. I reference some of the interviews in this work but their value 
extended even beyond that of the few quotes contained in here. They provided the impetus and 
the direction to find out more about the issues of name, home, and identity in Macedonia.  
Giorgi also referred me to two archives. One was the Cinematheque of Macedonia and the other 
was the State Archive of the Republic of Macedonia. In the former I was able to watch the films: 
Po Dolinata na Vardar (1950), Crno seme (1971), Crveniot Konj (1981), and Inkoninuo, a 
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documentary made about the exile of Aegean Macedonians from Aegean Macedonia. All of 
these films had reference to the Aegean Macedonians and their contents came up in interviews 
with members of Giorgi’s society. They allowed me to participate in some of the cultural 
heritage of the Aegean Macedonian exile. In the State Archive of Macedonia, I was given access 
to the files of the Society for Refugees from the Aegean Part of Macedonia. The file contained 
minutes of meetings from local and national boards of the society mostly from the fifties. The 
file also contains lesson plans used for teaching the Aegean Macedonian who they are as 
Macedonians. Papers viewed here constituted primary sources for looking at how Aegean 
Macedonians were accepted and how they were organized when they started to come home to 
the Socialist Republic of Macedonia. I used these sources extensively in chapter four where I 
deal with the question of whether Aegean Macedonians returned home when they came to SR 
Macedonia.  
 
Finally, the experience I gained as a participant observer when Aegean Macedonians went to 
apply for birth certificates in their places of birth in Greece formed the basis of my chapter three. 
Travelling with Giorgi Donevski and members of his society gave allowed me the opportunity to 
see the naming practices that take place on the border. Participating in their applications for birth 
certificates presented me with a view that showed the actions of the Aegean Macedonians as well 
as those representatives of the Greek state who participated in naming practices. It made me a 
witness to these practices in an immediate way that did not rely on the accounts of others.  
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CONCLUSION 
As we move on to the stories of the Aegean Macedonians and their encounters of naming with 
nation states in the Balkans and elsewhere, we now have a concept of the name and its 
significance to the study of nations and states. While states are said to have the right to bear the 
names that they select for themselves as a form of self-determination, not all states are able to 
control their own names. Not only are they not always allowed to select their own name but even 
selecting a name is negating their self-identity or self-presence which is a violence that states and 
nations are asked to perform on themselves. It is through a name that nations, states, and nation-
states are inscribed into culture, into a system of signs that function through difference to one 
another making self-determination a thin illusion. 
 
As well as being the vehicle through which states and people abrogate any pretence to self-
identity, names also are seen to indicate ownership connections within the international system. 
Names can unite territory, people, culture, and products and can facilitate control by anyone able 
to control the use of that name. It is not just the property of ownership that the name expresses 
and facilitates but it also can bestow other properties upon the named as in the case of Greenland 
which was named with the intention of making it more economically attractive. In Baghdad, 
naming was used to make the city more navigable and secure for American forces operating in 
the region.  
We have also seen that names, although they may be designed to fix reality by offering an 
invariable way to write and talk about places and people that would otherwise be referred to by a 
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string of deictics, have infinite meanings attached which multiplies and fractures reality. This 
state of affairs is exasperated by the lack of foundational connection between name and named as 
Mill argued long ago about the city of Dartmouth. This combines a multiplicity of meanings for 
each name with a lack of foundation for deciding between contradicting meanings. These 
features of naming play themselves out in the history of the Aegean Macedonians whose stories 
we now consider.  
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CHAPTER 3 
WHAT IS YOUR NAME? 
Early on a Sunday morning we waited for the bus outside of the Holiday Inn in Skopje, Republic 
of Macedonia. The bus had been organized by the group, Nezaborav, which is a club of some 
three thousand people who were born in, or have close family ties to the Aegean part of 
Macedonia. There were a handful of people sheltering from the dark morning under the porch of 
the hotel when I arrived. A man, who must have been in his seventies, greeted me. We had met 
in the club on Friday when we were both paying our fare for this trip. Our conversation, partly in 
Greek and partly in Macedonian, was a mixture of weather and the challenges of being a 
Macedonian in Greece. The Aegean part of Macedonia, or simply Macedonia if you are the 
government of Greece, was our destination that day. There, members of this organization and 
their guests would visit their native villages and, as a demonstration of their human rights, apply 
for birth certificates in town halls staffed by Greek functionaries. 
 
In this chapter, I want to focus on two ‘discursive practices’ that I divide spatially from one 
another. Both of them occurred during the course of this excursion. Both of them belong to the 
class of phenomena that I have referred to in my introduction as naming practices. The first is the 
border crossing. It is at the border that we are asked to prove that we are the name that we say we 
are. Since, as was argued in the last chapter, this is an impossible task – there is no basis for a 
name - then what is it that we really do during the border crossing and how is it determined that 
we have successfully completed the assignment that we are given? The second practice I discuss 
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here is related to the recording of births. Part of the trip was devoted to the application, at Greek 
town halls (demarcheia), for copies of the Aegeans’ birth certificates.95 Part of the proof that you 
are the name you say you are is your certificate of birth. It is a record that a person, who was 
born in such a place at such a time was called a certain name by someone who was at close 
proximity to that person. It works like the naming of a discovered territory as we discussed in the 
last chapter. These two practices, then, involve one being asked to certify to another that they are 
the name they say they are.  
 
The Aegean Macedonians case is an important and informative one for several reasons. Often, 
names of individuals are not disputed by states. Any dispute could be settled by connecting the 
name of the individual to the name of a state. This is what a passport does. The name on the front 
of the document, the name of the state, is well known. This well known, and perhaps respected 
name, reinforced by armies of soldiers and diplomats, underwrites the name of the individual 
.This is not the same as saying that names of states themselves are not problematic. Indeed, in the 
case of Macedonia, the name is openly and famously problematic. The Aegean Macedonians 
themselves also have problematic names, at least in the context of proximity to Greece. The 
names which they are known in their families and in their Macedonian passports are not the 
names that were registered by the Greek authorities where they were born. These people then 
have the added difficulty, and added room for play, of two names. They have the name that they 
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are known by and the name that was registered as an attempt to document their existence by the 
Greek authorities.  
 
In this chapter I show how the naming practices are set up, how they fail to finally fix a name, 
and what tactics those caught up in the practices have at their disposal in order to make life go on 
in a situation where they cannot show that they are the name that they are known by. In this 
event, those working in the name of the Greek state, attempt to co-opt the naming practices in 
order to establish names for people born within the performed borders of the Greek state, as well 
as the places and parents of these people. These names that they attempt to establish are ones that 
conform to a supposed Greek idiom, which stands to represent the assertion that all people whose 
origin is within the borders of modern Greece are Greek, they come from Greek progeny, and 
Greek villages. Ultimately this practice fails to link these people and places unambiguously to a 
Greek name that is itself an ideal that is constantly reiterated but never able to establish itself as a 
sovereign idiom. Aegean Macedonians, with smiles on their faces and in the way that one would 
answer a quiz show question, with Slavic accents, present themselves to the Greek authorities 
using Greek names for themselves, their villages and their parents. They present themselves as 
ignorant of their Greek names, they guess at the names. We will discuss these tactics that allow 
Aegean Macedonians to pass through these tests and visit the site of their native villages. We 
will discuss them in the context of Jacques Derrida’s negotiation.  
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The rest of this chapter is as follows. Following a brief description of the events that dislocated 
the Aegean Macedonians, I will discuss the practices in which I played a part in September 2011 
in the land that lays on the borderlands of Greece, Macedonia, and Bulgaria. I will first discuss 
the border crossing both on that day and as described by some of those I spoke to in their former 
experiences. I will then discuss the different but related practices of the demarcheio. Before that, 
though, I present what I mean when I talk about discursive practices.  
 
DISCURSIVE PRACTICES 
Since they are an important part of my work in this chapter, a discussion of discursive practices 
is warranted. It only during such practices and by such that meaning, as temporary and mutable 
as that meaning may be, can be gleaned from what may represent itself as a physical act.
96
 I deal 
with the border checkpoint and the dimarcheio in terms of them being sites of such practices. I 
want to highlight the practice of discursive practices.
97
 I see them as rites that one participates in. 
The approach to the border, where the symbols of nation states such as flags and police uniforms 
adorn the location, is a procession to a site consecrated by the state for the purpose of admitting 
foreigners and natives. Bearing the correct artifacts, the passport, the stamp, the biography, 
maybe even hotel receipts as evidence, one enters into a liturgical negotiation with a proxy of the 
state. Like all discursive practices we are not talking about words on page, writing is not limited 
to the written word. In these locations, as we shall see, people are produced, not in the sense of 
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fixed, stable individuals, but as one who is constituted and reconstituted through the various 
discursive practices in which they participate.
98
  
This is not to suggest that, because the practice of crossing the border produces individuals and 
states supposed to be involved, that they do so in the same way every time. Similar, even, if there 
was a way to differentiate and compare them, identical discursive practices are used for different 
purposes depending upon time and circumstance.
99
 The practices that I discuss here are used by 
some Aegeans to produce themselves as Aegean Macedonians at the same time that other people 
are trying to reproduce Greeks.  
 
CROSSING THE BORDER 
At the end of the road “Marshal Tito,” that runs along the shores of lake Dojran lies one of the 
three border crossings between the Republic of Macedonia and Greece. It was here that, 
following a meandering trip around Macedonia picking up the dispersed members of our group, 
we arrived prepared for the crossing into the Hellenic Republic. The Macedonians on board the 
bus had been instructed by their leader, Gjorgji Donevski, that they might well be asked to give 
their names, the names of the villages where they were born, and the names of their fathers. It 
was explained to them that, were they to be asked, they should answer with the Greek versions of 
these names. One lady was worried because, being so young when she left Greece, she had never 
heard her Greek name spoken, nor seen it written. She was therefore ignorant of it.  
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Leaving Macedonia was a straightforward affair. Like the experiences I have had with borders in 
England and the United States: handing over my passport and getting it back with or without a 
new stamp in it. We handed our passports to the organizer of the event and he handed them to the 
Macedonian authorities. Aside from about 25 Macedonian passports we also handed a French 
passport, five American passports, and a couple of Australian ones. The negotiation of identity 
was more obvious when those passports were handed on to the Greek border agents. Since the 
border agents do not recognize passports issued by a government with the name The Republic of 
Macedonia, they insisted that those of us travelling with these passports use a separate sheet of 
paper that is provided by the Greek authorities. These sheets are not objectionable as they do not 
contain the name of the state where their bearers hold citizenship. However, since there were 
many of our number without these sheets, we were delayed while the Greek authorities 
handwrote these forms and stamped them. In a reconstruction of this delay, I will suspend my 
account of the crossing here. Border crossings are sites of hospitality and, since names and 
identities are strongly implicated in affairs of hospitality, I will break here to discuss hospitality 
in some detail.  
 
AWAITING HOSPITALITY 
Hospitality has been important to the modern study of International Relations since Immanuel 
Kant’s (1795) Perpetual Peace proscribed the treatment of visitors from foreign states with 
hostility.
100
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negotiation, I intend to foreground the role of the name in hospitality. Derrida associates the 
question of the name with hospitality and it requires little work to frame his concept of 
hospitality as a question of names. So, after a brief exploration of Kant’s concept of hospitality, I 
will emphasize the concept of the name in the hospitality questions formulated by Jacques 
Derrida. All this I do with a view to exploring the name and its role in mobility across borders. 
 
A traditional liberal concept of hospitality focuses on the individual, the citizen of a foreign state 
and how that person can expect to be treated by another state of which he is not a member. The 
way Kant articulates the rights, privileges and interdictions of hospitality make them seem very 
compatible with the rules governing immigration to liberal states in the contemporary world. 
Indeed they are. Kant’s code of hospitality: recognizes the division of the Earth into peoples, 
each of which possesses a land; allows host states to refuse entry to would-be visitors; disavows 
any perceived right for a stranger to remain permanently in the land of another; protects the guest 
from hostility on the condition that he “occupies his place peacefully.101” 
 
These assumptions create a difficult environment for the crossing of Aegean Macedonians into 
the Greek-governed land that they were born in. If we take Macedonians and Greeks as peoples 
then dividing the Earth into separate peoples separates Greeks and Macedonians. If each of these 
peoples is said then to possess a land then, as currently constituted in international law and 
norms, the land that the Aegean Macedonians were born in, the one that they wish to visit on this 
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trip, is currently apportioned to the Greeks. Further, the Greek state is allowed by Kantian 
hospitality to refuse entry to the Aegean Macedonians insofar as they are visitors and a separate 
people. Finally, as well as allowing the Greek authorities to refuse permanent leave to remain to 
the Aegean Macedonians, Kant protects the peaceful Macedonians from hostility. Following the 
advice of Donevski and presenting themselves as Greeks to the border police is thus a well 
thought out tactic. Rather than present themselves as guests at the mercy of the Greek authorities, 
they present themselves as Greeks who belong in Greece. In doing so, they cross the border of 
identity in order to cross the international border.  
In universal hospitality, Kant sees a precursor to world citizenship or “cosmopolitical right”. 
Since the: 
"community of the nations of the earth, in a narrower or broader way, has advanced so far 
that an in justice [sic]in one part of the world is felt in all parts, the idea of a 
cosmopolitical right is no fantastic and strained form of the conception of right, but 
necessary to the unwritten code, not only of the rights of states but of peoples as 
well…102" 
 
Kant's eye may be fixed on achieving perpetual peace and universal citizenship but his hand does 
not extend that far. While 'community' is singular, he renders 'nations' in the plural – again 
separating the Aegean Macedonians from the Greeks that they fought alongside in resistance to 
the Germans, Italians, and Bulgarians and during the Greek Civil War and, as a result, from the 
land of their fathers. Consistent with this imagined world of nations, his third definitive article 
for perpetual peace limits membership in a world community to the principle of universal 
hospitality. Thus, the Aegean Macedonians and the Greeks are joined together only in the act of 
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hospitality including the hospitality of the border where we now await the return of our papers. 
Of course, this hospitality is itself tightly circumscribed. 
 
The German philosopher argues that the affording of hospitality is not a “philanthropy103" but a 
required concession based on natural law. The unruled surface of Earth, or the global commons 
as it is often referred to, belongs to all mankind equally. The commons, Kant mentions seas and 
deserts but we could add air today, both divides the peoples of the Earth because of its 
uninhabitability and unites them because of the free access to other peoples it allows.
104
 The 
Atlantic Ocean may be a vast expanse void of habitation and therefore divide people in America 
from people in Europe. However, the fact that there are no measures to prevent free movement of 
ships on its surface and aircraft above it makes it a permanent connection between the two 
peoples. This connecting property of unruled regions of the Earth is based on the premise that 
"Originally, however, no one had any more right than another to occupy any particular portion of 
the earth’s surface.105" It therefore contravenes Kantian natural law for Barbary Coast pirates to 
raid ships in adjacent waters.
106
 The telling word in the above quote, however, is ‘originally.’  
 
The prior paragraph really explains not a natural law of hospitality but one of communication. 
Where the surface of the Earth is still common - in deserts and seas, it is against natural law to 
prevent access. This law is a prerequisite for the establishment of friendly relations between the 
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peoples of the Earth. While this establishes a natural right for members of one people to 
approach the homeland of another, what are their rights when they arrive? Kant's account of 
these rights, brief as it is, reflects more on what is outside the rights of a foreigner than what 
those rights comprise. 
 
First, Kant affirms, nothing gives the foreigner the right to be a permanent visitor. Thinking of 
the other role in traditional hospitality, that of host, the potential for a guest or visitor to someday 
attain the role of host is completely off the table at this point. This eventuality is not even made 
possible by its interdiction.
107
Even leave to remain in the company of strangers “for a time108" 
requires a specific "friendly agreement.
109
" 
The right that the stranger is allotted in Perpetual Peace is the right “not to be treated as an 
enemy when he arrives in the land of another.
110” Although we might breathe a sigh of relief that 
the stranger will not be slaughtered or imprisoned on sight, this quoted text also does something 
else. Slightly later on in the paragraph, Kant asserts that “Originally, no one had more right than 
another to a particular part of the earth.
111” This original condition has now surely past for Kant 
and this passing allows him to speak of “land of another.” As possessor of the land, the 
stranger’s host has the right to refuse to receive him. The proviso articulated by Kant is that in 
refusing to receive him, the host cannot cause the destruction of the traveler. 
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These aspects of Kant's theory are particularly important. The highest status that a foreigner can 
even imagine in this work of Kant is that of "permanent visitor". This constructs a world of 
naturalized peoples, a world where the Aegean Macedonian, as a Macedonian (and not a Greek) 
can never be at home in the land where he was born. It is a right for Aegean Macedonians to 
approach the Greeks across the desolate space between the border stations. It is an expectation 
that, once the Macedonian has reached the Greek border post, that he be spared of violent 
confrontation, however, it is impossible for that Macedonian visitor to ever achieve any status 
beyond that of a guest amongst a foreign people. This implies that the guest from abroad is 
always the recipient of hospitality for as long as he will sojourn in the land of the other. If the 
strangers, out of benevolence, agree to allow the migrant to remain, he remains a guest. 
 
While hospitality as discussed by Kant constitutes a familiar state- centric view of the concept, 
which makes the state’s capacity to extend hospitality unproblematic, and makes hospitality 
dependent on international agreement between states, Jacques Derrida’s critique112 has called 
into question this view. Kant’s permanent stranger is almost entirely subject to the whim of the 
host state. His right is only the right not to be violently confronted or to be denied entry where 
such a denial would result in his demise. In the works of Derrida, we have a very different 
stranger. In traditional (specifically ancient Greek) hospitality, Derrida sees a foreigner with real 
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rights, a party to an agreement that extends beyond the not being killed or sent to his death but 
also being tolerated, having his differences tolerated. One of the reasons that his work is so 
useful to this project is that, going beyond a simple natural rights argument, Derrida opens up 
questions of identity that are intertwined with hospitality. 
 
Derrida summons the figure of Socrates as he stands before the Athenian tribunal to defend 
himself. While we will remember that Socrates refuses to appeal to the sentiments of the men 
there gathered by bringing wife and children to plead for him, Derrida outlines one plea that 
Socrates does make on his own behalf. The concession that Socrates seeks is hospitality, to be 
treated as a foreigner. Why does Socrates, a native of Athens, though admittedly a foreigner to 
the court, wish to be treated as a foreigner? Derrida explains simply that: "at Athens, the 
foreigner had some rights…a right of hospitality for foreigners." The words that Derrida puts 
into the mouth or mind of Socrates are: "if I were foreign, you would accept with more tolerance 
that I don't speak as you do, that I have my own idiom." Hospitality is thus rendered in this scene 
as a tolerance of difference. Socrates’ demand for hospitality here is not a demand that his life be 
spared. As we all know, his life is not spared and even when offered to him by a friend later in 
Crito he does not prize it enough to break the laws and retain it. The sort of hospitality that is 
described by Derrida in this passage, then, turns away from Kant’s imperative not to kill the 
foreigner to an expectation that the foreigner will have his differences tolerated. 
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Going further, the notion that Socrates can ask for hospitality in Athens at all is a break with any 
Kantian convention. If Kant sets up a world of peoples each with their own territory with 
universal hospitality extended at the borders of these territories only then Socrates, as an 
Athenian, who spoke daily in the market place, is not at a territorial border, at least not an 
immediately recognizable one and so cannot be recognized as a beneficiary of hospitality in the 
Kantian sense. His foreignness is not derived from birth in another state, or another city, but 
rather from his unfamiliarity with the idiom of the court and the rhetoric of the young. Casting 
Socrates as a potential recipient of hospitality in his home (and native) city of Athens opens up 
hospitality and increases beyond number the size of the pool of potential guests. 
 
Significant it is to note that that which is tolerated is not a difference in language, Socrates is not 
a Barbarian, but a difference in idiom. It is this very point that follows in Of Hospitality "That 
the foreigner, the xenos is not simply the absolute other
113
."  
The foreigner is intelligible. As well as enjoying tolerance of his difference, the foreigner, 
through the pact he makes, the xenia also takes on an agreed identity. Or, as put by Derrida, 
Precisely because it is inscribed in a right, a custom, an ethos, and a Sittlichkeit, this 
objective morality that we were speaking about last time presupposes the social and 
familial status of the contracting parties, that it is possible for them to be called by their 
names, to have names, to be subjects to law, to be questioned and liable, to have crimes 
imputed to them, to be held responsible, to be equipped with namable identities, and 
proper names. A proper name is never purely individual.
114
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But intelligibility is not enough in the Greece-Macedonia dispute. Macedonia was invited into 
the community of nations, the United Nations under a name given it by the organization: The 
Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. While sufficient as an interim name for use in the 
United Nations, it is not a name by which it can be invited to the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization. 
 
Hospitality is produced by what seems like a dialectic. This productive opposition is described 
by Jacques Derrida in the fifth of a series of seminars given in Paris in January 1996. Entitled 
Pas d’hospitalité (Step of hospitality/No hospitality),115 this work describes a difference between 
the law of hospitality and the laws of hospitality. For Derrida,
116
 the law of hospitality initiates 
an impossibility. The law of hospitality, or hospitality as absolute hospitality, or unlimited 
hospitality demands that we “say yes to who or what turns up, before any determination, before 
any anticipation, before any identification whether or not the new arrival is the citizen of another 
country,
117
a human, animal, or divine creature, a living or dead thing, male or female.
118” 
Derrida emphasizes identification here and enriches it by later explaining that this law requires 
us “to give the new arrival without asking a name119” The law of hospitality, then, is 
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characterized by the lack of the question of a name. It demands that we give all without asking a 
name. 
The laws of hospitality amount to the constitutive antithesis of the impossible law of hospitality. 
They are an attempt to render real what would otherwise be an “abstract, utopian, illusory120” 
concept. In the attempted implementation of this utopian hospitality, conditions are added. We 
see this in hospitality laws implemented by modern nation-states. In these regulations, we see 
that questions are required. Who are you? Where do you come from? What is the name of your 
father? Where were you born? How long will you stay here? Why did you come here? This first 
question demands that you answer with a name, an intelligible name. Again the question of the 
name arises. It is essentially this requiring of a name that separates the laws of hospitality from 
the law of hospitality. While this dialectic between name and no name might define the two 
constituent parts of the concept of hospitality, the dialectic is complicated by a further question 
of the name. If the laws of hospitality require we ask a name before we allow someone to 
become a guest what name shall we agree upon? Derrida sets up these related questions nicely 
thus: 
Is it more just and more loving to question? [as pertaining to the laws of hospitality] or 
not to question? [as pertaining to the law of hospitality] to call by the name or without the 
name? to give or to learn a name already given?
121
 
 
We see then that the opposition that produces the concept of hospitality can be expressed as the 
question of the name, to ask or not to ask. The case of the Aegean Macedonians that I discuss 
here is a case that directly refers to this question of names. For reasons yet to be explained in this 
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paper, these people are known by at least two names. Sometimes, they are aware that they are 
known by another name but do not know what that name is. While the unknown name is a 
keyword that allows them entry to the path that leads to a reclamation of their past, they are left 
to guess it. Aegean Macedonians have often been assigned a secret identity that they can only 
learn during games of trial and error. 
At the time that the decata begalci were born, in Greece, an ethnic Macedonian would likely be 
given two names. The first one, and the one they are most likely to know is a Macedonian name. 
This name would have been given by her parents and would have been known in the village. 
However, when the birth or christening was registered with the Greek authorities, these 
authorities would register the name as a rough Greek equivalent. For example, the name of 
Macedonian Prime Minister, Nikola Gruevski is a Slavic name. Had he been born in 1930s 
Greece his name may have been registered as Nikolaous Grouios.
122
 It is probable that he would 
never have heard this name used to refer to him. Because there is usually more than one way to 
Hellenize the name, and because many of the decata do not know Greek, this name could be 
completely unknown to him all his life. Especially where the child was very young when she was 
evacuated, she may well never have heard the Greek version of her name and may not realize 
that it exists. 
 
Being known by a name that is not familiar to you, or is not your familiar name, refers us to this 
question of the name. When we offer hospitality, do we do it to someone with a name already 
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given or do we give a new name? While it is not my intention to answer the question of whether 
or not this is “more just or more loving,” it is my intention to explore the negotiation of identity 
that this type of hospitality demands. How have Aegean Macedonians encountered the question 
of the name and what have they done under these conditions? How have the laws of hospitality, 
on the wrong end of which they have often found themselves, invited them to negotiate their 
identity. 
As stated, the laws of hospitality represent the attempt to render hospitality within a legal 
framework. Laws of hospitality govern relationships between individuals, relationships between 
a sovereign and his people, between sovereigns, and between sovereigns and the people of other 
sovereigns. For example Arizona’s ‘Castle Doctrine’ law regarding the use of deadly force in the 
protection of one’s home expressly forbids the use of deadly force against an “invitee.123” This 
law is certainly an attempt to legislate a particular concept of hospitality one, in fact, that draws 
from Kant’s prohibition of violence against the peaceful guest. It is criminally non-hospitable to 
invite someone to your home and then kill them (or threaten to do so). Clearly, it is Derrida’s 
laws of hospitality rather than law that govern the justifiable use of force. People other than those 
with a legal right to be in the structure or an invitee are defined as intruders and the use of deadly 
force against such a trespasser can be justified in the law. This would not be the case should the 
law of hospitality be in effect and we accepted all who come. 
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Diplomatic relations between states are also governed by the laws of hospitality. Section 2 of the 
Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations states that “The establishment of permanent 
diplomatic missions, takes place by mutual consent.” Again, states are not excepting whoever 
comes in this convention. Before the establishment of a diplomatic mission, questions will be 
asked, among the first of these questions will no doubt be what is your name? Who are you who 
want to represent yourself to us? Only when states have negotiated mutually acceptable answers 
to these questions do diplomatic missions become assigned. There are no Basque diplomatic 
missions. 
BACK TO THE BORDER 
Back at the border, the preparation of the paperwork for the twenty people that didn’t have it 
took over two hours. During this time, one of the border policemen entered the bus. He was 
asking some of the passengers (in Greek which several of the questioned did not understand) 
questions about where they come from. What is your name? he would ask. The decata begalci 
would try to pronounce the Greek version of their names. Some knew the names and gave them, 
others struggled and were helped by others on the bus to Hellenize their names. What was your 
father’s name? Again, the Macedonians on the bus would Hellenize the names of their parents, 
the names of villages where they were born. I count this as a negotiation of identity and will 
speak more about it later. Here it is enough to say that these Hellenized names result from and 
exist only in this very specific negotiation between decata begalci who wish to visit their native 
land and Greek authorities. 
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The name issue, as it is known in popular discourse surrounding the issue that Greece and 
Macedonia have over the constitutional name of the latter is actually a names issue. This became 
further apparent as we crossed onto the now Greek side of the border and the people on the bus 
started to talk about where their villages were located? The change in names of these villages 
created a sense that the topography that was remembered by these people no longer existed at 
least not on the road signs or maps. As well as the change in names of villages, mountains, 
rivers, and lakes had also changed. This caused difficulties in planning routes through the 
homeland of these people, some of whom remembered well the names of their villages and 
surrounding topographic markers but could not find them on maps or road signs. 
 
Before moving on to the Greek side of the border, though, there is something to be said about 
border control. It has been argued that borders are a place where the citizen submits fully to the 
might of the sovereign. The would-be traveler, the would-be guest, recipient of hospitality, 
surrenders an account of his identity to the border authorities which ultimately decide whether he 
is thereby admissible. This account of a powerful sovereign and a submissive subject is one 
which I counter with this story of negotiation. The identity that is finally agreed upon as a basis 
for acceptance into the country is the result of a negotiation. It is one that was not necessarily in 
existence before the negotiation took place. 
 
Mark Salter investigates how airports succeed in "securitizing identity". Drawing from Michel 
Foucault's confessionary complex, where subjects are rendered docile in the face of state 
86 
 
interrogation,
124
 he represents the sort of relationship between sovereign host and potential guest 
that I dispute here. His work describes power in the airport, at least its sources, as diffuse. 
Authority is exercised from multiple centers. Amongst the agencies exercising governance of the 
airport are the airlines, national aviation security agencies, private airport and airline operators, 
the International Civil Aviation Authority. While the sources of power are diffuse, the exercise 
of that power is very concentrated and, according to his theory, irresistible. These powers are 
focused on the airport, a place where mobile citizens, deviants within the nation-state structure 
congregate, in order to regulate and surveil deviant behavior.
125
 
 
Although he does not do so explicitly (how could he), Salter links his study of the airport with 
our study of hospitality. "For the citizen, the immigrant, the refugee or the asylum seeker," 
attests Salter, "airports are places of extreme interrogation of one's identity and home
126
" This 
linking of identity and home is important to our study and is this pressure that mobile people[s] 
come under at locations such as airports, national borders, and police stations, that initiates the 
game where identities - names, both of people and of homes, become malleable. As mentioned 
before, the role of the traveler in determining his identity is seriously limited in this article by 
Salter. As he puts it "a traveler is the author of one's [sic] identity, but not the final arbiter of 
his/her belonging.
127
" Somewhat nullifying this authorship, though, is something of a submission 
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to authority described in this piece. When dealing with the confessionary complex of Foucault 
within airports, Salter remarks "As travelers are conditioned to confess their history, intentions, 
and identity, they submit to the examining power of the sovereign.
128
" While what Salter is 
saying here is perfectly reasonable, it omits something important. It is reasonable in that, when 
one answers a question one is unavoidably agreeing to the validity of the question and its asker. 
In this way the answerer is submitting themselves to the asker. However rather than putting 
themselves under the power of the sovereign, they are surrendering a mutually acceptable avatar. 
Since identity is the result of negotiation, as Derrida writes, "A proper name is never purely 
individual," both parties submit. They submit in the way that one submits an object. The 
authority submits narratives that can be used by the traveler that aid in the production of a 
narrative. In turn the guest-applicant submits this produced narrative. 
 
The specific process that interests Salter in this work is the request of an individual to enter a 
space and the adjudication of a government official of that claim.
129
 Although Salter 
acknowledges differences between crossing different borders, this "'deep structure' of sovereign 
politics,
130
" represents something universal for Salter. Representing oneself at the border 
constitutes about one half of this 'deep structure', this resigning of the social contract. It is both a 
resignation of the contract in that in presenting yourself and requesting entry you resign any right 
you have to the protection of the sovereign. In the same move you resign the contract by 
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presenting yourself as a loyal subject of sovereign power and make the Hobbesian promise to 
obey the decision of the sovereign. This presentation of oneself to the sovereign is a main subject 
of my work here. It points us back from the topic of performative borders towards the theme of 
hospitality. We do not need to gaze distantly since, recalling Kant, it is at the border that 
hospitality makes its domain. In the presentation of oneself before the sovereign, one must 
"confess all manner of personal information including economic, social, and psychological 
factors for our travel and our return home.
131
" More fundamentally, we must confess our name. 
In order to be offered hospitality we must represent ourselves with a name that is legible to the 
sovereign. 
 
As we have seen though, in the case of the Aegean Macedonians, they are not confessing their 
name. The name that they consider theirs is illegible to the Greeks. It is incomprehensible and 
unacceptable. Sometimes they do not know the name. In what sense then can it be said that these 
people are confessing their identity in the face of the sovereign? While Salter's work emphasizes 
the power of the sovereign to demand submission of something personal, I would like to argue, 
with Derrida, that a proper name is never purely personal. It is social property that is negotiated 
in the sorts of spaces that Salter investigates such as the airport and other border crossings. 
 
Also, these negotiations take place in other places. When the taxi driver asks me where I am 
from on the way back home from the embassy we engage in a similar negotiation. Of course he 
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does not wield the power of a sovereign state but nevertheless the question demands that I 
answer with a name that is agreeable to us both. When I answer with the name of my native 
town, Hartlepool, this is usually not satisfactory. It has no meaning to my interlocutor and so 
another question follows until I can give an answer that is legible. Although a very useful place 
to start, hospitality is not only acceptance into a sovereign state but also into a taxi, or a school, 
or the home of a potential friend, a landlord. Identities that ultimately refer to states, to 
sovereigns, are negotiated all the time. 
For Salter, mobility has long been perceived as threatening behavior.
132
 Salter wants to preserve 
the border as a specific state of exception and consciously privileges the decision of the 
sovereign made at the location of the border. Combined with his image of the docile supplicant 
at the border, Salter writes a rather formidable, demigod of a sovereign. In this work I will 
present a rather different narrative where the sovereign and the applicant engage in a mutually 
constitutive negotiation. The identity of both being constructed by ear and contingently on the 
basis of the extension and acceptance of hospitality. While it may not qualify under Salter's 
definition of sovereign politics, it is nevertheless politics and at least as worthy of attention as an 
overbearing sovereignty reducing all who come into contact with it to quivering confessors. 
 
Salter argues that the performance of sovereignty is most apparent, not in decisions to exclude or 
include foreigners or refugees, but in the decision to exclude citizens. These excluded citizens 
are the real constitutive outside of the protected inside. Therefore, even the insiders are not 
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safe.
133
 This also is relevant to the Aegean Macedonians. Georgi Donevski is convinced that 
Aegean Macedonians who were children at the time of their evacuation from Greece are entitled 
to Greek citizenship. A removal of the automatic right of entry to the place where one is a citizen 
adds weight to an argument that nobody is really at home, at least not permanently. The threat 
that the sovereign can deport you at any time or can refuse your return to your native land is 
enough to make you a stranger. In the same way that Kant's foreign citizen can only ever be a 
long term visitor in your country, so is this the most any of us can hope for. What about the 
sovereign though, the one who excludes or accepts. Is the sovereign the only host? Reaching this 
conclusion would have serious implications for liberal political theory and politics as it is 
understood in much of the world today. Should all citizens turn out to be long-term visitors with 
the sovereign as the sole host then sovereignty begins to look distinctly alien to citizens. Salter 
ultimately shares this conclusion
134
. Where I aim past Salter is with my assertion that sovereigns 
are not the only ones equipped to change their mind. There is not a fixed herd of sheep watched 
over by the wolf-Leviathan. Rather, when the wolf gets hungry for sheep, citizens can present 
themselves as goats. 
 
A journalist born in Romania to Aegean Macedonian parents related a story. When travelling 
from Macedonia to Greece for work he used to have to fill in a form at the border. On the form 
was a space for nationality. He would write Macedonian in that space. In response, the Greek 
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officers would insist that he write FYROM.
135
 When he would refuse to do that, the Greek 
authorities would let him leave it blank. It is possible that the authorities filled in FYROM after 
the journalist had left the border. However, not writing it in himself shows the power that he had 
to negotiate his nationality at the border. He was not free to write what he wanted but was free 
not t write what he didn’t want.  
 
Roxanne Doty investigated immigration and identity in the historic case of post-World War II 
Britain. While Britain, she says, might be considered an unlikely case of an identity that is not 
fixed fast, actually, there are no unlikely cases. Her fundamental assumption that identity is "not 
fixed and stable but are rather always in the process of being constructed and reconstructed
136
" 
can be used to somewhat undermine the power of the sovereign at the border. When we consider 
identities as being always in a process we see that, while the sovereign may really think he is 
demanding that we uncover something real, fixed, and pertinent, we cannot give that. Our 
identity, particularly with regard to nationality but also even our name, is open to negotiation and 
at borders, wherever they are constructed, is where this negotiation takes place. In this sense, we 
answer Derrida's question of the name, with a no. When asked do we offer hospitality to 
someone with their own name or do we give a new name, or do we not ask a name we answer 
that names are social and are open to negotiation. 
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Doty argues that "the construction of foundational grounds occurs through discursive practices 
that attempt to fix meaning." Understanding the issue like this, we can identify hospitality as one 
of these discursive practices. Hospitality, at the border and elsewhere, discursively produces a 
(potential) host and a (potential) guest. At places like border lines, a negotiation of identities 
takes place that attempts to fix the identities of the negotiators; at least for a time. 
 
This work of Doty's focuses on the measures taken by the British state to deal with the ambiguity 
of its own identity arising from increasing immigration to the commonwealth. The identity of the 
immigrants themselves is handled more incidentally. Her illustration of the "tension between 
universality and particularity" at the heart of the discourse of Commonwealth identity includes 
the following quote: "We are responsible for them, and they think of themselves, as anybody 
who has been there knows, as British people. Oh yes they do. It is rather moving.
137
" This quote, 
as well as illustrating the tension between universality and particularity is also suggestive of a 
negotiation in progress. As Doty points out, there is the tension between constructing a ‘we’ and 
a ‘them.’ This also suggests a negotiation of identity. The speaker would probably set himself up 
as a final arbiter but nonetheless the claims of Britishness from the Commonwealth citizens is an 
important influence on his perception. 
 
APPLYING FOR BIRTH CERTIFICATES 
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Names were also the focus of discussion in the demarcheio (Town Hall) in Nea Zichni. The 
Vrodous or Sharlija mountain range separates the Greek peripheries of Serres and Drama and 
divides Greece from Bulgarian municipalities bearing the names of prominent 20th century 
revolutionaries that feature in the Macedonian national anthem such as Jane Sandanski and Gotse 
Delchev. To the south of these mountains, on the road between Serres and Drama lies the village 
of Nea Zichni. It was about noon when we arrived there having been informed by workers in the 
Serres demarcheio that the records for a village where three of our number were born were kept 
in Nea Zichni. 
 
What happened in this town hall was reminiscent of what we had encountered at the border of 
Greece. We entered a room which served as the office for four local government functionaries. 
Explaining, in pretty good Greek, that we had come to apply for birth certificates for these three 
people so that they could later apply for Greek passports, Georgi Donevski began the exchange. 
The man at the desk closest to the door demanded the names of all those who were making an 
application. Georgi had briefed the applicants beforehand that they should use the Greek names 
that would have been recorded in the Greek records at the time of their birth. Two brothers 
answered with their Greek names. The third applicant, a woman, was not sure what her Greek 
name was. With Giorgi’s help, she took an educated guess. The Greek functionary wanted to 
verify the names of these people by seeing their papers. As evidence the applicants handed over 
their Macedonian passports. This caused two objections from the functionary. The first was 
“How can there be a country called Macedonia? Is there a country called Macedonia?” While the 
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Macedonians wanted to refer to the state to prove their names, the name of the state was 
questioned. The second objection was: 
You told me that your name was [Greek name] however, in this document [that I do not 
recognize because it has the name of a fictional state] it is written [Macedonian name] 
 
After objecting in this way the man looked up the names. While he found the names of the two 
brothers listed with their family in his records he could not find the name that the lady had 
guessed was her Greek name. While he had found the records of the two brothers the functionary 
refused to issue the birth certificates. Next to the names of the brothers were written words to the 
effect that the Greek state had removed citizenship from the children. The sovereign had, in the 
absence of these children, judged that they no longer desired to be Greek citizens. 
 
Dimitar Chulev, the journalist who was born in Romania to Aegean Macedonian parents and 
who now lives in Skopje recounted an experience he had on a visit to his native village. There he 
visited a woman who lived next to him when he was a boy. It was the first time he had seen her 
in decades and she was now an elderly lady. He said that when he told her that he was Dimitar 
who she had looked after when he was a child she replied with disbelief “You can’t be Dimitar 
Chulev.” The evidence she offered in support of her statement was that “Dimitar was a small 
boy, you are old.” 
 
Of course, this is an experience that perhaps we all have at some time. We run into an old lady 
who knew us when we were children. She tells us that she cannot believe we are the small boy 
who damaged some of the flowers in her garden while playing football and brought new ones to 
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replace them. We then try to convince her that yes indeed we did it. We recall some of the other 
details surrounding the incident or recall other memories we expect they share. This conversation 
is a negotiation of sorts. The incongruity of the way we look, speak, and act now compared to 
when we were seven years old demands an explanation. In a way, the elderly interlocutor is 
correct. We are not the boy that played football in her yard. Our faces are different, we are older, 
larger, we speak a different language from that child. Perhaps the only thing that stays the same 
is the name. So we use the name to claim the little boy that we are not any longer. 
Anyone who has followed the dispute between Greece and Macedonia over the constitutional 
name of the latter will recognize in the above example more than a little of this dispute. In this 
work I want to deal with names. We have already begun to see how the name issue cannot be 
separate from issues with other names. When an Aegean Macedonian takes out his passport to 
prove he really is the name that he claims to be and is confronted with the objection that the 
name you appeal to for verification of your own name itself needs verification.
138
 Then, when a 
woman is unable to give her name because she does not know the correct Greek formulation of 
it, again we see the implication of the name dispute causing disputation of names of individuals. 
 
In the same way that an adult claims a young boy by his name and so is only a name, is a state 
anything more than a name? When we talk of the survival of states are we not simply discussing 
the successful continuation on a claim to a name. What else can we be referring to? Are we 
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talking about the government? No. Governments in some states (Italy) change as often as once a 
year but we do not talk about the death of Italy every time this happens. What about 
constitutions? If states were constitutions then French history would begin in 1958 with General 
DeGual. This would be an unusual and unacceptable conclusion to draw. The fact that France 
can refer to its current constitution as the Fifth Republic itself belies this sort of position. Is a 
state a history? If it were a history, and if we understood history as a series of interrelated events 
and the understanding and social significance of these events then how could they ever be 
jeopardized? How could armies and navies protect or menace an entity that is built on things in 
the past, things that no longer are? Is it a culture, a way of life? If my parents culture, their idiom, 
their memories, the way they spend their spare time is not exactly mine, (and can it really be?) 
then do I belong to a different state? If one British person plays cricket on the village green and 
another plays football in the street then is that the same state or different? If playing cricket on 
the green ceases does Britain cease? Did Britain die when fox hunting was banned? Or when 
football was invented? Or when the industrial revolution brought trains and ended canal 
transportation did the state die? What more is there to a state than the continued convincing (but 
certainly not substantive) claim upon the name? Having your name accepted by your peers or 
accepting the one that they give to you? The survival of the state is the survival of the name. 
When we take these questions seriously we link identity and hospitality and start to see how the 
problems facing Aegean Macedonians with regards to their names is rooted in the laws of 
hospitality. 
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CHAPTER 4 
POLITICAL MOVEMENT FROM MACEDONIA TO MACEDONIA 
According to the electoral program of VMRO-DMPNE, the governing party of Macedonia, a 
“separate museum for the exiles from the Aegean part of Macedonia139” is to be built in Skopje. 
It is due to be completed in 2014 and has a budget of MKD 5,000,000 or about USD 135,000. 
This separate museum is to be under the auspices of the Museum of Macedonia, which, with a 
budget twice that of this special museum of the exiles, will also receive new premises. In the 
special museum of Aegean Macedonians “their Golgotha” will be exhibited “through authentic 
documents, photographs and objects”140 
 
MUSEUMS AND NATIONAL SPACE 
Thanks to the work described by Handler and Gable in their The New History in an Old Museum, 
we can question how “ideologies and interests…underpin or are reinforced by those 
representations of culture
141” exhibited in the museum. Museums are not simply “repositories of 
cultural and historical treasures.
142” On that basis, we can wonder what the curators of the new 
museum, under the direct charge of the ruling party in Macedonia wish to tell us about the 
Aegeans. The new museum of the exiles can be seen to reflect the position the exiles themselves 
occupy in Macedonian national space, at least in the minds of its creators, in the following way. 
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The exiles occupy a space that is simultaneously equivalent to and different from the space of the 
Museum of Macedonia. In one sense, their artifacts are at home in the national space. In this 
interpretation, one points to the new museum coming under the auspices of the Museum of 
Macedonia, its location in Skopje, and its inclusion in the development plan of the nationalist 
VMRO-DMPNE party. In another sense, the artifacts are separated from the national space 
signified by the Museum of Macedonia. They are in a separate museum, funded by a separate 
budget. The struggles they have experienced are known as their Golgotha when described in the 
political platform.  
 
My argument in this paper is that one reason for our ability to say that Aegean Macedonians live 
both inside and outside of the national space, which seems like a contradictory state of affairs, is 
the phenomenon of political movement. When we engage in political movement we alter the 
meaning associated with space, in this example the national space. In manipulating this meaning 
of space we shift the Aegean Macedonians beyond the border of what counts as national space 
and back again. Therefore these exiles can be both home and away in Macedonia because the 
meaning attached to the space we are assessing allows enough room for the play of politics, a 
politics of naming space and people. This has real implications for international studies – not 
least investigations of diasporas to which I now turn my attention. 
  
DIASPORA AND ITS RELIANCE ON DIFFERENTIATING SPACE 
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Current discussions of diaspora are centered on the idea of movement, physical or spiritual, from 
one defined space, usually associated with a homeland, to another, usually foreign space. They 
rely on knowing where the group belongs and whether that group currently resides in their 
homeland or not. It would be difficult to identify a group as part of a diaspora if they currently 
lived in the homeland where they longed to be, wouldn’t it? While studies on diaspora have 
examined a range of non-physical space, none escape the problem caused when the division of 
space is contested – as it always is.   
 
Safran’s definition of diasporas has been influential in the study of the phenomenon. Its six 
diaspora-defining characteristics, without exception, rely on an ability to separate domestic and 
foreign spaces and to determine whether a potential diaspora resides in one or the other.  As a 
corollary, they require that we identify the supposedly diasporic group with a homeland. While I 
do not have space here to discuss all six, I will, by way of example, show how two of them make 
the assumptions mentioned. The first of these criteria state that “they, or their ancestors, have 
been dispersed from a specific original ‘center’ to two or more ‘peripheral,’ or foreign 
regions.
143” Applying this test to any ‘they’ poses the problem of identifying a center distinct 
from the periphery. Without such a distinction we can never say whether people have been 
dispersed from a center.  Also present in this criterion is the idea of dispersal, of movement from 
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one space to another. If the differentiation of space is possible then deciding whether people have 
moved from one to the other is unproblematic.  
 
If it isn’t, though, how can movement be discerned? Macedonians, specifically Aegean 
Macedonians would meet Safran’s first criterion if we understood the difference between center 
and periphery unproblematically. We could make an argument that the traditional region of 
Macedonia, comprising contemporary Macedonia, parts of Greece, and parts of Bulgaria, is the 
center and that Australia, Canada, both of which hold many Macedonians, are the two 
peripheries. What about those Aegean Macedonians who have moved from Macedonia, via a 
third country to a Macedonia that is sometimes considered a different Macedonia? 
 
Safran’s fifth criterion has a similar need for the identification of qualitatively different spaces. It 
goes as follows: “they regard their ancestral homeland as their true, ideal home and as the place 
to which they or their descendants would (or should) eventually return.
144” This time again, we 
are asked to designate a homeland for a group of people who are defined by movement. Further, 
we must be able to differentiate that from their current place of abode if any sort of return is to be 
effected. If we wanted to know whether or not the people to whom I spoke constitute or do not 
constitute a diaspora, we would have to be able to know whether the place that they now live, 
Macedonia, is separated from their ancestral homeland, Macedonia. Only if they agree that they 
are no longer in Macedonia can they seek a return to Macedonia. Yet, if they agree that they are 
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now not in Macedonia then they divide the territory of Macedonia into an authentic Macedonia 
and a Macedonia that is so in name only.   
 
Clifford offers an alternative way to identify diaspora based on “decentered lateral 
connections…and a shared, ongoing history of displacement, suffering, adaptation, or 
resistance.
145” This is more promising and less reliant on the differentiation of space. With the 
help of Rouse,
146
 Clifford makes the point that spaces seemingly separated by distance, like 
Aguililla and Redwood City, “become effectively a single community.147” This position 
represents an opposing pole to the argument that distance must separate the diaspora from its 
homeland. It is a movement towards a single community but still spreads that single community 
across space that can be identified and differentiated by the different names attributed to the 
cities where the diaspora resides. While motioning to a position that undercuts the need to 
distinguish space, Clifford also wants to hold onto it. He uses distance from a center, and thus 
relies on distinguishing spaces, as a defining feature of diaspora by positing that distance from 
the center is an important point in distinguishing a diaspora from a borderland community.
148
  
 
Michael Baumann traces the development of the meaning of the word diaspora from its historical 
links to the Jews. Looking at the word diaspora as a second to third century BC neologism, 
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Baumann describes it as a technical word to describe the “Jewish existence far from the 
‘Promised Land’149” It is used at that time to distinguish the enforced separation from Jerusalem 
under Babylonian captivity, which was described as exile, from the choice to enjoy a higher 
standard of living away from the war torn region. This has two assumptions. One is the common 
thread running through the diaspora literature generally that diaspora involves being far 
separated from home. The second involves  
some agency on the part of those dispersed. Though they could return home, they choose to 
remain separated from their homeland for the time being because of the less than ideal 
circumstances that persist there. To make such a judgment, though, those involved must 
understand that they are separated from their home, that where they live now is not their 
homeland. On top of this, we must think that they can see their homeland well enough from 
where they are to discern the current political or economic situation and make a judgment about 
it. We must also assume that they control their own movement.  
 
Beginning from the concept of diaspora and the insistence of those who work in this area that 
space be clearly differentiated is useful in broadening the impact of the problem discussed in this 
paper, namely the problem of dividing space from itself and assigning it as homelands to groups. 
Not only have we to consider how physical space is divided, which is the main focus for this 
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paper, but beyond a physical geography lies that of the “mental and social.150” How are we to 
divide up a mental landscape and detect movement between its distinct parts?  
 
How can we tell whether a group constitutes a diaspora? When ideas such as center and 
periphery have been exposed as ineffective and in a world of movement how can we tell the 
migrants from the indigenous, the host from the guest? How do we know when someone is at 
home or not?  
 
These questions apply to the group of Aegean Macedonians discussed in the previous chapter. It 
is them that I have in mind when I ask these questions. Their stories begin towards the end of the 
Greek Civil War in 1948. A major part of the Macedonians in Greece, because of promises of 
recognition of their nationality and the provision of schools and churches in their own language, 
sided with the democratic forces in the conflict. While some Macedonians disavow the leftist 
politics of the movement and insist their motives were entirely nationalist, and others distance 
themselves from any form of nationalism even now, the promise of a homeland in the Aegean 
part of Macedonia, a place where the Macedonians could attend school and church in their 
mother tongue was enough to entice their participation in a war against the right wing Greek 
government. Men, and later many women, over the age of 14 were drafted into the Democratic 
Army of Greece (DAG), closely linked to the Greek Communist Party (KKE) and fought 
alongside Greeks (often under Greek officers). Their strength, and their expected homeland was 
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centered in the north outside of the main towns. Villagers in the mountains sheltered and 
supplied the fighters of DAG and provided auxiliary services.  
 
When we use this as our starting point to talk about a potential homeland for the Aegean 
Macedonians we see how, even though these people had lived in these villages for their whole 
lives, and their parents and grandparents before them, their belonging to the place is put in doubt. 
Even before the coming flight from this place they are both at home and not at home. They are 
fighting to remain at home in their villages, but fighting also to make it truly their home where 
they can realize the promises of the KKE by being allowed to speak their language and worship 
in their own churches. Aegean Macedonians are fighting to achieve a homeland in their homes. 
 
In retaliation for these services to the communist side of the war, the ‘monarcho-fascist’ forces, 
as my interviewees referred to them, supported by British and American militaries, bombarded 
these villages. Towards the end of the war, when only elderly women and children were left 
there, and bombs were still falling, it was decided to evacuate the children. This would free up 
remaining women to go to the front to fight. This began a massive a new stage in the massive 
exodus of Slavs from the Aegean part of Macedonia. Therefore, without achieving a homeland in 
their homeland, being both at home and separated from their homeland by the coming defeat of 
their side in the Civil War, they were expelled from their homeland before they achieved it.  
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The children were evacuated to democratic countries in Eastern Europe in groups led by 
(usually) elderly ‘mothers.’ Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, and Yugoslavia 
(Vojvodina in the beginning) were the usual destinations of these children. Some of them spoke 
Greek and others didn’t but, as explained in another chapter, all were usually known as Greek 
refugees. The leaders of DAG, along with the political leadership of the KKE went into exile in 
Taskent following defeat in the war, which many claim was decided at Yalta anyway.  
 
CRITICAL GEOPOLITICS 
From this discussion of diaspora we move to a glance of the critical geopolitics program. This 
chapter is about names and space and so it makes sense to consider some of the more critical 
work on discursively produced spatialities and their relationship with world politics. During this 
discussion, and more so in the next sections, I will flesh out my theory of political movement and 
how names play a role in both distancing people from and returning them to their homes. In this 
section I argue that critical geography and geopolitics opens a space for me to discuss the 
discursive production of space. They have called attention to changing representations of space 
and the dependence that these representations have on hegemonic powers and the relationship of 
other societies to these powers. My look at political movement is inspired by this 
denaturalization of world space. However, my thoughts on political movement take me away 
from the hegemony that critical geographers often find in these discursive productions of space. 
Rather than building controllable representations of the world, political movement suggests a 
constant flux in space so as to disavow any recourse to hegemonic discourses.  
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Critical geographers have highlighted the inconstant quality of space as experienced by people. 
John Agnew charts the journey towards understanding the Earth as the world.
151
 As early as the 
15
th
 century, European voyages of discovery effected a subjective view of space and moved 
towards a view of the world as a whole via its impact on cartography. Since “the practice of 
navigation over the open sea required a precise positioning of the travelling self in relation to the 
world as a whole,
152” then “perception of space was no longer totally abstract.153” There was the 
expectation that maps reflected what was really out there and that, by looking at the whole world 
drawn in a seemingly objective way, all on one page, a view of the whole world as if from space 
was possible. This re-visioning of world politics is a historicization of the movement from an 
abstract world governed by conjecture to an objective rendering of the Earth.  
 
While this historicization accepts the variability of space and our imaginings of it, it doesn’t 
capture the vacillations that occur in that imagination. In Agnew’s account, the movement is 
unidirectional. We move from the cartography of conjecture of the ancients to the modern 
‘objective’ view that sets the stage for world politics. As a result of this unidirectional 
movement, there is really only one politics under discussion, that of Europe and its offshoots. 
While this makes Agnew’s theory a one of massive global significance as a destabilization of the 
status-quo rendering of world politics, it does miss the to and fro of political movement that I 
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describe below. My contention, which I articulate in a field much more local than global, is that 
while it can seem like there is one dominant view of world political geography, at least on a local 
level, there are competing narratives which defy any global generalization. Further, these rival 
geographies vacillate from one imagining of local geography to another moving people and 
places in the process.  
 
Another project of critical geography is to expose the western centrism of spatial divisions of the 
world. These divisions are often based on levels of development with region imagined as more or 
less developed often depending on how much like Europe they are. Toal illustrates this point 
with reference to the discourse of the Cold War and the Truman Doctrine which “spatialized a 
free world, a slave world and a world that has to choose between the two.
154” In the same work, 
his focus in the paper, he also mentions the spatialization of a Third World that is a target for 
development. This sort of categorization of space is also represented by what Agnew calls ‘time 
as space.
155’ 
 
 Alternative systems of governance are classified as the product of backward societies that 
resemble the past of the West. Even modern Italy has a “straightforward inheritance from the 
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past” constituting a “political practice which is based on the exchange of favors.156” This view is 
unsettled with the reminder that “the ideal of civic maturity is hardly relized anywhere on 
earth.
157” However modern we might see a region or a country as being, this does not exempt 
that locality from the reality of political favor exchange.  
 
 Again, this is a useful critique of the allocation of qualities to world spaces. It denaturalizes the 
universalist ideas of development and modernity. It also casts differences between regions or 
states as alternative modernities rather than as manifestations of the pasts of more advanced 
spaces. The focus of critical geopolitics tends to be on the defining of geographical boundaries 
between societies. Critical geographers open up discourses of spatialization but tend not to focus 
on the variance of space that at first glance seems occupied by one society .In its foregrounding 
of hegemonic power exercised through such spatializations, it doesn’t pay attention to the 
alternatives that occupy the same geographic space thus fracturing that space and casting it in 
such a way that it can no longer be referred to as simply one space. It can’t really because what it 
is taking on is a globalized hegemonic way of looking at the world. My treatment of space in this 
chapter is particularistic in that it takes inspiration from events in a relatively small geographic 
space and investigates how space is defined and redefined across very small spaces of time and 
circumstance.  
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I have said that critical geographers concentrate their attention on hegemonic discourse. This is 
another difference between what I am trying to do here with political movement and what the 
critical scholars of geopolitics have been successfully doing. Agnew and Corbridge, leaders in 
the type of scholarship we are discussion here, state that: 
Spatial practices and representations of spaces are dialectically interwoven. In other 
words, the spatial conditions of material life are shaped through their representations as 
certainly as representations are shaped by the spatial contours of material life.
158
  
 
 For them there is a reflexive relationship between what is really out there and representations of 
what is really out there. This is important, in part, because it privileges some political and 
scientific elites who best understand what is really out there and so become purveyors of 
authoritative representations of space. Specifically “those in authority in the Great Powers or 
within the hegemonic state (if there is one) have the power to constitute the dominant 
geopolitical discourse.
159” These dominant discourses are tenacious and “even challenges often 
must conform to the ‘terms of debate.160’” At the level of global discourse, these arguments have 
some appeal. If you take pronouncements of governments and the media that report them 
seriously it is conceivable that you can find a coherent dominant discourse. It is my contention, 
however, that such dominant geopolitical discourses have much less influence in the face of local 
expertise and that competing spatializations live on side by side. These may be particular to 
regions, circumstances and times. They can go on independently of any sort of global dominant 
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discourse and the existence of these very localized representations of space belie the saliency of 
any overarching worldview.  
 
POLITICAL MOVEMENT 
Now that we see the children evacuated and the parents, those that survived the fighting, exiled 
from the homeland that was not quite yet a homeland, we turn to the question of return. If the 
people I am referring to, those refugees from the Aegean part of Macedonia, are to be considered 
a diaspora then there must be some prospect of a return home. It is this issue which leads me to 
my concept of political movement. A useful starting point for a discussion of the concept is a 
claim made about the refugees of the Greek civil war; the claim that “[m]ost never returned 
home.
161” The refugees referred to left Greece around 1948, immediately prior to the defeat of 
the communist forces, with which many ethnic Macedonians in Greece fought, and took refuge 
in the democratic countries of eastern Europe. Later, many were reunited with their families in 
Skopje and other Macedonian cities north of the Greek border. The claim that most never 
returned home excites the question: what about those who settled in Macedonia? Did they return 
home? 
To say that they did not return depends upon a distinction between multiple ‘Macedonias.’ It 
assumes that the Macedonia in which they now live is not the same as the Macedonia from 
which they fled. The name is the same but the space it is supposed to represent differs. Names 
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play an important part in this concept. In our case, the name remains the same but the space that 
name represents is considered qualitatively different – it is not home.  
 
Remember that Lyotard shows proper names acting as a form of deictic that appear fixed through 
the invariability of their form. So, while ‘here’ can be any place (it could be here, or here, or 
even here), Rome, is considered to occupy a particular place. Macedonia is similarly expected to 
be one unchanging place. This is the source of stability and changelessness that space, 
appropriately endowed with a name, conveys to us. A feature of Lyotard’s system is that there is 
one name that is to attach meaning to a defined space. The name connects so much description to 
one place, one here, that it creates an over determined system. Rome is the capital city of the 
empire, the modern capital of Italy, the ancient city, the rail terminus, the home of Lazio football 
club, the city where the European Economic Community was founded by treaty, etc. Because all 
there is to be said has not been said about Rome, the meaning of Rome is infinitely variable
162
. It 
is in this infinitely variable meaning that politics acts. In different circumstances, in different 
relationships, and at different times, limited subsets of these infinite meanings are brought to 
bear. And, in the changing meaning of the word, people are ushered across borders, alienated 
from their home here and repatriated there. Without moving themselves, the ground underneath 
them moves as meanings are altered, fixed, and liquefied. 
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In understanding space in this overdetermined way, political movement goes someway to 
countering what John Agnew describes as the view from nowhere pervasive in studies of the 
international. 
“[B]ecause of the strong tendency to associate space with stasis or changelessness…state-
centricity has continuing normative attractions…It provides a grounded set of socio-
geographic units for both longitudinal and cross-sectional data analyses.” 
 A concept of political movement is a movement away from the grounded set of units towards a 
world of shifting ground that offer no basis upon which to make data analyses. It undermines the 
set of units that offer themselves as a ground upon which to base studies of world politics. The 
metatheory of fixed points of reference, data points,  depends upon the idea that the ground 
contains some meaning in itself, some self identity. It is an attractive one. The physical 
appearance of geographical features changes very slowly and often not at all in several 
generations. With technologies of cartography based on the fixing of points in relation to 
seemingly immoveable features and abstract grids of Cartesian coordinates, space appears rigid 
and even self-defined. However, accepting space as identical to itself is a capitulation to the idea 
that Agnew calls “a view from nowhere.” Political actors, including nation states, have views 
based on “partiality and situatedness.” This leaves space, like anything else, open to politics.  
 
The political part of political movement consists of a negotiation, in Derrida’s sense of the word, 
between two poles. The image of being between two positions and moving backwards and 
forwards from one to the other gives us the sense of the political contingency that exists in this 
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interstitial place. This negotiation is itself a political movement where we are in a constant flux 
between two poles and can never settle on one.
163
 For example, in the case that we discuss here, 
we can never fully discern the true Macedonia from the false one because names cannot be 
proven and the meaning of Macedonia continues to be written. Since there is no way to 
distinguish between the different Macedonias and the movement from one to another can never 
be finally decided, we can never rest at one of the poles and so the movement between the poles 
is perpetual. This inability to rest on solid ground is what the politics of political movement 
implies. This movement, and the attempts to stop it once and for all at one of the poles, to decide 
once and for all the real Macedonia is the politics of political movement, in fact, it can be 
thought of as the movement of politics.  
 
The movement of political movement is a little less abstract but no less contingent. This 
movement is the effect of rendering someone home or away by striking a particular political 
position. Since these political positions are contingent upon time and circumstance, people can 
be and are moved regularly and quickly between belonging and not belonging, between being a 
stranger or a host. Movement understood in these terms can be experienced even when standing 
still. Take my opening discussion regarding the museum for example. Without any physical 
movement on their part, the museum moved them backwards and forwards across the border of 
the national space. So this movement then is between or within political spaces like states for 
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example that are themselves political in the sense we have already described. Whether or not 
people move, the movement of politics can take them from their homes. 
 
NAMES AND POLITICAL MOVEMENT  
The final component is names. Names supply the vehicle for both politics and movement. It is by 
proclaiming one name and not another that political stances are made manifest. It is also, as we 
shall see in the case of exiles from the Aegean part of Macedonia, the means by which we know 
if we have moved, if we have returned home or not. We move from place to place under the 
steam of names. It is names, displayed next to roads, on GPS devices or map books that provoke 
a sense of change in location. Some see these road signs as the evidence of the presence of a 
central authority,
164
 or the cultural norms and nation building of a sociopolitical elite.
165
 Names 
are not only held as evidence of a central organizing authority or a reference to an original 
nominator. Names orient and locate people and peoples. Due to the political nature of names 
already described, then, people are relocated on the basis of politics and this is the movement of 
political movement.  
The removal of signs bearing the names of towns during the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia 
in 1968 led to a major disruption of Red Army operations. As Czech writer Milan Kundera 
explains: “Overnight the country had become nameless. For seven days, Russian troops 
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wandered the countryside, not knowing where they were.
166
 That the capacity of a professional 
military force to move is severely limited by the absence of names begins to speak to their 
requirement for movement. 
 
As well as the disorientation of not knowing where they were, the removal of names disrupts the 
movement of the invading troops. It is not only that they didn’t know where they were. Kundera 
can only describe them as wandering the countryside and not moving from one place to another: 
he cannot tell us where they were. Without a change in names there is no movement, not in the 
sense of a from here to there movement, only a wandering. Concurrently, with a change in names 
there is movement. In this account of the nameless Czechoslovak countryside, it is the lack of 
change in names rather than the absence of names that is the crucial factor. Indeed, there was one 
name, Czechoslovakia, which made the event relevant to the Czech writer, which nevertheless 
did not change as the soldiers wandered its countryside.  
 
Azaryahu concentrates his work on the significance of names and what they can and cannot tell 
us about official histories and changes in regimes. For example, he is interested in the changing 
street names of Paris as a “use of names of streets and squares for the purpose of political 
representation.
167”  The investigation of political movement is not primarily one of this political 
representation in the manner of Azaryau’s work. It is also the effects of the breakdown of names, 
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when one name, like Macedonia, is endowed with meanings that suggest multiple places. All this 
assumes, but mostly neglects, any claims to political representation that names may have. Rather, 
it concerns the possibility of movement in the midst of these representations, their contradictions 
and temporality. The result of the change, clash and clang of representations is that movement is 
at once hindered and facilitated.  
 
Movement across political borders is performed by a change in names and related symbols. As 
you cross the border between Macedonia and Greece, where movement between spaces is 
performed by flags, checkpoints and questions, formal and informal, you are immediately 
greeted with a paradox.  Pulling away from the post of the Greek border police, and entering 
Greece, you are greeted with a road sign emblazoned with the phrase: ‘Welcome to Macedonia’. 
The ‘welcome’ part of the sign suggests a move from one political space to another yet the name 
remains the same. What those who put the sign there, the Greek authorities want it to say is 
welcome to the region of Macedonia, this constituent part of the Republic of Greece. Welcome 
away from that imposter Macedonia. However, the incongruity of the welcome, the performance 
of the border crossing, and the name of the place sets off yet another negotiation,
168
 the back and 
forth between difference and identity. The identical name on either side of the border calls 
attention to movement between political entities as a performed, artificial, and arbitrary 
phenomenon contingent, in part, on a change in names. It destabilizes the border.  
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Here, though, we are concerned with movement from Macedonia to Macedonia, a movement 
between spaces whose identical name is a vain protest of a negotiation that goes on in its 
meaning. The claim of identity, a political one for sure, draws attention to political movement, a 
movement activated by a political stance. The political stance of the sign in Greece welcoming 
you to Macedonia, or indeed directing you to take the ‘Macedonia wine route’ through the 
countryside, is an attempt to erase the name of the territory from which you have travelled there. 
Moreover, you will not see any signs to lead you back to the Republic of Macedonia but instead 
placards will bear the name of its capital Skopje, FYROM or even, directing you back 20 years, 
Yugoslavia. As movement between political spaces is determined by names, the politics of 
naming, or naming with political intent, interferes with movement. And so, movement becomes 
dependent upon standing still and maintaining a (political) position. You can deny movement 
without the border. 
 
Showing the results of this split in the name, this failure of the lynchpin between deictic and 
meaning, I ask that we return to the claim made that most of the refugees from the Greek Civil 
War never returned.  In supporting that claim, John Agnew states that the refugees stayed “in 
Yugoslav Macedonia.”  The adhesion of Yugoslav to the name Macedonia is a result of the 
failure of the name under political weight. With the further name ‘Yugoslav’ connected to the 
name, the possibility of a Macedonian political movement to an unfamiliar Macedonia is 
maintained.  With the political addition, refugees are divided from their homeland and remain 
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estranged from the land of their nativity. The modifier divides the meaning that might be 
connected with Macedonia   
Fleeing towards a name is hazardous. As one current union leader from Aegean Macedonia 
reported during an interview, he thought that in Pirin Macedonia his people, the Macedonians, 
would be at home. The Macedonian Committee set up to help them adjust to life in this 
Macedonia became a target of protest though as Macedonians were asked to take on Bulgarian 
citizenship.
169
 
 
Before beginning with the histories offered by the child refugees (now well into their later years 
of life), I want to discuss the questioning of the equivalence of the names Macedonia and 
Macedonia in the context of border controls. The equivalence of the name Macedonia with the 
name Macedonia is called into question at the border in at least two ways. One of the ways is the 
refusal of entry for bearers of a passport which bears the name the Republic of Macedonia. As 
discussed in the previous chapter, Macedonians are issued with a Greek document for receiving 
visa stamps that does not contain the name Macedonia with the accompanying meaning of the 
government and territory of the Republic of Macedonia.  
 
DISPERSAL FROM THE HOMELAND 
I now offer a brief account of the flight of Macedonians from the Aegean part of Macedonia to 
third countries that I am putting together using some of the interviews that I conducted in 
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Macedonia. This is intended to give some background to the rest of the chapter which deals with 
those people who came from those lands beyond the name Macedonia to Macedonia. I am 
hesitant to use the word return in the context of these refugees. A return to Macedonia is made 
possible by the name. The name Macedonia and its connection to the territory that overlaps the 
territory of Greece and the Former Yugoslavia make possible such a return. However, there is 
enough difference between Macedonia and Macedonia, in terms of government, social 
organization, landscape, language,
170
 etc. There is then a negotiation in the return to the 
homeland.  
 
One of the children who were taken from the dangers of the Civil War raging near his home told 
me of his flight from Greece. He was a child in Voden/Edessa
171
 during the Second World War. 
His father was a partisan fighting with the Democratic Army of Greece. He told me that 
following the end of the Second World War, because of the leftist political position of the 
partisans, the Greek government began terrorizing them following the withdrawal of the 
occupying forces. This was the reason, he told me, that women and children were fleeing. In the 
winter of 1946, when the man was six years old he fled to the mountains surrounding his town. 
His party were disguised as fish merchants to pass clandestinely through the town of Voden 
                                                 
170
 Even though Macedonians often only spoke their native tongue at home, the surrounding environment, 
particularly in the towns was filled with Greek language in the Aegean Part of Macedonia. In the 
Macedonia they returned to, this was not the case.  
171
 Voden is the Macedonian name for the town and Edessa the Greek name. The town is situated in 
northern Greece near to where much of the fighting in the later stages of the Civil War took place. It is 
about 30 miles south of the border with what was then Yugoslavia and what is now the Republic of 
Macedonia.  
121 
 
(Edessa) which, like the other towns in the region, were controlled by the Greek government. 
Crossing the border with them were columns of about 300 women and children.  
 
As discussed earlier the status of the homeland and the connection of the Aegean Macedonians 
openly vacillates in this account. At first you can read homeland into the narrative. The man was 
a child and had lived in the area all his short life. His father served in the militia nearby and he 
used the Macedonian name of the town throughout his account except to explain that the Greeks 
call it something different. On these terms, the actions he is describing are a quitting of his 
homeland due to terrorization from a national government that was not his own. On other terms, 
that the nearby militia unit belonged to the Democratic Army of Greece, that he could escape 
unrecognized from the area, and that the government was persecuting him and his family for 
their political positions, suggests that the homeland was not fully theirs and did not really afford 
them much of a home. This narrative of leaving under duress and in secret was a recurring theme 
in the stories of the Aegean Macedonians that I interviewed. In fact, many of their stories began 
with this motif. The focus on this clearly represents that an unwillingness on the part of the 
refugees to leave their homes and villages and this would be consistent with a homeland that you 
feel fondly for and would not leave voluntarily.  
 
An important detail that this man wanted me to be sure of, as we shared a drink at the ABC 
Tennis Club, is that their destination was Macedonia and not Yugoslavia. This characterizes their 
flight from their home, in some ways, as not a quitting of their homeland altogether. The journey 
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from Voden to Bitola, where they were housed temporarily in the homes of Jews who had been 
sent to death camps by the Bulgarian occupiers, would not have required moving through any 
land not known to the voyagers as Macedonia. In that sense, travelling to Macedonia (and not 
Yugoslavia) would have meant that, in the terms of political movement, there was not a 
movement. The significance of his insisting that he fled to Macedonia, the same place from 
where he fled, is that he remained in his homeland. Due to the poverty of Macedonia at the time, 
he and the others were unable to be absorbed and so, helped by the International Red Cross, they 
were directed to Vojvodina (in northern Serbia), specifically Gakovo and Sombor. This 
movement is qualitatively different as it moves my interviewee and his fellow travelers beyond 
the space named Macedonia to another part of Yugoslavia. Because of the politics of the time, 
we can say he remained in Yugoslavia during this second movement but he represented it as a 
temporary exile from his homeland.  
 
The memories he shared from his time in Vojvodina were related to the food that they had for 
them to eat there. They ate beans and potatoes directly from one large pot. They opened a school 
there and it was the first time that he had access to education in his own language. In Voden, 
everything outside the home had been conducted in Greek, again casting doubt or at least 
vacillation on the status of the city as a home for Macedonians.  Following the defeat of the 
partisans in Greece in 1948-49 the man’s father went to live in Skopje. By then, Macedonia was 
more organized. This meant that my interlocutor and his compatriots living in Vojvodina could 
return home. In Serbia they were foreigners but in Macedonia they were at home in the politics 
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of the man telling the story. In other politics, that of Tito I imagine, as a Yugoslav he is as at 
home in Serbia as in Macedonia.   
This man, like thousands of others who fled Greece around the same time, has been stripped of 
his land and citizenship. He would like them back. He supports his claim to the right to live in 
Voden again by pointing out that he has around fifty relatives that live there and if they enjoy 
that right then why shouldn’t he? What is the difference between him and them? Hearing him say 
this is like hearing the case for Aegean Macedonia, Voden in particular as a homeland. He 
connects the place with family and explains draws comparisons between himself and his blood 
relatives that still live in the town. 
 
A woman told me of fleeing Macedonia by ship from Albania. She did not know where she was 
heading but, after a lot of travel, and after having seen a dead man thrown overboard, the ship 
arrived in Gdansk, Poland. From there the children were loaded onto trains. Again the refugees 
were ignorant of their destination. She was relocated to a specially built village in Hungary. It 
was shared by both ethnic Greeks and Macedonians. On Sundays they listened to Greek music. 
All inhabitants of the village were known as Greek political refugees. Hungarians referring to the 
refugees as Greeks is insprired by the fact that, Macedonian or not, they came from Greece. This 
appellation suggests that the Maceonians were not in exile from their homeland but from a land 
as equally foreign as Hungary. Inhabitants of the village lived like a big family and held reunions 
in Thessaloniki between 1973 and 1975.  
 
124 
 
This lady describes her time in Hungary as temporary and related that every year on New Year’s 
day, it was common in the village to speculate that this would be the last year they would spend 
in Hungary. They had no citizenship while they were there and travel was difficult for the 
Macedonians. In 1984 Hungary issued a directive that meant Greek political refugees should 
either take Hungarian citizenship or leave. My informant didn’t want to come to Macedonia 
citing the difference in culture between Hungary and the Balkans. She thought she would adjust 
but found it more difficult than she expected.  
 There was one school in the settlement that both Greek and Macedonian children attended. The 
difference in instruction was constituted by a choice of Macedonian or Greek literature.  
 
In 1976 the woman was given a visa to visit Greece but it was forbidden her to visit any of the 
border villages. She was not able to see her village until 1989. When she did, the house of her 
family was just some stumps, some steps, a wall, and a pile of stones. She wept like a child.  
 
RETURN TO MACEDONIA? 
Was this return to the pile of stones a return home for my informer? Many of the decata begalci 
resettled in Macedonia, the part of it which was until 1992 a constituent republic of Yugoslavia, 
with the help of the International Red Cross. For many, it was a matter of being reunited with 
their families. Their parents were in Skopje or other Macedonian cities sometimes with older 
siblings.
172
 The Red Cross, in cooperation with authorities in the Eatern Bloc countries, found 
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the children that had been separated from their parents almost a decade previously and reunited 
those willing with their families. Some of the children’s parents had emigrated to Australia, 
America, or the Soviet Union and children of those parents sometimes joined them there. A well 
known Macedonian artist who was himself a child refugee informed me that a lot of his cousins 
live in Tashkent, Uzbekistan.
173
  Many of his other cousins, whom he visits, live in Greece, in 
Kostur, Lerin, Voden, and Solun.
174
 
  
Thinking of names and political movement, as these children were reunited with their families, 
they moved from states with names like Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary to a place, 
Macedonia, with the name of the homeland where they had been separated from their parents. 
Not only did the space have the same name as their lost homeland but it was contiguous with that 
place. They moved home. Since the refugees who had been born and ejected from Macedonia 
called themselves and their language Macedonian, the territory which bore their name claimed to 
be something more natural and permanent than the childrens homes and villages they had left 
behind. Perhaps more than that, though, is that it promised to be the place they left from. 
Understanding Macedonia as a united whole asks us to consider that these refugees left from 
Macedonia around 1948 and returned to the same place about a decade later. However, by some 
political understanding, they had never lived in this home before.  Understanding Macedonia as a 
group of separate parts with one part in Greece, one in Bulgaria, and another in Serbia demands 
that we agree with Agnew that the refugees never returned home. 
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If names are the lynchpin between ostensive statements and meaning then they might also prove 
to bind the meaning of a group of people and a territory holding the same name. As already 
described, the tension comes when there is political division within the meaning. Whilst 
discussing the movement of the Aegean Macedonians from their villages and towns in northern 
Greece, we have said that their movement has been linked to the name Macedonia. The people in 
question were either moving towards what they thought was Macedonia or imagining a return to 
their home. There are examples of this backwards and forwards between a united Macedonia – 
homeland of the Aegeans in the history of the association responsible for their integration into 
Macedonia. 
 
In the ‘Extended Plenary Meeting of the Chief Board of the Association of Refugees from the 
Aegean Macedonia’ an expectation was articulated about the participation of these immigrants in 
the People’s Republic of Macedonia, Yugoslavia. It discusses their status: 
“We found ourselves refugees in the course of the war for our people, but not refugees in 
alien territory but in our own land – in the free part of our fatherland – the Free People’s 
Republic of Macedonia. There is no question that we just enjoy political freedom, no 
question of less than full equality formal and real. Let us remember this land as our free 
fatherland, let us participate as much in her building as in the management of the state 
apparatus. Let us participate in state and political life, mass organizations and in the 
party. Rightly the comrade participants in DAG pose the request for recognition of their 
ranks, because the Macedonian participated in DAG as a Macedonian with the ultimate 
aim – the liberation of Macedonia. Let us enjoy the right to vote, to be elected and to 
elect from the local organs to the National Assembly. Let it show so much that our fight 
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is part of the fights of the entire Macedonian nation and the continuation of Free 
Macedonia is equal with that of our brothers from Vardar Macedonia.
175’ 
 
In the quotation above we already begin to see the vacillation between identity and  
difference. The Aegean Macedonians are ‘refugees’ but in their ‘own land.’ The repetition of “let 
us”176 suggests that participation in political life and the remembering of this land as our land is 
not already present. While their fight is part of the fights of the Macedonian nation, it is 
nevertheless their fight, peculiar to them. What makes it even more the fight of the Aegean 
Macedonians is that it is “equal with that of our brothers from Vardar Macedonia.” It is this sort 
of vacillation that illustrates the politics of movement.  
 
When I read that document, I can’t help but think of Roxanne Doty’s treatment of this tension 
between identity and difference. 
“Here we find a tension between universalism and particularism, identity and difference 
that involves, on the one hand, the claim that ‘we’ and ‘they’ are the same, one universal 
brotherhood of man, and, on the other hand, the claim of difference that is implicit in 
these terms. This tension could be held at bay and the question of what difference was 
could be deferred as long as most of ‘them’ stayed ‘there’. But when they came to the 
‘mother country’ in large enough numbers the tension approached its limit.177” 
 
In our statement above we find a ‘we’ – the refugees from Aegean Macedonia - and we find a 
‘them’ – ‘our brothers from Vardar Macedonia.’ While the we and the them are separable under 
the terms mentioned, they are also “equal”. Vardar Macedonia itself has another identity “The 
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Free People’s Republic of Macedonia”. Again we see two names, sometimes they are equivalent 
and sometimes they contrast with one another. Depending on these phases of identity and 
difference is the status of the refugees as having returned home or as still being abroad and 
estranged from their home. This short passage of speech spoken by one speaker contains in it 
disagreement over the subjectivity of the principle actors in that narrative.  
 
The ‘we’ and the ‘them’ mentioned above both play the role of deictics Lyotard’s triadic model 
of reality. Remember that the name was the lynchpin that held together the deictic with the 
reality. In this vacillation between identity and difference where the deictic goes from we to 
them, the name sometimes remains constant and sometimes changes. Sometimes the we refers to 
Aegean Macedonians and in those instances the them refers to Vardar Macedonians. However, 
both can be subsumed under the name Macedonian.  
Though  in their ‘fatherland’ questions of equivalence and difference arise. From the minutes of 
the meetings of the “Glavniot Odbor na Makedoncite od Egejska Makedonija” (Chief Board of 
the Macedonians from Aegean Macedonia, “the board”), we can see an unstable distinction 
between (local) Macedonians and (Aegean) Macedonians. This distinction occurs in the context 
of a housing shortage that adversely affected the new Macedonian refugees. 
 
Not only was there a shortage of accommodation in Macedonia but the accommodation that was 
available was often reserved for local people. As Slavjanka, a member of the board described it: 
“even if enough apartments were built, this issue would not be resolved for us because our 
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[people] who inhabited new apartments…the local boards took the apartments from our [people] 
and gave them to others. This happened in Kumanovo, Štip, and Skopje…178” A very 
fundamental division is written into this statement. ‘Naši’ (ours, our people) is used for those 
who are thrown from their homes, and ‘drugi’ (others) are the ones who are favoured by the 
housing authorities. Maybe the housing shortage is solved for these others but it is certainly not 
resolved for “us.”  
The ‘others’ are not defined beyond the simple distinction that they are not ours. ‘Ours’ are 
further described. There is a man called Sotir whose family “came from Greece.” Despite having 
lived in his apartment for two months he was thrown out.
179
 Ours also include “the girls from the 
[children’s] home ‘11th October.’” When they applied for housing they were told that Aegeans 
should “go to your board and let them give [apartments] to you.180” 
  
This incident shows that a division between ‘Aegeans’ and others recognized by local 
authorities. In the case of Sotir, ejected from his home of two months, his foreignness to 
Macedonia is performed in the description of him and his family having come from Greece. This 
alternative rendering of Aegean Macedonia is devoid of any name to connect him to his new 
home in the PR of Macedonia. It is a political act.  
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The organized refugees also took a very conscious part in writing the subjectivity of 
Macedonians generally. One of the ways they did this was in offering courses on the history of 
the Macedonian people. This was an attempt to fix a subjectivity that had been somewhat 
contradictory. Lazo Damovski, who was on the Skopje City Board of the Association of 
Refugees from the Aegean Part of Macedonia pointed out the contradiction in the subjectivity of 
the refugees. “Our membership is not familiar with the national history and the fundamental 
progeny of the Macedonians. One part believes that we are descendents of Alexander the Great, 
others that we are of the same tribe as the Bulgarians…181” Curing this lack of understanding of 
the true origin of Macedonians was important in the battle against “Greater Bulgarian and 
Greater Greek chauvinistic tendencies as well as the revisionist staff of the Communist Party of 
Bulgaria and the Communist Party of Greece.
182” The remedy to this crisis of subjectivity was 
instruction in history. The course was to be split into five sections: “From Samuil to the Turkish 
Occupation, from the Turkish occupation to Ilinden, From Ilinden to the Balkan wars, from the 
Balkan wars to the German Occupation, 1945-48, and then from the evil declaration of the 
Cominform until now.
183” 
 
The above movement by the Skopje Board displays a concern over the subjectivity of the 
Macedonians. The subjectivities currently held by the membership leave them vulnerable to 
Bulgarian and Greek narratives about who they are and where they belong. In order to protect 
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their membership from such influences, they must be brought to understand their progeny in a 
certain way. The content of the instruction is not to be had in this exchange. However, we learn a 
lot about the proposed subjectivity simply from the way the course is divided.  
 
This discussion of political movement and the spaces through which that movement has taken 
place began with a discussion of diaspora. The basics of diaspora involve a homeland, 
estrangement from that homeland, and a desire, at least under certain circumstances, to return to 
that homeland. Throughout this chapter we have seen that discursive space through which 
migrants, refugees, and diasporas move, is dependent upon names that give themselves to 
multiple political interpretations. Infinite meanings are attached to Macedonia to the point where 
only politically can we decide whether or not the Aegean Macedonians had a homeland to be 
estranged from. Further, it is politically contingent – dependent on how we represent the 
Macedonian political space, whether or not Aegean Macedonian refugees had been estranged 
from that homeland when they crossed a political border into Yugoslavia. Then, taking seriously 
John Agnew’s statement that most refugees never returned home, we saw that it is possible to 
return to a home that you have never really been to before, to return to a homeland that you may 
never have been present in before.  
 
Political movement, rapid vacillation between being at home and away almost simultaneously is 
one of the results of the name as the lynchpin of reality. Because names can hold contradictory 
meanings, Macedonia can be at once united and divided, it can both contain internal borders and 
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not contain them. Depending upon the situation and the people involves, Aegean Macedonians 
are at home in the Republic of Macedonia where their artifacts lie in the national museum and 
they are refugees still with their artifacts in a special museum for refugees.  
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CHAPTER 5 
FLORINA/LERIN: THE VIOLENCE OF NAMING IN AEGEAN MACEDONIA 
So far we have looked at how people have been in naming practices and how they have resisted 
real attempts to render them intelligible within a system of signs. We have further glanced at the 
role of names in what I have called political movement. Implicit in both of those stories is a 
violence or force. A violence or force, we have said, has been enacted on and within the meaning 
that the name links with a person, a body. In the case of political movement, that violence can be 
located in the meaning attached to geography, including the people that are written within the 
land. What was implicit in those preceding considerations I treat explicitly in this chapter.   
 
SITUATING FLORINA/LERIN
184
 
Map 2 shows the city of Florina/Lerin situated in the south-west corner of the Pelagonian plain 
just over seven miles south of the current Greece-Macedonia border. It is approximately eighteen 
miles south, across the plain, of Macedonia’s second city, Bitola, which itself was once known 
by a Greek name – Monastiri, and it is just shy of one hundred miles west of Greece’s ‘co-
capital’, and largest city and port of the Macedonian region, Thessaloniki.185 Administratively, 
the city forms a part of Greece’s West Macedonia region along with the Kastoria, Kozani, and 
Grevena prefectures. The Greek regions of West Macedonia, Central Macedonia, and – partially- 
East Macedonia and Thrace make up the region that we have referred to as Aegean Macedonia 
                                                 
184
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 Known as Solun to the Macedonians.  
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and is colored blue on Map 1.  Florina/Lerin has a population of 56,374
186
 when the surrounding 
countryside is taken into account. In terms of party politics in the region, few (just under 40%
187
) 
turned out to vote in the recent June 2012 elections
188
 and those that did were split roughly the 
same as the country as a whole with the center-right ‘New Democracy’ in first place and left-
wing conglomeration ‘SYRIZA’ in second. The geographic situation of Florina/Lerin, and its 
changing population have made it liable to a negotiation of identity and name over its history. 
Before we move on to discussing a recent outbreak in name inspired violence in the city, I will 
provide some background. 
 
Florina features in Loring Danforth’s account of Greece’s attempted Helenization of the part of 
Macedonia awarded it following success in the Balkan wars.
189
 While Central and Eastern 
Macedonia were subject to an influx of ‘Greeks’ from Turkey and Bulgaria, Western Macedonia, 
and particularly Florina/Lerin was less impacted by this population influx.
190
 Danforth credits the 
maintenance of a separate Macedonian identity in Florina/Lerin and other West Macedonian 
localities to class. Many of the Slavic speakers there were poorer and held small farms isolated 
from the Greek influence of the towns.
191
  Therefore, in 1930 Slavic-speaking Macedonians were 
about 61% of the population of Florina/Lerin and her environs.
192
 According to a survey of local 
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authorities carried out by anthropologists Jane Cowan and Helleen Van der Minne in 1993, two 
years before the events we discuss in this chapter, in that year, 64% of the rural inhabitants of the 
Florina prefecture, excluding the town itself, were Slavic-speakers. Despite the passage of time, 
and despite official Greece’s claim that there are only Greeks living in Greece, Florina/Lerin 
retains some considerable diversity.  
 
The slavophone Macedonians, resident in Florina/Lerin and the rest of Aegean Macedonia since 
before the breakup of the Ottoman Empire, have encountered a concerted effort by the Greek 
government to disavow a Slavic identity including the language that they speak at home and the 
Slavic names they use to refer to places and people.
193
 Kiselenovski, a Macedonian historian, 
estimated that, in this region, there lived some 240,000 slavophones, the vast majority of which 
lived in the west of Aegean (Greek) Macedonia around the centers of Kastoria/Kastur, 
Florina/Lerin and Edessa/Voden. Even though the Greek census of 1928 reported only one third 
of this number,
194
 it is clear that there was a sizable population of Slavs in this part of Greece. 
Writers of an unabashedly pro- Greek government history of Greece, John Koliopoulos and 
Thanos Veremis describe the situation that Greek refugees from Constantinople and Smyrna saw 
as they migrated to “western Greece”195 They tell us that in Aegean (Greek) Macedonia of the 
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1920s “Greek- speakers where not everywhere in the majority.196” This Slavic linguistic 
majority, who had remained in their homes in this region following the end of the Greek- 
Turkish War in 1922 and the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923, which had led to population exchanges 
between Greece, Turkey and Bulgaria, came under great pressure to Hellenize during the 1930s. 
According to Rossos (who quotes mainly Kiselenovski and other Macedonian scholars), the 
Greek government “went so far as to ‘Greekocize’ the personal names and surnames (of 
Macedonians)”. Also, “a special law was passed and published in the official government 
newspaper which ordered the replacement by Greek names of all the Slavic names of cities, 
villages, rivers, mountains, etc.
197” Florina/Lerin was one such place whose name was changed.  
 
1995 VIOLENCE 
It is here in Florina/Lerin that on September 6th 1995, members of a group named “Rainbow,” a 
political party representing some of the Macedonian minority still present in the city, hung up a 
sign that caused a violent reaction among their fellow citizens. In this section, I will describe the 
events of that day, beginning with the nature of the sign, going on to talk about some of the 
events that led to the local police removing the sign and then move on to the burning of the 
offices of Rainbow during a visit of the Mayor and Police Chief to the premises. Following this 
account I make the claim that violence, as it is discussed earlier in this chapter, is best described 
with reference to this theory of Derrida. 
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In September 1995, Ουράνιος Τόξος/Виножито198 (Rainbow), a political party representing the 
Slavo- Macedonian inhabitants of northwestern Greece /Aegean Macedonia opened an office in 
the Macedonian town of Florina/Lerin. On the building containing these offices, the leaders 
placed a sign that announced the name of the party in both Greek and Macedonian. According to 
a final judgment of the Europeans Court of Human Rights given on 29th September 2005, on 
13th September 1995, “the public prosecutor at the Florina Criminal Court ordered the removal 
of the sign on the ground that the inclusion of the party's name in Macedonian was liable to sow 
discord among the local population.
199” As well as the Greek and Macedonian translation of the 
name of the party “Rainbow,” the Slavic name of the town was also used. Featured on the sign 
were the words Лерински Комитет. (Lerin Committee [of the Rainbow Party]). 
 It was this reference to the Slavic name of the town that appears to have been among the main 
concerns for public prosecutors in Florina/Lerin. In the indictment of Rainbow leaders Vasilis 
Romas, Costas Tasopoulos, Petros Vasiliadis, and Pavlos Voskopoulos, the prosecution 
proclaims “Among other words written therein, there were the words ‘Lerinski Komitet’ written 
in linguistic idiom. These words, in combination with the fact that they were written in a foreign 
language, in the specific Slavic linguistic idiom, provoked and incited disharmony among the 
area’s citizens.200” That none of the other specific names featured on the sign occupy such a 
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privileged part of the indictment, we will progress on the basis that it is the use of the Slavic 
name of the town, alongside the Greek, which was the main incitement of violence in the town. 
 
The violence that was incited began, in the terms of the ECHR judgment two days after “the 
local authorities had clearly incited the population of Florina to gather in protest against the 
applicants [Rainbow leaders] and some of their [local authorities] members had taken part in the 
protests.
201” This official incitement of violence is important to the idea of the violence 
underpinning society’s order as we shall see when we discuss Derrida’s theory in detail. The 
incitement that the judgment refers to can be found in a Resolution drafted by the Prefecture 
Council of Florina, which at the time was run by the centre- right party Νέα Δημοκρατεία (New 
Democracy). In the Resolution they refer to the sign hung outside the offices of Rainbow as 
containing “progressive content, in the unacceptable Skopjan script, which questions the Greek 
character of Florina (see Lerinski Komitet)”. Then calling for action they order “all the Political, 
Trade Union and Cultural Associations and…particularly the Local Authorities and the 
representatives of the Government, to take a position regarding the actions committed by the 
treacherous clique of Voskopoulos & Company.
202
 It did so on the ground that these men 
violated a law. While “to take a position” is perhaps not an incitement to violence, the tone of the 
resolution, which refers to the leaders of Rainbow as “hirelings of Skopje…puppets of Skopje’s 
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propaganda… a treacherous clique203” is inflammatory and is mostly oriented around the 
foreignness of this political party. 
 
Beyond the making of political statements, the local authorities, according to some sources, 
actually participated personally in the violence. Adesmeftos Typos, a newspaper with Greek 
nationalist leanings, reported that, following the removal of the offending sign by the police 
commissioner and its replacement with a cardboard one by Rainbow activists,  
“Mr. Dimitris Stylou, Mayor of Florina, and the whole municipal council went to the 
offices of the Rainbow organization and took down the provocative inscription. Then, 
they set up a fire and, while singing the song, ‘Renowned Macedonia, country of 
Alexander’ they burnt it.204”  
 
A similar story in Eleftherotypia, a more radical newspaper, describes the mayor being “at the 
head
205” of a large group of citizens gathered in the center of Florina/Lerin who later “set fire to 
fitted carpets, inscriptions, as well as leaflets which they found in the offices.
206” When the 
police and fire brigade responded they did so “without making any arrests.207” The violence that 
was enacted against the Rainbow organization (specifically and tellingly against its name on a 
sign) was sanctioned, if not perpetrated, by the established authorities in the city. 
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Fotios Kolettis, President of the Florina/Lerin district organization of New Democracy, as part of 
his sworn testimony in the 1998 trial of the Rainbow leaders explains why local authorities acted 
in the way they did against the Rainbow Offices. He asserts that “everybody put the blame for 
the displaying of the sign on the competent authorities of the prefecture (Public Prosecutor - 
Prefecture - Local Council - Police) and they threatened that if the authorities do not intervene to 
remove the specific sign, they will take the law into their own hands and will remove it 
themselves.
208” “The people of Florina,” continues the civil servant, “have fought for many years 
so that this town remained Greek.
209” This claim to law, particularly to an already present law 
which justifies the people in acting against the sign that casts doubt upon the Greek nature of 
Florina/Lerin will need to be addressed and will receive attention later. 
 
While the local leader of New Democracy emphasized the violent feelings which caused political 
and government officials to act against the banner, Michael Tsotskos, local leader of PASOK, 
the recently out of favor center-left party, spoke of the peace that the intervention was intended 
to bring. He testified that: 
Under the present conditions prevalent in the Balkans today, I would say that the above 
action renders only bad services to our country and to the peoples of the Balkans, and I 
fear very much that it serves some transatlantic third parties who have a stake in the 
destabilization of the broader area of the Balkans. Our land, and the broader area, are in 
need of normality, peace, cooperation among its peoples and development. 
 
                                                 
208
 Excerpts from sworn statements in Helsinki Monitor & Minority Rights Group- Greece, Greece 
against its Macedonian minority The Rainbow trial, 81 
209
 Ibid., 82 
141 
 
While it is peace and stability that is emphasized here, the testimony seems to say pretty much 
the same as the one given by Tsotskos’ political opponent in the other party. Namely, that the 
sign disrupts the peace, in this case in the interests of “some [nameless] transatlantic third 
parties.” However, one subtle difference is important to notice between the two claims. The 
difference concerns the current state of the region. If we go back to the statement of Kolettis, we 
see that there was a law referred to. This law, presumably, was that Florina remain a space 
without the national ambiguity introduced by signs with Cyrillic script. His account of the 
violence, then, was based on the premise that the authorities were able to act from a ground of 
law to return Florina/Lerin to an established order. Tsotskos seems to begin his testimony on the 
opposite premise. Specifically he asserts that Our land, and the broader area, are in need of 
normality, peace, cooperation. suggesting that Florina and Aegean (Greek) Macedonia, rather 
than being a settled question, is actually in some turmoil to which this event adds. This disputes 
the idea of authorities acting on previously set law and bringing the community back to an 
original settlement.  
 
The above account of the violence that occurred in Florina/Lerin illustrates what is at stake in 
naming. This case is one where the threat of a renaming provoked a violent reaction that was 
marked by the participation of people who are not usually associated with this sort of action. It is 
clear that the sign, the board bearing the alternative name of the city, was the target of the 
violence and well as those who fabricated it. This is obvious from the charges brought against 
the party leaders that we read above. Those charges focused on the displaying of the sign, 
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particularly the words Lerin Committee in conjunction with the script and the language of that 
name. It was the name, the attempt to rename that led to the charges. Further, the Florina 
criminal court demanded that the sign be removed. We have heard the account of how the mayor 
and the council went to remove the sign and in a ritual involving a patriotic song destroyed the 
sign with fire. This deployment of political leaders, patriotic songs, courts, and fire was primarily 
against the name, or at least signs and papers displaying the name. So, we already begin to 
connect violence with the name.   
 
THE LAW TO COME AND THE PRODUCTION OF PAST VIOLENCE 
The particular problem with the name seems to be associated with the script and language of the 
name. In fact, Greek authorities will not refer to Macedonian as a language at all, and certainly 
won’t call it a ‘Macedonian.’ Above, they refer to the language as the Slavic idiom. This allows a 
much more direct reference to the work of Jacques Derrida on foundations of authority.  
According to Derrida, “the violence of an injustice has begun when all the members of a 
community do not share the same idiom throughout.
210” The leaders of Rainbow, in their 
reference to their city as Lerin, in their demonstration of the “Slavic linguistic idiom” on their 
sign exhibit, in a very literal
211
 fashion, that they employ an idiom which is not shared by the 
community. Remember that, at least according to the testimonies of the authorities, people in the 
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town were offended by the idiomatic use of the name of their town and threatened to take it 
down themselves if the local council did not act.   
 
What was it, in this case, which caused such a violent reaction to the appearance of the foreign 
idiom? What made it foreign? In answering this question we are required to suspend, to a certain 
degree, the structure of time, certainly the order of cause and effect. The separation of these 
idioms, here in the form of the representation of Lerin, a Slavic alternative, is itself a product of 
the violence which it also causes. In the same words that Derrida uses to explain the founding of 
law (generally), the founding of this difference between Lerin and Florina and thus the law 
(specific to this case, written and not) that the city in which Rainbow established offices should 
be referred to only as Florina “consists of a coup de force, of a performative and therefore 
interpretive violence that in itself is neither just nor unjust and that no justice and no previous 
law with its founding anterior moment could guarantee or contradict or invalidate.
212” The 
violence that included the removal of the original sign, the confiscation of the second, cardboard 
sign, and the burning of the carpets in the Rainbow office can be said to be this performative 
coup de force. Then, as well as the violence being directed against the name, the violence 
produces the violence of the name Lerin.  
 
The actions of the Mayor and council produce the violence of the name Lerin insofar as it is part 
of an ongoing violence which creates the foreignness of the Slavic idiom. This makes the 
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violence of the name a product of its own product since the violent property of the name 
becomes apparent only after violence is used to remove the name. Once the alternatives 
Florina/Lerin are created, and once it is accepted that there is a true identity of the city, then 
violence must decide between the two identities. In the sense that it is a product of its own 
product it corresponds precisely to the account that Derrida gives of revolutionary violence. “All 
revolutionary discourses justify the recourse to violence by alleging the founding, in progress or 
to come, of a new law.
213” In our case we have seen how the people of Florina have been 
fighting and (in the case we discuss) are still fighting that Florina remain Greek. In this sense the 
new law, the one that insists, Florina is Greek is still to come in the sense that it is still being held 
up as an ideal that must be defended against doubt caused by Slavic signs. This is clarified in 
Derrida’s explanation that: “As this law to come will in return legitimate, retrospectively, the 
violence that may offend the sense of justice, its future anterior already justifies it.
214” In 
September 1995 agents of a foreign nation, Skopijans in the terms of the Greeks, tried to subvert 
Florina and were rebuffed by the inhabitants. The foreignness of this nation though was not 
decided until after they were rebuffed. In this way, the violence that was perpetrated was 
justified by its effect which was to exorcise the Slavic identity from within its borders. 
It might seem unfair or unusual to retroactively attribute violence to the placing of the sign Lerin. 
If, as I am arguing, the utterance of the name Lerin became a violent act, an act of force, only 
following the violence to remove the name and became violent in the law to come, it might be 
tempting to absolve the authors of the sign from any complicity in the violence. To do so, 
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though, would perform a great disservice to Voskopoulos and his friends. First of all, it would 
identify Rainbow as helpless victims of the oppressive actions of the Greek authorities. It would 
debarb their action in constructing and placing the sign out there in the first place. Surely this is a 
brave attempt at the discovering of the Slavic identity that has until this point been hidden. 
Negating the force of the sign erected by the Rainbow leadership would neutralize their power to 
enact change in their community. As well as ignore the real power that Rainbow has in its illicit 
naming practice, it would be unfair to the Greek population to paint a picture of unidirectional 
violence, a violence in response to a nonviolent act. In order to further clarify exactly what I see 
as violent in the actions of Rainbow, I turn again to Derrida’s work on authority. 
 
VIOLENCE AND THE COVERING AND UNCOVERING OF FLORINA/LERIN 
At this point we have seen how the act of naming can become violent acts through a law to 
come. However, the relationship between force and names does not end there. By means of 
further investigation of the work of Jacques Derrida on the theme, we will see how force was 
employed in Florina/Lerin seeks to suppress the name, to make the name known and, in addition, 
to erase itself from the scene. This break down of violent practices is influenced by Derrida’s 
discussion of Lévi-Strauss’ experience, recorded in Tristes Tropiques where a game played with 
young girls turns into an example of the violence of names. When one little girl is hurt by 
another, she runs to Lévi-Strauss’ and discloses the name of her adversary. This is a remarkable 
event because it is forbidden for the members of the group to use proper names for one another. 
Having understood that her name was being told, the other girl comes and reveals the name of 
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the first in the ear of the visitor. With the encouragement of the anthropologist, the children are 
soon led to reveal the names of the children and then the adults.  
 
The violence in this scene is described by Derrida. “There was in fact a first violence to be 
named.” The extent of this violence, though it is a prerequisite of the story of the war of names, 
only becomes apparent during it. While the people all have been named, the lack of knowledge 
of the name covers over this original violence. It is a violence, however, that is “To think the 
unique within the system, to inscribe it there, such is the gesture of the arche-writing: arche-
violence, loss of the proper…215” For international relations fundamentally, and for our specific 
example of Florina/Lerin, this sort of inscription has implication. In as far as states in the 
international system are said to be sovereign, unique, and independent actors, they should be 
taken as proper to themselves. However, inasmuch as they are named, inscribed into a system 
where they are defined against one another- Macedonia is not Greece, is not Iran- they cannot be 
self-present or self-possessed. In other words, this violent inscription is an attack on “a self-
presence which has never really been given but only dreamed of and always already 
split…incapable of appearing to itself except in its own disappearance.216” 
 
If naming effects an undermining of uniqueness of states, if it makes their existence negative and 
dependent on not being one another, then it does something additional to Florina/Lerin. It is not 
so much that it makes Florina/Lerin dependent upon the other names in the system, rather, since 
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names negate one another, the presence of the name Lerin threatens to negate the name Florina. 
Without an understanding of negotiation between poles, without a conception of identity as a 
back and forth between rival identities where none of the poles are a resting point but merely 
delimit the course travelled, then this threat of negation can appear to undermine what some 
would see as the true identity of the city.   
 
We see from the above account, in statements about inhabitants fighting to maintain the Greek 
identity of their city, that the negotiation of identities that is always present in everyone and in 
every place, indeed, in every name, is not recognized. Rather the struggle  that occurs there is 
framed in a way that there is only one city, Florina, that will be lost forever should it become 
Lerin. So, taking into account the above description of the violence of naming, of inscribing 
names in a system of differences, we are left with the construction ‘Florina is not Lerin.’ In this 
situation, we are forced, by that system of difference, to ask for resolution to the question where 
are we? We are exposed to a violence that says to us that, because Florina is not Lerin, and 
because you are only in one place, this place must be either Lerin or Florina. This is doubly 
violent when we take into consideration that neither Florina nor Lerin can exist self-presently. 
They can only exist negatively as in the formulation Florina is not Lerin. Therefore to choose 
one is more to deny the other than it is to assert that choice. The system of differences itself then 
endows names with a sort of violence where the existence of one name is the negation of the 
other. It promotes violence to maintain the one name under the threat of the other name. 
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Derrida’s second violence is the one which in the story of the quarrelling children is figured by 
the interdiction of the revelation of the proper name. As stated above, the proper name has been 
given and has destroyed the property of the name by inscribing it. However, its concealment by 
decree is another violence associated with the name that “is reparatory, protective, instituting the 
“moral,” prescribing the concealment of writing and the effacement and obliteration of the so 
called proper name, the originary violence…217” In the Florina/Lerin case, this aspect of violence 
would be well hidden if we didn’t know where to look for it. While I provide some background 
of the city above, the account of the case of violence begins with the display of the sign with the 
name Lerin. Somehow, this completely conceals the naming that brought the name Florina into 
being. That is, when we encounter the September case
218
, the city is already called Florina. The 
force that brought that state of affairs into being is buried in the background. Rather, it is 
dispersed between the future and the past. We read in the background section that the area was 
once heavily inhabited by Macedonians who called themselves and their districts by different 
names. From this we deduce that some form of renaming violence, accompanied as it was by 
population exchanges, language suppression. In this way we lose the violence of naming in the 
past. We move it into the future when we move forward from the display of the Lerin sign to the 
violence which sees it ceremonially burned and its authors prosecuted in court. The violence of 
naming the city Florina is thus seen as either a past event or a reaction to the attempted renaming 
of the city. It is this concealment of the originary violence, which we can never really uncover 
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but only move further backwards and forwards into history that constitutes the second form of 
violence.  
 
LAW, AUTHORITY, AND THE NAMING OF FLORINA/LERIN 
Having set out a description of two different kinds of violence and how they play out with 
regards to the naming of Florina/Lerin, I now move forward towards a discussion of Derrida’s 
piece entitled Force of law: The Mystical Foundations of Authority. In my reading of this I 
explore the relationship between violence and the law, violence and authority that has already 
played a role in explaining what happened in FLorina/Lerin in 1995. Following that discussion, 
although it may seem a superfluity, I move to present a link between authorship, authority, and 
name. This connection which we have already been discussing between violence and name, the 
name as violence, the name as authorizing violence, has been useful to understand the event that 
constitutes the moment of this paper. To be clear, and to serve as a reminder, that event is the 
erection of a name-bearing sign, its destruction by violence, and the subsequent court case that 
sought to undo the violence of the destruction that occurred in Florina/Lerin 
Derrida begins his discussion of the law as a force that justifies itself: 
When one translates “to enforce the law” into French by “appliquer la loi,” for example, 
one loses this direct or literal allusion to the force that comes from within to remind us 
that law is always an authorized force, a force that justifies itself or is justified in 
applying itself even if this justification may be judged from elsewhere to be unjust or 
unjustifiable.
219
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First it is worth noticing the concealment of force that Derrida himself performs when he 
translates from English to French. Of course, what is really interesting to us here is the reference 
to force itself. This passage though draws our attention to law as a violence and one which 
justifies itself. We already mentioned a law in the context of the events in Florina/Lerin. Here 
though, we see how Florina being the only name for itself is a law in this context. While we may 
judge the violence used to surpress the name Lerin as unjustified, forcing the point that the city is 
Florina and not Lerin seeks to justify itself in its action. In fighting to remove the possibility of a 
Lerin, Florina authorities enact, or as Derrida points out, enforces the law that the city is only 
known as Florina. It is only a law following the removal of the sign, that is it becomes a law only 
during its enforcement.   
In addition to this idea of law enforcement, there is the expression that law is always an 
authorized force. Here I read the term ‘authorized’ in a very specific way. It is authorized in that 
it is attributed to an author, it gains an author. Because it is the law, let us confine our thoughts to 
the law of the state or the ‘law of the land,’ the authorship of the violence, of the authorized force 
belongs to the state or the local community. Conversely, though, as we have seen, this force 
“justifies itself”. We can talk about this paradox as the violence within the violence. While force 
is attributed to an authorizing subject, it is at the same time the force which justifies itself and so 
needs no author, no authority. We are left with the law as a special sort of violence one which, on 
the one hand, at least in our case, is perpetrated by the correct people, those authorized to use 
force by the sovereign Greek state, but which, on the other, is not beholden to the name of the 
one who practices it because it can justify itself. The actions in Florina/Lerin authorize 
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themselves through enforcing the law this is Florina (not Lerin). They are perpetrated and thus 
authored by the Mayor and the Council.  
 
That which justifies the law, the part of the law that justifies itself, this “fiction,220” is nothing 
more, nothing less, than force. Derrida very deliberately places this force of law within law itself. 
The implication is other than making the obvious claim that “law [is] in the service of force…for 
example an economic, political, ideological power that would exist outside or before it.” Instead, 
goes the claim,  
“the operation that consists of founding, inaugurating, justifying law (droit), making law, 
would consist of a coup de force, of a performative and therefore interpretative violence 
that in itself is neither just nor unjust and that no justice and no previous law with its 
founding anterior moment could guarantee or contradict or invalidate.
221”  
 
At the same time that this explanation produces a self sustained rupture within language, a law 
that can speak for itself and be defined positively, it is yet defined negatively against the 
backdrop of other laws, preexisting laws that are unable to validate it.  
This idea of law might seem quite totalitarian. To accept that laws are authorized only by the 
violence inherent in their enforcement would deny the liberal habit of basing laws on natural 
rights, more recently human rights, utility, or other such justifications which usually explicitly 
renounce violence. For example, we saw that the testimony of the local PASOK leader in Florina 
justifies the violence of the authorities with the words: “Our land, and the broader area, are in 
need of normality, peace, cooperation among its peoples and development.” This specifically 
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denies the enforcement of the law, the violence of it by stating that the government’s actions 
were to restore peace. In arguing that law authorizes itself, establishes itself under its own force, 
we are putting ourselves in opposition to this sort of justification.  
 
What makes this conception of law much less totalitarian is when we consider that both the 
naming and the renaming of Florina/Lerin were laws in this sense. Neither set of actions are 
justified by any source beyond themselves. As covered in chapter 3, names are unjustifiable. 
There is no recourse to any outside authority such as geographic features that can determine the 
name of a person or a city. The sign and its burning are therefore only justified from within 
themselves. However, the fact that both events are justified in this democratizes the naming 
process. The law: this is Lerin is held in equal standing with its rival law: this is Florina. We can 
no more say that those erecting the sign have any more or less right to do so than those who 
burned it. This undermines any attempt to a dictatorship of names where we recognize one as 
being more right than the other. So, it is clear why Florina/Lerin is used throughout this chapter.  
 
It is then possible to take a position where this performative violence has a relationship with laws 
that have already been somehow established. It is a negative relationship where the rupture 
caused by the performative violence cannot be supported or invalidated by the current law. A 
new law, one that is a real rupture, can only be said to contain this violence should we be able to 
show that it is neither allowed nor disallowed by current law. This is significant in the sense that 
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it allows us a law by which to judge whether a specific violence is this performative, ‘legal222’ 
violence.  It is also important in that it suggest the following problem with the idea of an original 
law.  
 
If what I am calling a rupture here, and I use it with reference to the emergence of a new sign in 
a system of signs, here laws, can only be defined negatively, against a preexisting set of laws 
that, however, can neither justify nor invalidate the law, then how can the first rupture have 
occurred? In the same way that language can only have come on the scene according to an 
always already present model, so too must law have come about that way. An originary violence 
that was not a violence in that it did not rupture or disturb what was there because it came when 
nothing was there.  
 
The relationship between violence, law, and its author is a complicated one. Above, I have 
claimed that the self-authorizing violence connected to law is both within law and without. That 
is, the violence is authorized both by itself, itself as author, and from without. This is a result of 
my double reading of the word authorized in the above passage cited from Derrida. As well as in 
the sense of being made authoritative, I am using authorize with the meaning that an author of 
the violence is brought into being by the violence. It authorizes itself because there is no law that 
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either confirms its legitimacy or precludes its possibility. It also authorizes itself by constituting 
its own author, bringing into being an actor, an auctor.
223
  
 
Taking what we have said above about self- authorization along with Schmitt’s theory of 
sovereignty, we can democratize sovereignty in a way that multiplies sovereigns. As Schmitt 
famously opens his Political Theology “Sovereign is he who decides on the exception.” He 
further explains this as follows: 
About an abstract concept there will be in general no argument, least of all in the history 
of sovereignty.  What is argued about is the concrete application, and that means who 
decides in a situation of conflict what constitutes the public interest or interest of the 
state, public interest or order le salut publique, and so on.  
 
This reference to a ‘who,’ to a deciding actor, an actor on behalf of the public is what I wish to 
draw attention to here. In the double understanding of authorization this ‘who’ constitutes a split 
in the ideal of sovereignty, a split between violence and the actor that I have said that violence 
brings about and is perpetrated by. 
 
Also, as well as the one who decides, I wish to include in the sovereign the one who does not 
decide. Or rather, the one who undecides the already decided. This undecision is also a violence, 
one which reveals what has been hidden, or speaks that which was erased. In the specific case of 
names, it pronounces a forbidden, or hidden name, which reminds us of the negotiation between 
alternative names spoken of in a previous chapter that is a prominent landmark in this discussion 
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of Florina/Lerin. The negotiation, never really resolved yet perhaps driven underground, is 
violently interjected where stillness seemed to dwell and so: decided becomes undecided.  
 
One thing that we see in the particular example of Florina/Lerin is the multiple actors, the 
multiple deciders. There are those who decide and those who undecide. This, I argue constitutes 
a dispersion of violence that constitutes many sovereigns, it distributes sovereignty to people 
who act. This multiplicity undermines a view of sovereignty as  
“a homogeneous and continuous presence that is hierarchically ordered, that has a unique centre 
of decision presiding over a coherent ‘self’, and that is demarcated from, and in opposition to, an 
external domain of difference…224”  
 
It denies every part of this ideal including any coherent ‘self’ that some actors would want to 
produce. It takes Hobbes’ mythical bellum omnium contra omnes as being unresolved by the 
invention of the supposed Leviathan- nation-state. It controverts any sense of a peaceful 
domestic sphere in opposition to “an external domain of difference.”  
This explanation of law, violence, naming, and authorization helps us to better understand what 
was going on in Florina/Lerin in 1995. It helps us to understand the nature of the violence of 
naming and renaming. In no way, though, is this discussion of violence and naming restricted to 
this one case. Foundational violence and democratized sovereignty plays out everywhere. To 
stay with  Derrida, he gives an account of the imposition of the French language on France. It is 
already easy to see how this example would parallel the Florina/Lerin case that we now consider. 
“One founding violence of the law or of the imposition of state law has consisted in imposing a 
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language on national or ethnic minorities.
225” This statement both supports what we said earlier 
that the violence surrounding Rainbow’s sign being an expression of this sort of founding 
violence and sets up the example of France. 
 
France experienced this violence “on at least two occasions first  the Villers- Cotteret decree 
consolidated the unity of the monarchic state by imposing French and by forbiddingLatin.226”The 
second occasion was “the French Revolution, when linguistic unification sometimes took the 
most repressive pedagogical turns.
227” In mentioning the first example, Derrida does not let the 
Latin that was replaced off lightly. “It is true,” he says, “that Latin was already a violent 
imposition and that from this point of view the passage from Latin to French was only the 
passage from one violence to another.
228” While we have seen the imposition of Greek upon the 
Slavic minority in this paper we have not seen the prior imposition of Slavic languages on the 
inhabitants of what is northern Greece (other than in the case we now consider.) Further, we have 
not investigated the imposition of the Cyrillic alphabet by Greek monks on the Slavs themselves. 
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CHAPTER 6 
CONCLUSION 
This project set out to investigate names and naming practices in international politics. We 
proceeded on the basis that names failed to fulfill their promise as indicator of stable identities 
throughout time and across space. We wanted to look at how actors in global politics used this 
failing to make life go on. People often want to move. They flee from violence, they want to 
return home. What is the role of naming in this? How are people allowed to move or prevented 
from doing so because of their names. How does movement affect your name, the name of your 
parents and the name of your home? What about toponyms? How are they deployed to move 
whole peoples from one place to another and how do they prevent those people from returning? 
These are the questions that we found and discussed as we contemplated names and naming and 
their consequences for people and states.  
 
The study focused on the experience of Aegean Macedonians, mostly those who were evacuated 
shortly before the end of the Greek Civil War. In world politics, it is probable that the case of 
Macedonia is, if certainly not the only one, the best known and the most salient naming dispute. 
It probably gets the most attention in western media because the Republic of Macedonia’s entry 
into both NATO and the European Union are being blocked because of protests from Greece 
regarding its name. These consequences of naming may have some impact on the day to day 
lives of people in Macedonia. What I have focused on here, though, are the more personal effects 
of naming, rather than the dispute over the name of Macedonia, on people. 
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The Aegean Macedonians are especially implicated in this most famous of name disputes. 
Having been born in Greece, and having been assigned Greek identities by the authorities there, 
many now live in the Republic of Macedonia. When the Greek government dispute the name of 
their northern neighbor they also dispute the names of these Macedonians born in Greece. 
Particularly, I have looked at their ability to be at home in the various places that they have 
travelled. Being at home, being a guest, passing border posts, and making new lives for 
themselves in foreign lands all depended on the name that they could negotiate for themselves 
and for their people. It is the Aegean Macedonians, then, that have most obviously been 
implicated in this naming dispute in terms of their personal life. Living in this situation has also 
made them most clearly involved in practices that seek to name them, particularly those that seek 
to associate their names with Greece of with Macedonia. 
 
In this chapter we will first discuss some of the empirical findings of this study. Through 
interviews, participant observation, and the reading of archival information, I saw some things 
happening that I described in my other chapters. I found that naming practices associated with 
borders happened deep within national boundaries, names are a result of negotiation and are 
never simply determined by their bearers, names of places affect movement and attachment of 
people through them and to them, names are supported with reference to other names, but they 
also contain their own force or violence by which the name justifies itself. It is fitting to start this 
chapter with a discussion of how we have come to these conclusions before moving on to discuss 
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their implications for both theory and policy and finishing with some possible expansions for this 
research. 
We saw how discursive practices of naming can occur at border crossings. In the case of the 
Aegean Macedonians, the naming practices started long before their encounter with the Greek 
authorities. Dozens of miles before the border, the leader of our group was already involved in 
identity negotiation with the rest of the company. In anticipation of the Greek authorities and 
remembering past events were others had been denied entry into Greece for using their 
Macedonian names and places of birth as answers to Greek questions, Donevski advised the use 
of Greek personal names and Greek toponyms in order to secure entry to Greece. The power of 
the border extended well beyond the time and place were the crossing actually took place. Both 
the past border, where some were denied entry on the basis that the places they were born never 
existed, and the future border, the one we would cross later that day, effected a naming practice 
on the bus before we had reached the official crossing. Naming practices are therefore not neatly 
contained in certain spaces and are not confined to certain times.  
Names are never really owned by their bearers but are the result of a negotiation between the 
bearers and those who would give them hospitality. We saw this also on the bus, this time at the 
border crossing, when the border guard boarded our bus and started asking questions. Already 
primed by our leader to use Greek versions of their Macedonian names or to use the Greek 
names they knew they had been given by Greek town halls more than half a century earlier, the 
passengers on the bus attempted to give these. For some it was easy, they knew their Greek 
names. For others though, it was not that simple. They had never heard their Greek names and 
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didn’t know enough about the language to formulate a convincing one out of their Macedonian 
name. Later, in the town hall, one lady guessed her Greek name and got it wrong. Their 
ignorance of their Greek names and their quick manufacture of one for the occasion 
demonstrates how these names did not belong to the bearers. While some had them on the tips of 
their tongue for use in such situations, others did not have them at their command. These names 
became theirs only for a brief time, only when coached by their leader, and only when asked by a 
Greek border police officer or town hall administrator. Their names were not their own. 
 
Change in names can really upset the topography of a place. Names are negotiated, never 
permanent. A change in name though can make a place unfamiliar. Aegean Macedonians, going 
to visit their homes, a place they expected to be familiar with, when confronted with the new 
names given to Aegean Macedonian villages and towns were disoriented in their own home. And 
it is not only the travelers on that bus who were disoriented by the change of names. Can we ever 
really answer the question whether or not the Aegean Macedonians, in moving to the Republic of 
Macedonia returned to their home or not? Furthermore, those who fled to Pirin Macedonia 
thinking that there they would be home and finding that they had to become Bulgarians to remain 
there surely found themselves on the wrong end of naming. Or rather, they did not retain control 
over the meaning of the names they claimed as their own. 
 
The example of those who found themselves not at home in Pirin Macedonia brings us to another 
observation that matching a toponym to a demonym does not always afford people a homeland. 
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While the man I interviewed who explained his decision to move to Bulgaria and away from it 
was a Macedonian, while he moved to Pirin Macedonia and so identified himself with the 
country he was living in, nevertheless he found that he was not at home in Pirin Macedonia. His 
situation was complicated by another name, Bulgaria, which he had to take on in order to stay in 
Pirin Macedonia.  
 
We can further see from this experience that names do not enjoy hegemony over territory. In 
Pirin Macedonia, the name Macedonia is not enough to label the territory. We have to add names 
like Pirin and Bulgaria. In so doing, we complicate the link between demonym and toponym. 
Only when we have a Pirin Macedonian or a Bulgarian Macedonian, as opposed to just a 
Macedonian, can we more safely link them with the land described with those names. This 
multiple names inhabiting one space model complicates and confuses the linking of people to 
spaces. It also complicates their movement. We saw that those who moved to Yugoslavia 
described this as a move to Macedonia, to the free part of their land. With both possibilities, 
Yugoslavia and Macedonia open it allows both narratives that describe those who fled as exiles 
in Yugoslavia and those that describe them as moving to another part of their land. Taking these 
as different sorts of movement, the multiple names attributable to one part of the country make it 
impossible to finally decide whether a group of people are exiles, a diaspora, at home, etc. 
 
Further complicating this connection of demonym and toponym, is the possibility of division 
between ours and theirs even within a single demonym.  We saw this when we looked at the 
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tension between the Aegean Macedonians and the locals in the Socialist Republic of Macedonia. 
When issues such as housing arose, there was a tendency both in local authorities and in refugee 
groups to see one set of Macedonians as theirs and another set of Macedonians as almost 
foreigners. This might be expected and may seem like a well known phenomenon. When we 
look its implications for names and naming though, it becomes a very serious problem. If being 
Macedonian is not enough to belong, to be at home, in Macedonia, then the link between 
demonym and toponym is very much undermined. This does serious damage to the idea of 
national self-determination. 
 
Names cannot stand for themselves but are underwritten by other names. In the town hall, the 
worker there asked the birth certificate applicants to show him identification to prove that they 
really were the names that they said they were. Again, they had given Greek names, this time 
because their records in Greek would be found under those names, but, to prove them, they 
offered their (Macedonian) passports. The administrator did not want to accept their passports as 
proof of their names because he did not recognize the name on the front of the passport. Without 
the well known and recognized name of a state to guarantee the name of the bearer of the 
passport, their names and identities were questioned. This situation was also negotiated however, 
since the worker did eventually agree to look up the names in his record book and found two of 
the names.  
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Finally we have seen how names contain a force within them similar to the force of law. Names 
can be enforced by violence and this violence can reveal the earlier violence of naming. In 
Florina/Lerin, the violence perpetrated by some town officials against a sign that through into 
question the name of the city was a case of violent renaming. This violence further revealed the 
violent imposition of the name Lerin and, by association the equally forceful renaming.  
 
The research supports the conception of the name that I connected with Susan Bean and JS Mill 
in chapter two of this dissertation. The lack of a connection between physical or other features 
and the name allows some of our conclusions. Firstly, since this connection doesn’t exist, a 
situation can arrive where one place has more than one name. I have described that phenomenon 
in this chapter by saying that a name does not exercise hegemony over a specific territory. This 
doesn’t only go for territory but for people also. There are is no way to move from physical 
features to name or vice-versa in a way that makes one name right and the other wrong. The 
Aegean Macedonians are equally their Macedonian name and their Greek name. There is no way 
to decide and any decisions are made in negotiation with time, space, and potential hosts or 
guests. Similarly, Florina/Lerin is as much Florina as Lerin and no appeal to geography or 
history can make one of those names more correct. If, contrary to Bean and Mill, there were 
some way to decide from the geography of Florina/Lerin, or the physical make up of the Aegean 
Macedonians then we could decide by an appeal to something outside of politics what the real 
names were and we would not see the negotiation that we saw on the bus nor the violence we 
saw in Florina/Lerin. 
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Kofos’ worry that anyone who can control the name Macedonia can control its culture, history, 
and land
229
 is misplaced. One of our findings is that names are never really owned by their 
bearers and I will extend that slightly in this context and say that they are never controlled by 
anyone. In the last chapter we talked about polysemy vs. dissemination. We have concluded that 
names are the product of negotiation and are temporary in that they are only valid within the 
negotiation that is taking place. Therefore, no one person or entity controls the name and Kofos 
therefore has nothing to worry about in that regard.  
 
Another of the conclusions from this project is that there are divisions within demonyms. 
Therefore, my second reassurance to Kofos is that that even were some entity or people able to 
somehow control the meaning of the name Macedonia, or Macedonians, it is unlikely that this 
name would be relevant to all people who could be called by it. In fact, Kofos aids me in this 
argument. He divides Μακεδόνες from Македонци and in doing so really supports the 
conclusion. Any attempts to control the name Macedonian would be likely to go the way of the 
Bulgarian attempts to do so as described in chapter four or even the attempts to unite Aegean and 
Vardar Macedonians described in the same chapter.  
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I also find support in these conclusions for the use of naming as securing.
230
 The topography can 
be altered radically by renaming places. The way I have shown this in the project is through the 
experience of the Aegean Macedonians’ disorientation on returning to their native regions. They 
came equipped with names for the landscape and inhabited parts of it that differed from the 
names on the signposts. This led to attempts to convert the names on the signs to names they 
knew. The unfamiliarity of many of the Greek names for their villages and mountains made the 
landscape more difficult to navigate for the Aegean Macedonians on the bus. Similarly, in Milan 
Kundera’s novel discussed in chapter three, the Russian troops were disoriented by a lack of 
names. Rose-Redwood, Alderman, and Azaryhu’s argument that American forces secured 
Baghdad partly through the use of naming, finds support in this dissertation.  
 
We can also find significance in our empirical findings for the theory of Lyotard. Control over 
the meaning of the name, fixing the meaning and creating a knowable reality using names as the 
lynchpin proves absolutely impossible. With so many meanings attachable to each name, and no 
way to decide between them, each name is expected to bind infinite meaning to each ‘here’ or to 
each ‘him’ or ‘her.’ What we are left with then is not a model of a fixed reality built on a 
collection of ‘heres’ and ‘thems’ each impregnated with meaning by names. Following this 
study, every here has more than one name where each name affixes infinite meaning to the here. 
We have people with more than one name attaching infinite meaning with each name. In short, 
the fixing of reality through naming results in numberless heres occupying each unit of space and 
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unlimited subjectivities for each legal person. These heres and these subjectivities are always in 
the process of negotiation.  
 
This dissertation has also added to the literature on diaspora. Since diaspora is so dependent on 
space: a homeland and distance from that homeland, projects like this one, that complicate space 
make diaspora contingent on politics. My discussion in chapter four of political movement 
describes this dependence. Names and naming alter boundaries as negotiations progress. What is 
your homeland in one occurrence of discursive practice can easily change during another. The 
quality and characteristics of the space are changed through the negotiation of names. Without a 
homeland to be away from and to dream of return to, diaspora becomes a concept that is hard to 
really talk about. Now, what we have seen in this project does not suggest that we cannot talk of 
a homeland at all. It doesn’t completely negate any idea of diaspora. It does however, make 
space contingent on politics and on negotiation and so firmly positions diaspora into the 
contingent and political realm. Remember, the status of the Aegean Macedonians in the Socialist 
Republic of Macedonian was both host and guest, even in the same speech. 
 
There are implications in this study for the currently fashionable fascination with identity cards, 
biometric passports, stricter airport security measures, etc. These attempts to affix meanings 
related to security to names and then to affix those names to people are, like the attempts 
discussed in this dissertation, bound to fail. Since all that can be known about a person is still to 
be written, the meaning attached to anyone is always incomplete. Information known about that 
person is the result of negotiation, is contingent, and contradictory. One person may have several 
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names, each associated with different, or the same, meanings that would be attached to him or 
her by security groups. With such an inability to say exactly who it is that is immigrating to the 
homeland or boarding an airplane, those charged with preventing the dangerous people are going 
to have to work very hard to justify their positions.  
 
Another result of this inability to positively identify, to absolutely fix a name that means 
something in itself, something stable and non-contradictory, is to assuage the fears of those who 
worry about the power of government and others to know too much about them. It is tempting to 
worry that governments can gather personal data – data that reveals the real you, your views and 
intentions, your interests and concerns. However, any identity that you have is a negotiated one 
and one that is contingent upon time and circumstances. You are not the final arbiter of your 
identity but neither is any other agency. Attempts to pin your identity to an intelligible narrative 
that endures over time and space will fail.  
 
This theme of stable subjectivities can be applied to states. One way to broaden this study would 
be to look at how nation states, perhaps some of the successful ones like Greece and France that 
are both mentioned here, have gotten away with their claims to have endured over time. Further 
claims to have stood for certain values over that time would be even harder to defend yet states 
seem to get away with it. How does the present past and future of the United States, that of a 
state committed to human rights and the defense of democracy over centuries, persist despite 
strong contradictions? This is the next step to this study. Since this study shows the contingency 
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and arbitrariness of names and naming, how do some names endure and their contradictions 
seem to be hidden or perhaps ignored. If border crossings, their approaches, political speeches, 
movement, and exiles are sites of naming practices that affect persons, which ones affect names 
of states. We have seen names of states negotiated too in this project in those same sites but I 
think there are more of these practices to look at, some of which might be peculiar to states.  
 
Names and naming practices are significant in the lives of mobile populations and in the 
relations between the states that they move between. Names are also foundationless and unable 
to be stabilized by a sovereign center despite efforts, often on the part of nation states, to do so. 
This makes them a complicated and legitimate site for further investigation. In the cases 
discussed in this project, we have seen unsuccessful attempts to stop the to and fro of the 
negotiation that constitutes naming practice. We have seen this negotiation used for political 
purposes and exploited successfully by people to enable the continuation of movement. This is a 
positive message to people whose home consists of multiple sites the borders of which are in flux 
and negotiation.  
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